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ABSTRACT
The objective of this thesis is to examine various trends
in domestic and marriage patterns among a rural population
in the Blue Nile rainlands in Northern Sudan in the context of
the shift to a more intensive system of farming, characterised
by new forms of socio-economic differentiation. The theoretical
and methodological framework of the thesis is provided by a
discussion of Goody's comparative analysis of productive sys¬
tems and domestic institutions. Particular attention is given to
his treatment of marriage payments in the context of the variat¬
ions in Muslim marriage payments. I argue that where a subs¬
tantial proportion of the marriage goods are given to the bride
by the bridegroom, this kind of marriage payment constitutes
what Goody calls 'indirect dowry*. However, I suggest that in¬
tensification of such payments may occur relatively independent¬
ly of the system of transmission of property, since dowry pay¬
ments are more concerned with the expression of differential
life-styles, than with property relations as such.
New property relations have emerged with the uneven transform¬
ation of an extensive system of farming based on hoe cultivat¬
ion, supplemented by animal herding, to a more intensive sys¬
tem entailing the use of the plough in rainland cultivation and
new methods of irrigation in riverain gardens. Economic differ¬
entiation has occurred through the adoption of different labour
migration patterns and farming strategies. On the one hand,
seasonal agricultural labour supports the maintenance of tradit¬
ional patrimonies operated mainly by family labour; on the
other, regular employment in non-agricultural occupations, and
petty-trading and larger commercial activities, provide cash for
investment in small-scale capitalist farming enterprises. In
examining these processes I pay particular attention to chang¬
ing patterns of female participation in farming activities, and
to new forms of provision for women. While many unpaid female
activities are replaced by male paid services, many women are
nonetheless drawn into new forms of agricultural wage labour
that have arisen with the grov/th of commodity production.
The main trends in marriage that are discussed are the in¬
crease in marriage payments, especially goods given to the
bride, the elaboration of wedding ceremonial, the deferred age
at marriage, and the increase in marriage stability with the
decline in the rate of divorce, remarriage and polygamy. These
tendencies are associated less with the system of transmission
of property and more with the establishment of a conjugal
fund, derived mainly from achieved earnings; through the con¬
jugal fund differential life-styles are expressed.
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The purpose of this thesis may be defined as twofold: first, to
examine the process of economic differentiation among a rural
population in central Sudan, and to account for the varied con¬
tribution of women to farming activities; and second, to exam¬
ine changes in marriage payments and trends in marriage patt¬
erns in the course of the emergence of differentiated life¬
styles. In brief, it may be said I am interested in the relation¬
ship between particular systems of production and domestic
institutions. More specifically I am interested in the way
changes related to the intensification of agricultural production
and the emergence of new forms of socio-economic differentiation
affect the processes whereby social reproduction is carried out.
By social reproduction I do not mean some abstract formulation
according to which the social relations of production or mode
of production are reproduced. I refer to the social and cultural
practices in which the human needs for food, shelter, care, sex
and recreation are met; and also the manner in which the gen¬
erations replace each other, not only in a biological sense,
but, more importantly, transmitting with them their customs and
stores of social knowledge, their specific forms of property and
social distinctions. Since in the society in question familial rel¬
ations provide the main locus for social reproduction, I will
be concerned with patterns of family organisation and trends
within the institution of marriage. I will address particular
attention to patterns of domestic consumption, the nature of
marriage payments, and the frequency and durability of marr¬
iages.
At the empirical level of study which fieldwork entails, causal
factors are revealed as complex, and never one-directional. A
materialist analysis which has real explanatory value must em¬
brace an empathic approach which takes cognisance of the full
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range of factors involved in social processes. But at the same
time a materialist approach necessarily involves giving greater
weighting to certain factors rather than others. This entails
making reasoned associations, assessing the relative influence
of a number of factors, establishing the main direction of
cause and effect, and the testing of findings whenever poss¬
ible. This approach is neither more nor less fallible than other
approaches, and must be evaluated in relation to its authentic¬
ity in portraying reality 'out-there*, and according to its ex¬
planatory value. Thus in identifying factors related to the sys¬
tem of production as conducive to particular trends in domestic
institutions, I acknowledge the presence of other factors, which
may complement the key factor or which may pull in other dir¬
ections. I trust that in the presentation of my argument I take
sufficient account of these other forces which are involved. As
will become clear shortly, my general hypotheses are hardly
original; in fact they serve more as a test of the wider formul¬
ations of Goody and others that I consider in a moment. How¬
ever it is a test carried out in a cultural area which has been
held by some writers to confound these wider formulations
which postulate a vectorial correlation between particular prod¬
uctive systems and associated domestic institutions.
Sudan is an enormous country, almost one million square miles,
comprising markedly different terrains, ranging from desert and
savanna lands to tropical forests. Consequently many different
kinds of farming systems are found there. Historically the
areas which have attracted the most dense settlement have been
the riverain lands since these afford the potentiality of more
intensive utilisation through irrigation. As a result of such dev¬
elopments many areas adjoining the riverain lands are in a
state of transition from extensive rain-fed cultivation to more
intensive irrigated cultivation. This is the case in the area in
which I carried out my field research.
The population that form the subject of this study inhabit the
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east bank of the Blue Nile in the Gezira Province of the Sudan;
they are Muslim and Arabic-speaking. Formerly the population
subsisted from the rainland cultivation of sorghum millet, com¬
bined with the herding of sheep, goats, cows and camels. Cult¬
ivation was performed by hoe in semi-permanent fields; animal
herding involved the use of both local and distant pastures,
depending on the size of herds and the kind of livestock. Dur¬
ing this century this area has witnessed the decline in animal
herding, the commercialisation of rainland cultivation and the
intensification of production in riverain gardens through the
introduction of pumps. These changes have been accompanied
by an increase in population and an increase in both seasonal
and permanent migration from the area to the towns and neigh¬
bouring irrigated schemes. Some of these changes date from the
implementation of the famous Gezira Project between the two
World Wars, but others arise from political and economic forces
which predate this important venture.
New forms of socio-economic differentiation have emerged in con¬
nexion with these changes. Before the spread of monetarised
relations there was little distinction between the life-style of
the tribal and religious leaders and that of their followers.
Nearly everyone was engaged to some extent in subsistence act¬
ivities, notwithstanding the existence of long-distance trade
routes and the varying contacts of local communities with wider
state formations, which came into being largely through their
control of these trade routes. Today the circulation of money
and differential access to it and to other forms of property has
increasingly undermined traditional forms of social organisat¬
ion. The operation of capital and the circulation of a wider
range of commodities has brought about new forms of socio-econ¬
omic differentiation, transforming both the individual's relation
to the means of production and the life-style which he and his
family enjoy.
It is in the framework of these changes that I wish to pursue
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the two interrelated objectives outlined at the beginning of the
chapter. The work of both Boserup and Goody has a clear bear¬
ing on this project.1 Both Boserup and Goody are interested in
the relationship between specific systems of production, as char¬
acterised by particular farming techniques and level of intens¬
ity, and forms of domestic organisation, especially those con¬
cerning the relations between the sexes. Boserup is more con¬
cerned with the social and economic status of women, their
participation rates in agricultural work, and the conditions
leading to their seclusion within the home. Goody's approach
deals with a wider complex of domestic institutions, such as
the manner in which familial property is transmitted, marriage
payments, marriage choices and different familial roles. Both,
however, accord a preeminent position to the level of intensity
at which specific farming systems operate as a conditioning fac¬
tor of types of domestic institutions. Both recognise major diff¬
erences between societies which cultivate extensively by means
of hoe and those which cultivate intensively by means of
plough or with resort to irrigation.
The changes which have occurred among the population that 1
studied may be interpreted as constituting a transition to the
second type of farming system, characterised by the use of the
plough and irrigation. Although cultivation by hoe is still
practised, it is on a much smaller scale, and the patterns of
cooperative work traditionally associated with it have long
since lapsed. Even before the widespread introduction of plough¬
ing of rainlands and the installation of pumps in riverain gar¬
dens, the inhabitants of the east bank of the Blue Nile have
been affected by the introduction of irrigated farming in the
neighbouring Gezira area, between the Blue and White Niles.
Thus this shift to a more intensive system of agricultural prod¬
uction provides a relevant case-study for testing the broad
1. E.Boserup: Woman's Role in Economic Development. London, 1970.
J.Goody: Production and Reproduction. Cambridge, 1976.
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comparative findings of Boserup and Goody.
Here I must mention some of the difficulties posed by an histor¬
ical approach to the study of domestic institutions. In the first
place, even though important insights may be gained by compar¬
ison with social groups where hoe cultivation is still practised,
the evidence for earlier domestic practices is far from adequate.
Information collected from present-day informants, whose view
of the past is necessarily a coloured one, can be taken only
as a general guide. Local written sources which are pertinent
to these issues are scarce, and early census material complete¬
ly absent - the first National Census in Sudan was carried out
in 1951. Moreover, in so far as domestic institutions serve to
transmit many customary forms of behaviour, they themselves
may be resilient to change. Many of the trends in domestic and
marriage patterns that I discuss are assessed in the time-span
of living generations; a much longer time-span would, of
course, be desirable, but the absence of reliable data for ear¬
lier generations precludes this. Nevertheless, in spite of these
difficulties, I do not consider that they are such as to invali¬
date my project to test the comparative findings of Boserup and
Goody. Another point I wish to raise here is that some writers
have objected that Goody has paid little attention to the Middle
East, and that this area provides many cases, which fit un¬
easily into his comparative framework.1 Since Goody's approach
has been held by Comaroff to lack demonstration (p. 10), this
thesis may be considered as providing such an exercise. I will
return to the specific objections to Goody's treatment of marr¬
iage payments later in this introduction.
First I wish to examine the position of Boserup, particularly
her arguments concerning the participation of women in farming
activities. For the sexual division of labour clearly has import¬
ant implications for domestic organisation and institutions,
1. J.L.Comaroff (ed.): The Meaning of Marriage Payments. London, 1980.
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though Goody would see a less direct relation between this fact¬
or and forms of marriage and marriage payment than does Bos-
erup in this respect. Boserup argues that there are two related
factors which influence the participation of women in farming
activities. The first concerns the techniques of agricultural
production. ¥here hoe cultivation is dominant, women tend to
perform the largest share of agricultural work. By contrast,
where permanent fields are cultivated and the plough is used,
male labour tends to predominate. Women may nonetheless play
a significant part in weeding and harvesting. The second fact¬
or is the form of social hierarchy which tends to accompany
the conditions which make possible or necessary the permanence
of settlements and cultivation areas, and the use of more inten¬
sive techniques such as ploughing and irrigation. In these cir¬
cumstances, a portion of the population, whether through being
landless, or not having sufficient land, are forced to sell their
labour to other farmers. The participation of women tends to
vary with their position in the social hierarchy. Among the
landowning families which hire labourers the women tend not
to work in the fields, but are afforded the seclusion of the
home. Among the small-holding farmers the women may continue
to work on the family plot especially at peak periods during
the cultivation cycle. But with those families which possess no
land or very small plots the women may contribute a substant¬
ial proportion of the labour provided by their families to the
landowners. As for the contribution of female labour to partic¬
ular tasks, female labour may be displaced by male labour in
certain activities; for example, ploughing tends almost univer¬
sally to be a male task. However, depending on the actual
form of agricultural intensification, new labour-intensive tasks
may be created, thus encouraging the continued contribution of
women in farming activities; cotton-picking and the transplant¬
ing of rice seedlings are examples of such activities. However,
as stated before, not all women are engaged in these activit¬
ies. The production of a sufficient surplus and the hierarchical
ordering of social relations allows a large number of women to
- 7 -
devote themselves primarily to domestic activities. Boserup
associates the seclusion of women and the use of the veil with
these intensive farming systems which release a section of the
population from subsistence activities.
This approach appears to have greater explanatory value than
those arguments which consider that the withdrawal of women's
labour outside the home is largely the consequence of particul¬
ar cultural traditions. Many writers on the Middle East argue
from the premise that women's work outside the home is not com¬
patible with conformity to the strict precepts of Islam. Trends
towards the more rigorous seclusion of women are seen, accord¬
ing to this approach, as the result of the emanation of orthod¬
ox Islamic practices from urban centres into the countryside.
I would not deny that there are many passages in the Koran
which exhort the modesty of women and demand adequate prov¬
ision for them; the latter precept, made in the context of marr¬
iage and divorce, is taken as the source of the compulsory
marriage payment, which the bridegroom must bestow on his
bride. Together with the detailed prescriptions concerning the
shares of inheritance which women are entitled to, these pass¬
ages clearly propose that Muslim women should be endowed with
property, and at the same time they should be enjoined to con¬
duct themselves with modesty and propriety. Although the Koran
itself implicitly associates women's property rights and restrict¬
ions on their free behaviour, most writers that stress the imp¬
ortance of values in determining the position of women are
reluctant to see this connexion. Thus while they recognise that
within an Islamic culture there may exist considerable variat¬
ions in the extent of conformity to orthodox Islamic practices,
they are unable to explain adequately the reasons for these
variations. In short, allegiance to particular beliefs and val¬
ues is not considered problematic by the adherents of this
approach.
In the chapter which deals with strategies in rainland cultivat-
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ion and the sexual division of labour in these tasks, 1 will
challenge a variant of the line of argument just referred to,
since it is often put forward in Sudanese sociological writings.
This explanation holds that women are prepared to perform
agricultural work if it entails work on family plots in the com¬
pany of family members or kin. However, cultural values serve
to constrain women from working alongside hired labourers, who
are frequently men from outside the locality. Some women are
forced to work for wages alongside male non-kin, but they
would not do so if they could possibly avoid it. Thus work on
family plots is seen as being an extension of domestic work,
and thus permissible. On the other hand contact with hired lab¬
ourers is seen as constituting a threat to the virtue and modest-
y of these women, and thereby to the honour of their families.
I will assess the force of this argument in relation to my re¬
search findings in Chapter A. Here I wish to raise two general
points which appear to question its validity. In the first
place, if the threat of contact with strangers is considered
such an important value as to constrain women from working
outside the home, then other situations in which women come
into contact with stranger men must also be considered. How¬
ever, Sudanese women of all social backgrounds come into con¬
tact with strangers in the market-place when they go there to
purchase consumer goods. Admittedly girls of marriageable age
rarely make such purchases, but transactions between married
women of all ages and male shopkeepers are commonplace. No
elaborate ritual surrounds these transactions in the market¬
place; indeed they are often characterised by lively conversat¬
ion or informed criticism of the quality or price of goods. This
indicates that there is little force in the argument that contact
with stranger men per se constitutes a threat to the modesty
of women. In some Muslim societies, as well as some non-Muslim
ones, it is true that particular groups of women may be com¬
pletely confined to the home. Here I merely wish to point to
the dangers of generalising and exaggerating the significance
of a particular set of values. Secondly, 1 would add that cert-
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ain forms of work performed by women in the Sudan, such as
teaching and secretarial work, entail contact with unrelated
men, often in restricted space; however, these kinds of employ¬
ment are widely, though not universally, considered as being
'acceptable'.
I wish now to return to Boserup's position, and consider its
relevance to my area of research. First I will consider hoe cult¬
ivation in the rainlands as it is practised today. Then I will
consider how these practices differ from the period when hoe
cultivation was the standard pattern of farming. Finally I will
examine the significance of the introduction of ploughs and hir¬
ing of labour services. Throughout these changes the main crop
has been sorghum millet. Cultivation by hoe is carried out in
large fields bounded by low earthen ridges which prevent run¬
off of water. Men prepare pockets in the soil by means of the
hoe, or more accurately digging-stick, and the seeds are gener¬
ally inserted by women and children. Weeding is performed by
both sexes. At the harvest women reap the heads of grain,
while men cut the stalks and thresh the grain. Single women
may and do perform all these tasks, but generally there is a
sexual division of labour such as I have outlined. Each nuc¬
lear family acts as an independent productive unit; when addit¬
ional labour is required, hired labour of either sex is recruit¬
ed according to the nature of the task. In the past cooperative
work parties were recruited on the basis of kinship and other
social ties; these were rewarded in kind and not by payment.
Local holymen, in particular, mobilised large work parties
thereby producing a surplus with which to support their own
large households and followers, as well as needy families.
Since cultivation was more frequently combined with animal hus¬
bandry, women probably contributed a larger proportion of lab¬
our to cultivation tasks than men; after planting the crops the
men left the remaining tasks to women, thus leaving themselves
free to manage their herds. For example, at the harvest the
stalks were left in the ground for the herds to feed on. Thus
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women, and children from an early age, were important compon¬
ents of the total labour force. With the exception of long¬
distance herd movements women could, and no doubt frequently
did, perform all the productive tasks normally carried out by
men. All but the women of a few religious families engaged in
these activities. While certainly not constituting a female farm¬
ing system, the contribution of women was very substantial,
matching if not surpassing the contribution made by men.
Today, as I show in Chapter 4, while hoe cultivation has not
been completely superseded, it is increasingly common for farm¬
ers to hire tractor-ploughs. Traditional methods of labour re¬
cruitment, i.e. mobilisation through non-economic ties and pay¬
ment in kind, have completely disappeared. All labour services
exchanged between farming households, and even some of the
services exchanged within them, are mediated by money pay¬
ments. Wages exhibit a high degree of rationalisation, with
many tasks being paid by piece-rate. Most hired labour is re¬
cruited locally, i.e. from the same village or neighbouring
villages on the east bank, though some labourers are attracted
from other areas. The participation of women in cultivation has
become more selective. Some women work only on the family
land, sometimes with other unpaid family labour, sometimes
with hired labour parties. Some no longer make any contribut¬
ion to cultivation activities, while others, in addition to work¬
ing on their family lands as in the case of the first category,
hire themselves out in work parties to other farmers. Some of
the latter also perform wage labour during the cotton-picking
season in the Gezira after they have harvested their sorghum
crop in the rainlands on the east bank. Overall the participat¬
ion of women in rainland cultivation has probably declined,
though, as I have suggested, the actual contribution of partic¬
ular groups of women varies greatly. In spite of the preval¬
ence of male migration from the area, this has not induced
women to bear the brunt of subsistence crop cultivation. Quite
the opposite, migrant men are expected to support an increased
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number of dependents from their cash earnings. Thus the trans¬
formation of the traditional system of production has led to the
emergence of new patterns of female participation in farming
activities which are congruent with Boserup's thesis: that with
the intensification of production techniques and the establish¬
ment of new forms of social hierarchy, a considerable number
of women tend to withdraw their labour, while at the same time
other women are drawn into new forms of agricultural wage lab¬
our.
Turning to the processes by which this transformation, and
particularly the new patterns of social stratification, have
come about on the east bank, I would stress the importance of
the adoption of certain non-agricultural occupations and also
particular patterns of migration. These in turn are related to
local factors which have been conducive to greater economic div¬
ersification and accumulation of capital in some east bank vill¬
ages rather than others. I accept, however, that these local
conditions are 'articulated' with the growth of commodity prod¬
uction and monetarised transactions in the wider economy, and
particularly with the growth of state organisations and the
private services sector. By comparing two villages on the east
bank and by focusing on the differential response to these con¬
ditions, I will attempt to show how at the local level economic
differentiation has come about. In one village advantages have
accrued to different social groups variously through money
rents from titular land claims, petty-trading of produce from
riverain gardens and other goods, and regular employment out¬
side the locality. These advantages in turn have encouraged
the development of marketing and educational services within
the village, more extensive trading activities, and a steady
flow of remittances from migrants outside. Consequently many
farmers have cash resources with which to hire tractor and lab¬
our services. By contrast, denied these particular advantages,
most of the inhabitants of the other village continue to rely on
their traditional patrimonies of rainlands and small herds. In
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order to complement their stable or declining income from these
sources, they resort to hiring out their labour to other farm¬
ers, and other forms of local casual labour; and in some cases
they migrate with their families to the Gezira, again to perform
casual and seasonal labour.
Chapters 2 and 3 are largely devoted to the question of econ¬
omic differentiation among the population studied, whether in
the form of the historical background to the east bank rain-
lands, or in the comparison of two specific villages just re¬
ferred to. What I hope to demonstrate is that new forms of soc¬
ial stratification have arisen partly from the transmutation of
social relations associated with the traditional farming system,
e.g. religious families turning from cooperative work parties
to raising money-rents and investing in the introduction of
pumps in riverain gardens and in commercial rainland farming.
But also the breakdown of the old farming system has been acc¬
entuated by, and at the same time encouraged the emergence
of new social groups, notably traders and migrant workers.
Thus while landed property is one determinant of social posit¬
ion, other forms of property play an equal if not greater part
in defining an individual's place within the social hierarchy.
Most farmers on the east bank still enjoy access to rainlands;
what differentiates them is differential access to cash resources
with which to hire the necessary services entailed in crop prod¬
uction. However, I should add that with the implementation in
the area of the Rahad Project, a large government irrigation
scheme, some farmers will lose their traditional lands since
they will not all obtain tenancies in the new scheme.
The implication of the above discussion is that the widespread
introduction of ploughing on the east bank must not be treated
as an isolated factor influencing new patterns of female partic¬
ipation in farming activities. It must be considered in connex¬
ion with the other factors discussed here which have brought
about economic differentiation. Moreover, since planting by hoe
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is primarily a male task, though assisted by women and child¬
ren, the introduction of ploughing has not affected the contrib¬
ution of female labour in this particular task, as it would if
planting had been performed mainly by women. Nevertheless the
association of the use of the plough with the restriction of a
large number of women to the confines of the village does seem
to have a general applicability. Among those farmers who cult¬
ivated by plough more than ten acres, I recorded no instances
of their womenfolk engaged in any cultivation task.
Boserup's approach, therefore, provides a useful starting-point
for studying variations in domestic and marriage patterns,
since clearly the sexual division of labour has an important
bearing on family organisation. Goody (1973 and 1976) acknow¬
ledges the work of Boserup, and draws richly from it.1 But
while recognising similarities with her thesis, he considers
marriage institutions such as "polygyny and monogamy, bride-
wealth and dowry, as being related less directly to women's
contribution to agriculture and more to the problem of 'status
placement' in societies with varying degrees of socio-economic
differentiation." Since Goody's treatment of domestic institutions
is considerably more elaborate than Boserup's, it is to his
work that I now turn.
In his book, Production and Reproduction, Goody uses a broad
comparative and historical approach to trace the development
of various domestic institutions among those rural societies char¬
acterised by increased productivity of the land, high populat¬
ion densities, production of surpluses and unequal access to
the basic means of production. Under these conditions of social
stratification different 'styles of life' are preserved through
the reproduction of differences of property and status. These
differences are maintained, Goody argues, by direct vertical
transmission of property (i.e. from parents to children), and
1. J.Goody £ S.J.Tambiah: Bridewealth and Dowry. Cambridge, 1973.
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through provision for women as well as for men. Women receive
property, whether in the form of inheritance, dowry or marr¬
iage prestations, thereby preserving their relative status. 'Div¬
erging devolution' (transmission of property through both
sexes) entails the establishment at marriage of some form of
conjugal fund; this fund ensures some measure of support for
the woman in widowhood, and eventually goes to provide for
her sons and daughters.
Goody argues that the system of inheritance or devolution of
property is the salient factor in conditioning other aspects of
domestic organisation, such as marriage patterns, conjugal and
other familial roles, expressions of sexuality, and so on. Using
data from the Ethnographic Atlas, he demonstrates that strong
correlations exist between systems of diverging devolution and
the payment of dowry, monogamy (deviated from by recourse to
concubinage), low rates of divorce, discouragement of remarr¬
iage of widows, and endogamy. Geographically he associates
these interrelated domestic institutions with areas where plough
cultivation has generated high population densities, substantial
surpluses and social hierarchies, i.e. in Europe and many
parts of Asia. By contrast, in Africa and in other regions
where shifting cultivation and the use of the hoe predominate,
property descends laterally and through the members of the
same sex. The corporate nature of the property-holding group,
i.e. the lineage, is maintained through exogamy and the ex¬
change of bridewealth, with marriage goods passing from the
male kin of the groom to the male kin of the bride. These in¬
stitutions serve to encourage social homogeneity, rather than
differentiation of life-styles.
Goody stresses that other factors relating to the polity deriving
from conquests, religious conversion and ethnic assimilation
also have an influence on the form that domestic institutions
take. For example, he notes that the spread of Islam in Africa
may lead to the payment of a dowry to the bride which may
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exist alongside a prevailing pattern of bridewealth payments
exchanged between groups of male kin. 1 will return to this
particular point when I discuss the nature of and variations
in Muslim marriage payments, which is something Goody has
been specifically challenged on. First I wish to discuss briefly
some general criticisms that have been made of Goody's work.
Several points raised by Cornaroff (1980) in connexion with
Goody's essay on bridewealth and dowry (1973) are shown to
be somewhat misdirected if proper attention is given to Goody's
other works (notably 1971 and 1976). The earlier work (1971)
is devoted precisely to specifying what distinguishes African
pre-colonial states from systems of social stratification based
on unequal access to the means of production.' Nor is it true
that Goody reduces Africa to a single ecological order; in his
latter work (1976) he pays special attention to Ethiopia where
he shows plough cultivation gave rise to a system of social
stratification quite dissimilar to the savanna states. Moreover,
in this work Goody not only applies statistical evidence in
order to test his arguments, thus providing demonstration of
his approach which Comaroff claims Goody's work lacks; but
also Goody is very careful to explore his own methodological
framework, and to examine the notion of causality. While clear¬
ly some cases cannot be easily accomodated within Goody's
scheme, some of the contributions to Comaroff's work which the
latter cites as contradicting Goody's arguments do not seem apt¬
ly chosen examples. For instance, I doubt whether "Goody
would typify as African" (p.9) a Macedonian socio-economic sit¬
uation on the grounds of patrilineal reckoning and patrilocal
residence, and the production of only small surpluses; in fact
the elaborate dowry system which Rheubottom describes does not
seem incongruent with the economic activities he only briefly
alludes to: traditional patrimonies, shepherding, migrant lab¬
our and large-scale viticulture. Similarly I do not see how the
variations in bridewealth among East African pastoralists which
1. J.Goody: Technology, Tradition and the State in Africa. London, 1971.
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Turton describes can be taken as criticism of Goody's app¬
roach, rather than as a demonstration of it. For Turton him¬
self relates the main variations to economic and ecological
factors. According to the decisive role that cattle-herding plays
in relation to other forms of subsistence, bridewealth payments
tend to be the largest and most fixed, distributing cattle even¬
ly among the population.
1 may now turn to the question of Muslim marriage payments.
For Comaroff uses Peters' statement that in the Middle East
there "are many communities which practice some form of bride-
wealth, and where the plough has long been used" (1980, p.9)
as evidence against Goody's analysis. For Goody broadly assoc¬
iates dowry systems with plough cultivation, and bridewealth
systems with hoe cultivation. It is true Goody generally refers
to Muslim marriage payments as being a form of dowry; so it
is necessary to understand exactly how he defines the various
forms of dowry. Dowry he interprets as being basically a form
of transmission of property from one generation to another:
Dowry is essentially a process whereby parental
property is distributed to a daughter at her marr¬
iage (i.e. inter vivos) rather than at the holder's
death (mortis causa). 1 therefore include dowry as
part of the process of 'diverging devolution'.
(1976, p.6)
As a variant of this process, Goody defines indirect dowry as
"the system whereby the future son-in-law, or his family con¬
tribute to a fund which is then settled upon the wife", (p.8)
In spite of the different source of the payment, dowry and in¬
direct dowry payments both have in common the establishment
of a conjugal fund and the endowment of the bride. Several
other common features point to the similarities between dowry
and indirect dowry payments: the goods transacted at marriage
are variable in nature, since they testify to the relative status
of the bride and her husband; there tends to be considerable
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elaboration of the wedding ceremony and accompanying festivit¬
ies; in the event of the marriage being dissolved, the marriage
goods tend to remain with the bride, thus being returnable in
dowry systems and non-returnable in indirect dowry systems;
and, related to this, a feature which Goody does not stress,
but I would - from whatever source of wealth the marriage pay¬
ments originate, a large proportion of their value is trans¬
formed into household goods and clothing and jewelry for the
bride. Goody notes, of course, that the composition of the
goods, as well as their value, vary considerably. With the ex¬
ception of the European dower, landed property tends to be a
feature of dowry payments rather than indirect dowry pay¬
ments; and even among dowry systems the endowment of landed
property is not such a common occurrence.
Goody recognises the different implications that dowry and in¬
direct dowry have concerning age at marriage, maintenance or
break-up of the family property and marriage policies. But he
considers that their common features relating to the establish¬
ment of a conjugal fund and the endowment of the bride great¬
ly outweigh these differences. He contrasts these various forms
of dowry with bridewealth payments, which he sees essentially
as passing between different groups of male kin and as having
little to do with the status of the bride. Goody clearly recog¬
nises that bridewealth as so defined is practised by some soc¬
ieties in the Middle East. For example he quotes Peters' study
of the Cyrenaican Beduin as a case where bric&ewealth and exclus¬
ion of women from inheritance are associated with the corporate
nature of their social organisation. On this point Tillion has
argued that where Islam extends to tribal societies in North
Africa, koranic stipulations concerning the right of women to
inherit property and to receive marriage goods are very fre¬
quently broken.1 This is so, she argues, because to do other¬
wise would involve the alienation of property to members of
1. G.Tillion: le Harem et les Cousins. Paris, 1966.
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other groups, and would thus destroy tribal solidarity. Con¬
versely she notes that where these legal prescriptions are ob¬
served tribal society is dissolved, and more complex, heterogen¬
ous relations are established. Zahir al-Sadaty has also support¬
ed this thesis by showing an inverse correlation between a
high degree of lineage corporation and Islamic legal conform¬
ity. 1
However, among the greater part of the sedentary population
in the Middle East, both rural and urban, marriage payments
bear the characteristics of what Goody calls indirect dowry,
since they originate from the bridegroom or his family, and de¬
volve largely on the bride. A varying proportion of the marr¬
iage payment may be retained by the bride's father. But in
very few cases is this amount sufficient to enable the father
to procure a marriage for one of his sons, as would generally
be the case in bridewealth systems proper. Goody ends his
essay on the differences between bridewealth and dowry with
the caveat that they need not be mutually exclusive; elements
of each may be present in combination, or indeed the marriage
payments may not be marked at all. What I attempt to show in
this thesis is not that there has been a total change from one
system to the other, but that the recent trend has been for the
adoption of more features of the dowry system. However some
customs that I describe, such as the attempt in several Gezira
and east bank villages to fix a limit to marriage payments and
to standardise wedding festivities, clearly reflect a concern
about the disruption of relatively homogeneous life-styles.
What may be questioned I think in Goody's approach is his
close association between dowry payments and inheritance pract¬
ices as constituting alternative or complementary methods of
transmission of property. Probably it is this factor which has
1. F. Zahir al-Sadaty: Aspects of the Interaction of Islamic and Customary Family
Law in Selected African and Other Societies. M.Phil, London University, 1976.
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made many writers reluctant to recognise that many Muslim
marriage payments have more in common with dowry systems
than bridewealth systems. For the goods which Muslim women
receive at marriage do not prejudice their rights to inherit¬
ance. Certainly among the population that 1 studied no woman
forgoes her share of inheritance on account of goods she has
received at marriage, whether from her husband or her own fam¬
ily. Nor, would 1 suggest, is there necessarily a close connex¬
ion between the value of the goods which the bridegroom brings
to the marriage and the prospective inheritance of the bride.
I agree with Goody that in dowry systems there is a tendency
to match like with like, but the marriage alliances which dow¬
ry payments help to create may serve to maintain and enhance
an individual's social position by means other than matching
and combining family estates. Moreover, only in some cases
does the payment of the dowry by the bridegroom constitute an
early call on his own inheritance prospects. For indirect dowry
not only leaves the bride's family estate intact, but it may
also leave the bridegroom's family estate intact, requiring him
to save up for the marriage payment through other means, en¬
tailing, for example, migration and achieved earnings.
I would relate dowry payments less directly with methods of
transmitting property, and would associate them more with the
means of expressing relative social position. For at least in
part dowry payments provide a vehicle through which different
modes of life, embracing patterns of consumption, sexual mores,
manners and etiquette, are expressed. The goods inscribed in
such payments may also communicate forms of knowledge, such
as about the relations between the sexes, which are not just
specific to certain social classes, but which are widely shared
within the culture in question. I would agree with Goody none¬
theless that where dowry payments are pronounced, this indic¬
ates a hierarchical ordering of social relations, but I hold
that they have less connexion with property relations in the
strict sense than with the expression of different life-styles.
- 20 -
This suggests, therefore, that the intensification of marriage
payments, especially those associated with the establishment of
a conjugal fund and the endowment of the bride, may be relat¬
ed to economic differentiation relatively independently of the
system of inheritance of property.
This last point has an immediate bearing on my research find¬
ings. In the course of this thesis 1 argue that recent trends
in marriage practices among the population studied have in¬
volved the increase in marriage payments, particularly those
goods given to the bride, delayed age at marriage, elaboration
of wedding ceremonies, and an increase in marriage stability
with the decline in frequency of divorce, remarriage and poly¬
gamy. These tendencies are what Goody associates with the est¬
ablishment of a more binding conjugal unit. The ties which
unite the conjugal couple, he argues, are both material and id¬
eological. For property is endowed on the couple which in time
they devolve to their own children; also the family is imbued
with particular value emphasising its honour and the proper
sexual conduct of its members. However, what characterises the
conjugal fund among the population of the east bank of the
Blue Nile is property of a primarily domestic nature, and this
derives mainly from earned incomes rather than heritable prop¬
erty. There is little overlap between inherited property and
dowry goods. Inherited property is mainly wealth which can be
used potentially for productive ends. Except for the house and
its furnishings, many of the personal effects of the deceased
are distributed among poor and needy families; this takes
place at the alms-offering ceremony (sadaga) held towards the
end of the mourning period. Jewelry belonging to women is gen¬
erally sold, and the proceeds distributed among the heritors.
But although absent in inherited property, personal effects are
one of the main components of marriage payments; on the other
hand productive property is rarely involved in marriage trans¬
actions.
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The population on the east bank of the Blue Nile have been
Muslims for several centuries, at least since the late sevent¬
eenth century, and perhaps earlier. Though our knowledge of
domestic institutions throughout this period is somewhat scant,
it appears that there have not been major changes in the sys¬
tem of inheritance. Women inherit rainlands and livestock,
though generally in much smaller proportions than their stipul-
atory share. At most it can be said that with the emergence of
new forms of property, women tend to assert their inheritance
claims more forcefully. A weak form of diverging devolution has
thus long been practised, and so cannot be held attributable
for the trends noted above. However 1 do not consider that this
invalidates the basic tenets of Goody's approach. Among the
population that I studied 1 have emphasised the role of achiev¬
ed earnings, derived from regular employment and petty-trad¬
ing, in effecting socio-economic differentiation. Under these
specific conditions intensification of marriage payments and rel¬
ated marriage trends have come about relatively independently
of the system of transmission of property.
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CHAPTER 2
THE HISTORICAL-GEOGRAPHY OF THE BLUE NILE RAINLANDS
The area with which I am concerned in this thesis lies on the
east bank of the Blue Nile, extending northwards and east¬
wards from the confluence of this river with the Rahad River,
a seasonal tributary (14°30'N. 33°30'E.). The area forms part
of a semi-arid zone, and so the use to which these lands may
be put depends to a large extent on their proximity to the Blue
Nile, not only because of water availability but also because
of the contribution of accumulations of silt to the quality of
the soil. Thus we can categorise the lands of the east bank ac¬
cording to three ecological types: the riverain lands, which
comprise the lands immediately bordering on the river as well
as those exposed by the river at low flood; the clay rainlands,
comprising the plains stretching back from the river, whose
soils are composed chiefly of sediments deposited over many
millenia by the shifting course of the river and by high
floods; and the hinterland grasslands.
The topography of the riverain lands varies considerably accor¬
ding to the course of the river. Stretches of silt terraces are
interspersed by strips of wind-deposited sand, banks of coarse
sediments and some areas of exposed rock. Thus not all the
land bordering on the river is suitable for cultivation; more¬
over, the high terraces require some method of raising water
from the river, and while this does not pose too great a prob¬
lem during the flood period, it entails raising water some twen¬
ty metres at low water such is the variation in levels of the
fast-flowing Blue Nile. During its low water, from December to
June, the river exposes sand-banks and areas of heavier text¬
ured alluvium; according to the steepness of the slopes a vary-
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ing amount of land on these lower terraces (jerf) is available
for cultivation. Scattered between riverain settlements and
areas of cultivation on the high terrace lie areas of natural
vegetation.
For the most part this vegetation consists of clumps of bushes
and a few scattered trees, but in a few protected areas dense
woodland can be found. Various species of acacia are common,
namely: a. tortilis (samr), a. nubica (la'ot), a. mellifera
(kitr), a. seyal (talh), a. nilotica (sunt), and a. albida
(haraz); also the following fruit-bearing species can be found
- ziziphus spinachristi (sidr), balanites aegyptica (higlig) and
calatropis procera (ushar), the Sodom Apple. Several villages
take their names from the vegetation dominant in their locality,
such as Talha, Umm Sunt and Abu Haraz; the latter village,
where I stayed for the greater part of my fieldwork, takes its
name from the most imposing species of acacia. It attains a
height of 60 feet, has a broad canopy, and is distinguished by
its orange seed-pods much relished by goats and by the fact
that it sheds its foliage in the rainy season.
Stretching back from the riverain lands are the alkaline clay
plains. They are extensively used for rainland cultivation and
pasture for village herds during the rainy season. Rainfall is
variable, usually occurring between late July and mid-Septem¬
ber, falling in a few heavy outbursts and some light showers.
The mean annual rainfall is about 300 mm. During the rains
those parts which are not cultivated afford a light cover of
vegetation, comprising both annual and perennial grasses. How¬
ever for the greater part of the year this semi-arid region pro¬
vides a flat, bare vista, completely denuded of any significant
growth, interspersed by much smaller areas of scrub and scatt¬
ered trees.
These clay plains extend up to twenty miles east of the Blue
Nile. They are similar in soil structure and relief to the
24
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Gezira plain, the region between the Blue and White Niles,
where the same patterns of land usage of rainland cultivation
and pastoralism were practised before the implementation of the
famous Gezira Irrigation Scheme. Inhabitants on the east bank
of the Blue Nile draw drinking water from the river, or, if
their settlements are further inland, from man-made wells, sunk
to a depth of between 100 and 200 feet into the underlying
Nubian sandstone. During the last fifteen years the Government
has provided many settlements with boreweils and installed
pumps powered by diesel fuel.
To the east of the clay plains lies the vast grassland area,
known as the Butana. Here the clay thins, and there appear
small uplands and outcrops, formed of basement complex rocks.
Seasonal watercourses and low-lying areas afford some cultivat¬
ion, but the terrain is most suited to animal husbandry. This
area of low savanna is bounded on three sides by river-sys¬
tems (the Main Nile, the River Atbara and the Blue Nile); to
the south-east it is effectively bordered by the Sennar-Gedaref-
Khashm el Qirba railway (built in 1926), which more or less
follows the 600 mm. isohyet. To the south and south-east of the
railway the vegetation becomes more dense, and towards the
higher reaches of the Rahad and Dinder tributaries there a-
bounds a wealth of woodland and wildlife.
These last two zones, the Butana grasslands and the southern
woodlands, are of importance, at least historically, to many in¬
habitants of the east bank, in providing them with wet season
pastures for their herds and various dry season activities
(hunting game, gum-collecting and more recently charcoal-
burning). However it is with the riverain and rainland areas
that I am more specifically concerned, for this is where in re¬
cent decades many semi-nomadic groups have settled and exist¬
ing settlements have steadily expanded. Throughout the thesis
I use the terms 'east bank' and 'Blue Nile rainlands' inter¬
changeably, and I use them to include the riverain as well as
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the rainland areas east of the Blue Nile. This is partly for
brevity and convenience; but also I would justify this usage
since the productive activities associated with the two zones
have also been interrelated. At least until the introduction of
pumps for irrigating riverain gardens, riverain cultivation has
always been combined with rainland cultivation, herd mainten¬
ance or both of these activities.
These activities will be examined in greater detail at a later
stage. Here I merely wish to point out that ecological factors
and the low level of development of productive techniques have
favoured extensive rather than intensive methods of appropriat¬
ion from nature. The rainlands on the east bank extend, of
course, both north and south of the area with which I am prim¬
arily concerned, adjacent to the confluence of the Rahad River
with the Blue Nile. Randell (1958) has shown that rainland cult¬
ivation can be continued where mean annual rainfall is even
less than 200 mm. This is made feasible through the construct¬
ion of low ridges which prevent run-off of water (terus). South
of Sharif Ya'qub and latitude 14°15', as rainfall increases, the
construction of these terus becomes much less prevalent. Thus
the rainland area which I studied lies, more specifically, in
the southern part of the area where terus cultivation is prac¬
tised.
Little is known of the indigenous population which inhabited
the Blue Nile rainlands or the western Butana before the infil¬
tration of the Arabs into the central Sudan between the four¬
teenth and the sixteenth centuries. On the basis of historical
and archaeological evidence it seems probable that the majority
of the riverain inhabitants were Nubians, and that they formed
part of the Nubian kingdom of 'Aiwa whose capital was at
Soba. Several sites near Rufa'a and another at El Eleila two
miles to the north of Abu Haraz have been claimed1 as evidence
1. H.G.Balfour-Paul: Early Cultures on the Northern Blue Nile. Sudan Notes and
Records, Vol.33, 1952.
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of Christian Nubian culture. The historian Ibn Khaldun, writ¬
ing in the late fourteenth century, gives a general but contemp¬
orary account of the relations between the Kings of 'Aiwa and
of Muqurra to the north with the Arab tribesmen:
The kings of Nubia, at first, tried to drive them
/the Arabs7 out by force. They failed, so they
changed their tactics and tried to win them over
by offering their daughters in marriage. Thus it
was that their kingdom disintegrated, for it passed
to the sons of the Juhayna from their Nubian moth¬
ers in accordance with the non-Arab practice of in¬
heritance by the sister and her sons.
This passage, quoted by Yusuf Fadl Hasan (1973, p. 127), and
the latter's own researches suggest that much intermarriage
and assimilation took place between the matrilineal Nubians
and those Arabs who settled in the riverain areas. Following
a long period of both peaceful penetration and occasional raids
V
by various Arab groups, the Kingdom of 'Aiwa was finally over¬
run by the 'Abdallab Arabs in the late fifteenth century.
Spaulding states that the people in the Kingdom known as the
the 'Anaj came to be generally referred to as the 'Abdallab
following this change of rulers.1 However, Holt records a Sudan¬
ese tradition which asserts that the Nubian inhabitants of
'Aiwa abandoned the region following the 'Abdallab conquest,
and fled to the Nuba mountains in southern Kordofan.2 Which¬
ever was the case it seems likely that a mutual adaptation of
customs and institutions took place between the 'Abdallab and
other Arabs on the one hand and any remaining Nubian inhab¬
itants on the other. In support of the Sudanese tradition it
may be said that there is no legacy of a Nubian dialect along
the Blue Nile as there is to the north along the loop of the
Main Nile.
1. R.S.O'Fahey £ J.L.Spaulding: Kingdoas of the Sudan. London, 1974.
2. P.H.Holt: A Modern History of the Sudan. London, 1977, p.18.
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Arab traders and travellers noted other indigenous groups liv¬
ing to the south of the Nubians, but historians have failed to
identify these with any certainty. The eighteenth century trav¬
eller Cailliaud refers to one group as the 'Reds'; they appear¬
ed to have a reddish complexion because of their custom of
smearing the hair and body with ochre. Spaulding claims that
their homeland was to the south of Sennar in the highland area
bordering on Ethiopia. They or another indigenous group also
had settlements at the foot of various outcrops in the Butana;
apart from such settlements the central and western Butana
appear to have been but sparsely inhabited before their occup¬
ation by nomadic Arab groups, who will be referred to shortly.
There is historical record of one branch of the 'Reds', the
Hamaj; they were to reassert themselves during the latter per¬
iod of the Funj rule, for in their capacity as wazir to the
Funj Sultan they effectively controlled power at the Sennar
court.
Little is known either of the origins or background of the Funj
who established their sultanate at Sennar in 1504-5 and who
ruled there until the early part of the nineteenth century.
Spaulding argues that the Funj "were a southern Nubian people
whose homeland lay along the White Nile below the great
swamps." (p.24) They extended their authority over the south¬
ern reaches of the Blue Nile, and, to the north, at least as
far as the central Gezira. They amassed wealth through the im¬
position of taxes on local communities, but primarily through
their control of long distance trade in gold, slaves and var¬
ious natural products (skins, feathers, horns, etc.). The alleg¬
iance of local tribal chiefs was maintained through their oblig¬
ation to marry from within the royal clan, and through the
ideologies and ritual surrounding this clan and the Sultan's
office. Ultimately the power of the Funj rulers rested on their
heavily armed horse-back soldiers whose numbers were contin¬
uously replenished from annual slave-raids in which favoured
- 29 -
tribal chiefs were encouraged to participate.1
From the early sixteenth till the late eighteenth centuries the
east bank of the Blue Nile was something of a border zone be¬
tween the lands claimed by the 'Abdallab chiefs, based at
Qerri to the north of the Nile confluence, and the lands claim¬
ed by the Funj rulers based at Sennar to the south. 'Abdallab
advances to the south were checked at the beginning of the six¬
teenth century when their forces were defeated by the newly
emergent Funj at Arbaji in the central Gezira. But towards the
end of the sixteenth century Sheikh 'Ajib of the 'Abdallab ob¬
tained from the Funj Sultan the right to appoint judges at
Arbaji and at Abu Haraz on the east bank. However, at a sub¬
sequent treaty the same 'Abdallab Sheikh was forced to concede
the Gezira to the Sultan, though the 'Abdallab ruler maintained
his authority over the Arab nomads who occupied the Butana.
Spaulding admits that the allegiance of cultivators on the east
bank was not clear; he suggests that the treaty signed between
the 'Abdallab and the Funj "implies that some rainland cultivat¬
ors of the Butana were politically subject to the Funj Sultan,
but that their tax revenues should go to the 'Abdallab." (p.39)
Evidence of Funj influence on the east bank still exist today,
in the form of oral traditions, extant land charters and place-
names. For example, the forest near Abu Haraz and the one on
the opposite bank, named respectively Babalenge and Bankyo,
are remembered today as having been the royal domain of the
Funj rulers. In fact it seems that the distance between the in¬
habitants of the east bank and either the 'Abdallab or the
Funj meant that the former enjoyed considerable autonomy in
1. See Spaulding's work on the Funj Kingdom (1974).
The social formation of the Funj bears resemblance to the various West African
savanna states, which Coquery-Vidrovitch and other French Marxists have described
as representing an African mode of production, in which the ruling group intervened
only indirectly in the conditions of production and appropriated surplus from long
distance trade and predatory raiding (See Seddon, 1978). Goody's emphasis on the
extensive nature of cultivation and the control of the means of destruction (horses,
chain-mail, lances, etc.) seems to complement this approach (1971). See also my own
forthcoming article on the Funj.
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their dealings with either overlord. This is of relevance to my
discussion of the two social groups I wish to examine next -
the Arab nomads and the Muslim holymen. For many of the
settlements on the east bank are associated with members of
these groups.
In his book The Arabs and the Sudan Yusuf Fadl Hasan has
given a very carefully documented account of the Arab penetrat¬
ion of the Sudan in the centuries up until the early sixteenth.
I wish to give here merely a simplified account of the main
tribal groups who occupied the western Butana and the Blue
Mile rainlands during the Funj sultanate. To a large extent
these are the same groups that the Turkish and British rulers
found to be strongest in the area and so in whom they vested
powers of local government; since the early nineteenth century,
however, numerous members of other tribal groups have settled
on the east bank. For the sake of brevity I cannot match
Yusuf Fadl Hasan's scrupulous treatment of different indigenous
historical traditions and of the manipulation of genealogies.
When referring to the nomads as 'Arabs', I take it as under¬
stood that in the course of their migrations, whether through
Egypt and up the Nile or across the desert region between the
Red Sea and the Nile, the composition and identity of these
groups underwent many changes as a result of intermarriage
and contact both with other 'Arab' groups and with various in¬
digenous inhabitants. As to the degree of disparity between the
Sudanese Arabs and the tribes in Arabia with which their fore¬
bears may be identified, I refer the reader to Yusuf Fadl
Hasan's book.
The main tribe associated with the central plains of the But¬
ana, even till the present day, are the Shukriya, who are us¬
ually classified as part of the Juhayna group.1 However the
1. for the usual classification of the Arab groups that I as referring to, see
MacHichael, H.A.: A History of the Arabs in the Sudan, 1967 (2 vols.)
- 31 -
chiefly clan of Abu Sin claim to be Talibis, that is descend¬
ants of the Prophet's grandfather. One of their traditions re¬
cords how their ancestor, Sha' al-Din - living in the late
sixteenth century - recaptured some rebellious, heavily-armed
slaves who had deserted the Funj ruler; he was rewarded by
being given a daughter of the Funj ruler and several of her
personal slaves, and from all of these he begat many follow¬
ers. Under the leadership of the Abu Sin family the Shukriya
began to exert influence over other groups in the Butana. In
1779 at a decisive battle at Mandara in the central Butana the
Shukriya seized control of several villages and wells previously
controlled by the Rikabiyin and the Hamaj. Subsequent Shuk¬
riya expansion witnessed their encroachment on Rufa'a lands
adjoining the Blue Nile, and raiding and feuds directed ag¬
ainst the Batahin and Kawahla nomads. At times they met set¬
backs, such as when their leaders were deceived into assemb¬
ling at Abu Haraz under the protection of the Arakiyin holymen
and were then massacred by the Hamaj, but no other group ser¬
iously threatened their hegemony over the central Butana. The
Abu Sin family contracted strategic marriages with religious
families, such as the Arakiyin,1 and with other important trib¬
al chiefs, such as the Ja'ali ruler, Makk Nimr of Shendi. The
Funj rulers came to recognise in effect the independent power
of the Shukriya; in 1800 Sultan Badi wad Dakin empowered
Sheikh 'Awad al Karim Abu Sin to collect for himself land dues
from the occupants of an area covering millions of acres. (Abu
Salim, 1967). In return the Shukriya supported the Funj rulers
against other factions, and frequently assisted them in their
slave-raids against dissident tribal groups and against the
negroid peoples to the south. Similarly their subsequent support
for both the Turkish and the Condominion rulers was rewarded
with political office and economic privileges.
1. The most important marriage alliance between the Abu Sin family and the Arakiyin
was that between Ahmed Bek Abu Sin and Taiya bint Yusuf Abu Shara in the early nine¬
teenth century.
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The Rufa'a Arabs, also classified among the Juhayna group,
may be divided into the northern and southern groups. During
the Funj period many sections of the northern group became
settled, providing the nuclei of such villages as Hilaliya,
Rufa'a, Abu Haraz and Shabarga, all on the east bank. The
southern, predominantly nomadic groups may be subdivided into
the Rufa'a al-Hoi in the southern Gezira, whose background
and movements are described by Abd-al Ghaffar (1974), and the
Rufa'a al-Sharq, whose migrations take them from the Butana
in the wet season to the Rahad and Dinder Rivers in the dry
season. Of particular relevance to my study is one section of
the Rufa'a, the Arakiyin, who intermarried with some men claim¬
ing Sharifi descent (i.e. from the Prophet) and who settled in
Abu Haraz, as well as in other villages on the east bank and
some in the Gezira. Their history will be recorded shortly.
The Kawahla are believed to have migrated later than the
Juhayna Arabs into central Sudan, and this is why most of
their sections moved further west into the Gezira and towards
the White Nile. However, one section remained in the Butana.
Their rivalry with the Shukriya led to many hostilities between
them. One of their sections, the Margomab, broke away and
eventually attached themselves to the Shukriya. The Scottish
traveller Bruce records many of the settlements along the Rahad
and Dinder rivers as being occupied by the Kawahla during his
journey in the Sudan (1768-73); these settlements were deci¬
mated by famines, disease and warfare in the nineteenth cent¬
ury, and the area was reoccupied mainly by other groups, in¬
cluding West African settlers.
The Batahin, belonging to the Ja'ali group, also occupied the
central Butana plains, and, unlike the majority of the Ja'ali
group, continued to lead a nomadic life despite their frequent
harrassing by the Shukriya.
By the early nineteenth century the tribal distribution on the
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east bank and in the western Butana may be summarised as
follows. The grasslands v/ere occupied by various nomadic
tribes, notably the Shukriya, Kawahla and Batahin. Along the
Blue Nile and scattered through the rainland plains were num¬
erous settlements, varying in size and permanence; some were
the dry season camps of the nomads, others the permanent vill¬
ages of riverain and rainland cultivators. Of the latter various
sections of the Rufa'a Arabs and assimilated indigenous groups
probably comprised the greater part of the population. How¬
ever, through time other groups joined and extended these
settlements - Arab immigrants from other regions, traders and
* religious families, as well as nomads who had lost their herds
and slaves. While compared with the nomadic groups the settled
population was more open to pressure from centres of power,
such as the Funj, they often maintained a considerable degree
of autonomy through their association with local religious fam-
*
ilies. The Arakiyin of Abu Haraz provide just such a case.
The history of the Islamisation of the Sudan, and the important
part played in that process by the Sufi orders has been consid¬
ered by many writers, including Trimingham (1949), Yusuf Fadl
Hasan (1971), and several Islamic scholars.1 Until the early
sixteenth century the main agents of propagation of the Islamic
faith were traders and nomads, neither of whom were well
grounded in Islamic doctrine. However, from that period the
Funj rulers and their 'Abdallab viceroys welcomed individual
scholars at their courts and encouraged the spread of Islamic
learning in their territories. Islamic teachers came from many
parts of the Muslim world, Including Iraq, Yemen, Eqypt, the
Hijaz and the Maghreb. Many of them stayed in the Sudan long
enough to build mosques and khalwas where they taught the
Koran. Local Sudanese trained in these centres, and some of
1. J.S.Triminghae: Islam in the Sudan. London, 1949;
Yusuf Fadl Hasan: 'External Islaaic influences and the progress of Islaaisation
in the Eastern Sudan between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries', in Sudan
in Africa, ed. Y.F.Hasan. Khartoua, 1971.
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them continued their studies in Egypt. Thus the work of the
early missionaries was carried on by local holymen, and the
flow of Islamic knowledge into the Sudan was maintained
through the travels of Sudanese to perform the pilgrimage and
through other external contacts. The Funj rulers endowed lands
and slaves on several of these Muslim holymen, and utilized
their services as judges and jurisprudents, and also as mediat¬
ors of disputes; for example, the famous feki or holyman, Idris
wad al-Arbab, mediated the peace treaty between the Funj and
' Abdallab.
Writers have noted two tendencies in the dissemination of relig¬
ious knowledge carried out by the fekis. Some of the religious
centres, notably those along the Main Nile, were devoted to the
teaching of orthodox Islamic subjects; for example many jurists
and theological commentators graduated from the colleges at
Turunj and Qoz. On the other hand many of the fekis in the
Gezira and on the east bank adopted one of the Sufi orders
(tariqa) ♦ The Gadiriya tariqa, introduced by the Baghdad teach¬
er, Taj al-Din al Bahari in the 1570's, was the dominant order
until the eighteenth century, from which period other orders,
such as the Majdhubiya, Sammaniya and Khatmiya, were intro¬
duced. Although in some cases Sufism was taught as an exten¬
sion of the basic Islamic subjects, it often came to serve as
a substitute for the literate, othodox tradition, with the cere¬
monies of the tariqa relegating the functions of the khalwa to
a subsidiary role. This tendency was reinforced by the growth
of folklore surrounding individual holymen concerning their mir¬
aculous exploits, which were attributed to their possession of
mystical powers. Some fekis led ascetic lives, often wandering
extensively and apparently forsaking social ties. Others, how¬
ever, adapting to local conditions, identified themselves with
particular localities, and their descendents inherited not only
their claim to religious authority and mystical power, but also
the ties of their followers - to whom they dispensed various
services, and from whom they derived their means of support.
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Thus the Sufi orders were prone to particularisation and seg¬
mentation. For example in the Gezira and on the east bank the
Gadiriya tariqa was adopted and diffused by three mutually
competitive religious families, the Arakiyin, Sadigab and
Yaqubab. Of these the influence of the Arakiyin has been the
most enduring.
Yusuf Badri1 gives two main reasons for the far-reaching in¬
fluence of the Arakiyin, compared with rival religious families
on the east bank: first, that they demonstrated considerable in¬
genuity in combining Sufism and orthodox Islamic studies in
their teachings; and second, that they have always possessed
important economic resources, such as extensive rainlands in
the early period, and irrigated lands in the Gezira and income
from trading activities and government employment in the mod¬
ern period. The first reason meant that through their mainten¬
ance of the tradition of literacy they attracted followers from
other religious families and other social groups, and remained
of use to traders and rulers alike; at the same time, by perpet¬
uating local folk customs and forms of reverence which ab¬
stracted ordinary people's conceptions of social realities, they
retained popular support. The second reason is related to their
dexterity in accommodating their interests to wider political
forces and to economic change.
The following summarised history of the Arakiyin relies substan¬
tially on traditional sources, notably a collection of biograph¬
ies of local holymen and a chronicle of the Funj period, ex¬
tracts of both of which are reproduced by MacMichael (1967);
these are supplemented by oral accounts and some modern
sources (Badri 1970 and Hill 1970).
1. Yusuf Badri: A survey of Islamic learning in the Funj state 910-1236 AH (1505—
1820 AD). B.Litt, Oxford, 1970.
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The traditional sources recount that the ancestor of the Arakiyin,
or at least the ancestor who made them claim noble descent, was a
certain Sharif Ahmed Muqbil. All that is related of him is that he
was a wandering ascetic and that during a stay in Kordofan he marr¬
ied a local Arakiyin girl, Amna bit Hasan Ma'arik. A son was born
of this marriage, and was named Dafa'Allah by his mother's clan.
When he grew up he moved east and married from among the Jimi'ab
at Hilaliya.* The five sons of Dafa'Allah - Abdallah, Abu Idris,
Hamad al-Nil, Abu 'Asha and 'Omer - are the ancestors from whom
most of the Arakiyin in the Gezira and in the Blue Nile region
claim descent. The eldest brother, Abdallah al Araki was the most
learned. He studied at Turunj college and subsequently wrote sever¬
al treatises on jurisprudence and theology in the last decades of
the sixteenth century. He was initially opposed to joining a tariqa,
but changed his mind on seeing the popularity of Sufism among the
ordinary people. So he travelled to Mecca and was initiated into
the Gadiriya order by the successor of Taj al-Din al Bahari. He
stayed several years in the Hijaz teaching until he was summoned
back by his brother Abu Idris. During Abdallah al Araki's absence
his family had travelled extensively, but on his return they settled
at Abu Haraz where Abdallah al Araki was appointed a qadi by Sheikh
'Ajib. He was succeeded by his brother Abu Idris who by contrast
was an ascetic who lived quietly far away from the public eye. He
was in turn followed by his second son, Dafa'Allah Masuban, another
great scholar. He studied at Qoz in the northern Sudan and mastered
both the orthodox disciplines and Sufism. After completing his stud¬
ies he settled and taught first at Umm Shaneg, where he married a
granddaughter of Abdallah al Araki, but he v/as persuaded by his
former teachers to move to Abu Haraz. There, with the help of a
trader at the Sennar court, and with the use of six of the Sennar
ruler's ships to transport stones, he built a mosque. Furthermore
the Funj sultan endowed him with rainlands in the Gezira and with
twelve slaves, six of either sex. Many followers came and studied
under him, and it is said that he converted to Islam many of the
* Tribe from Gezira - White Nile.
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neighbouring Hamaj people. As well as paying homage to his great
learning, oral traditions describe his performance of miraculous
deeds, such as the taming of a crocodile. He died in 1683, and since
that time Abu Haraz has remained the centre of the Arakiyin.
It seems that following Dafa'Allah Masuban's death his successors
paid less attention to the teaching of the Koran, and devoted them¬
selves to Sufi liturgies and ceremonies. But following the visit
of one indignant feki koranic studies were taken up again at least
for a time. It is perhaps an indication of the conflicting inter¬
pretations of the role of a feki that about this time - during the
early eighteenth century - another important Arakiyin centre was
established at Taiba, just across the Blue Nile in the Gezira. The
next important Arakiyin teacher was Yusuf Abu Shara, a descendent
of Hamad al-Nil, another of the five brothers. It is said that he
taught koranic studies for 65 years. He died in 1802, and his tomb
(qubba) remains today one of the most popular for the many followers
and visitors that come to Abu Haraz seeking the blessings of the
Arakiyin holymen, both living and dead.
From the 1780's the Arakiyin became unwillingly embroiled first in
the hostilities between the Shukriya and the Hamaj, and later in
the dynastic struggle for the Funj sultanate. Although the daughter
of Yusuf Abu Shara was married to Ahmed Bek Abu Sin, the paramount
chief of the Shukriya, the latter were unable to provide the holymen
with adequate protection; nor could the Arakiyin leaders prevent
Abu Haraz being used as a base by the Hamaj for reprisals following
their defeat by the Shukriya at the battle of Mandara. In the early
1800's a faction involved in the Funj dynastic struggle looted the
Arakiyin, and killed both the son and a nephew of Sheikh Yusuf. A
traditional chronicle relates that the other Arakiyin leaders hid
in their grain-pits and were put to great shame. Similarly, follow¬
ing the Turkish invasion in the 1820's the Arakiyin were subjected
to raids and forced levies of grain and livestock. The khalwa of
Ahmed al-Rayyah, the grandson of Yusuf Abu Shara, was burnt down
in 1822. In 1830 the khalifa of the Arakiyin, Sheikh Mustafa - a
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descendant of Dafa'Allah Masuban - was impaled to death by the
Turks, while other fekis were blown to death from canons. As a re¬
sult of this severe oppression Ahmed al-Rayyah led the Arakiyin,
estimated at 12,000 strong, into the southern Butana where they re¬
verted to a pastoral life. They were persuaded to return only on
the promise from the Turkish authorities that the heads of the reli¬
gious families be exempted from taxes on their rainland crops. A
Turkish camp was established at Abu Haraz, as an outpost from their
main garrison at Wad Medani, and the Arakiyin became slowly recon¬
ciled to the new regime. When the Turko-Egyptian ruler, Mohammad
'Ali Pasha, passed through Wad Medani in 1B38, Ahmed al-Rayyah app¬
eared before him and obtained an order exempting him and his follow¬
ers from all manner of taxes.
When the Mahdist uprising began the Arakiyin were reluctant to join
forces with the Mahdists, especially when they saw that a leading
supporter of the movement in the Gezira was Sharif Ahmed Taha, a
sheikh of the rival Sammaniya tariqa. In practice they gave tacit
support to the Shukriya who remained loyal to the Turks and who de¬
feated and killed Sharif Ahmed Taha. But as the Mahdist uprising
grew in strength, Sheikh Hamad al-Nil of the Arakiyin, a descendant
of Yusuf Abu Shara, went to the Mahdi and asked for pardon. He was
not allowed to return to Abu Haraz, and in fact his khalwa there
was destroyed by the Mahdists. Some of the Arakiyin did join the
Mahdist cause, but Hamad al-Nil was kept under detention in Omdurman
after it had fallen to the Mahdists, and he eventually died there.
Some of his sons remained in Omdurman, but others returned to Taiba
and Abu Haraz where to this day the Arakiyin enjoy great prestige.
It lies beyond the scope of my thesis to show how religious fam¬
ilies like the Arakiyin came to adopt a position complement¬
ing that of tribal chiefs in providing a focus for local senti¬
ment and social values. Likewise 1 cannot trace here the
relationship of these holymen with Muslim merchants and the
wider state formation. And for a discussion of these traditional




























































































emergence of present-day classes, 1 must refer the reader to
Abd-al Ghaffar's article.1
Here I am primarily concerned with the significance of the holy-
men in the local economy during the Funj period, and in the
level of productive activity of the settlements with which they
were associated. Not only Abu Haraz, but most of the settle¬
ments on the east bank, of which there are references in the
Funj period, owe their origins and continuity to the presence
of various religious families,whether offshoots of the Arakiyin,
such as in Kiran and Umm Shaneg, or rival families, such as
in Wad el 'Qbeid and Sharif Ya'qub. Rainland cultivation of
dura (millet), supplemented by riverain cultivation of some veg¬
etables and cotton provided the main sources of subsistence.
Grants of land from the Funj rulers, such as the Arakiyin ob¬
tained, were significant not as property rights, since rainland
had no scarcity, but in terms of the exemptions from taxes and
various dues that the beneficients received. Without access to
labour resources entitlement to land had little or no value. The
religious families were able to mobilise extensive labour re¬
sources from their pupils and followers, as well as their own
family members and slaves if they had them. Other households
in these settlements worked their own plots of land, calling on
collective work parties (nafir) at peak periods in the cultivat¬
ion cycle (weeding and harvesting). Following the harvest all
grain other than that required for immediate consumption was
stored in deep pits, lined and covered with straw and topped
with earth (matmura). The storage of grain allowed the balanc¬
ing of poor harvests with the abundance of good harvests. But
also the surplus produce accruing to the religious families
through their mobilisation of a large labour force assured both
the continuity of the community as a whole and the enhance¬
ment of the reputation of the religious families by their gener-
1. Abd-al Ghaffar Muhammad Ahmad: "Tribal" Elite; A Base for Social Stratification
in Modern Sudan, in Sudan Journal of Economic and Social Studies, Vol 2 No 1, Summer
1977, Khartoum,
- 41 -
osity to their supporters and their hospitality to visitors.
Collective work parties were also summoned by religious leaders
in order to excavate wells, and sometimes hafirs (rain pools),
to provide a sufficient supply of drinking water for the local
inhabitants and their herds. While no doubt some sections of
the village community continued a largely nomadic existence,
travelling with their herds into the Butana in the wet season
(nishug), others kept smaller numbers of livestock which for¬
aged locally in woodland areas bordering on the river and in
enclosures lying behind the jerfs (zariba), and of course from
the harvest stubble. Close contacts were maintained with the
nomads of the hinterland. Oral traditions assert that the area
between the two villages of Abu Haraz has always been used
as a watering-point for livestock (mushra') and as a ferrying-
point *or transporting both people and animals across to the Gez-
ira. The neutral status of the Arakiyin holymen allowed the
sharing of such facilities by diverse tribal groups, including
mutually hostile groups, just as their position as arbiters and
mediators encouraged hostile groups to attempt to reconcile
their disputes and feuds in the presence of the fekis.
There must have taken place some exchange of goods from the
hinterland, such as animals and animal products, with goods
from the riverain and rainland areas, notably grain. However,
communities such as Abu Haraz during the Funj period must
have been largely self-sufficient, with the inhabitants growing
enough food to meet their needs, and with domestic crafts prov¬
iding them with their clothing, tools, housing materials and
rudimentary furnishings and equipment. European travellers
such as Bruce and Hartmann certainly portray such a picture.
This does not conflict with the fact that Abu Haraz was situat¬
ed at the intersection of two long-distance trade routes - one
an overland route from Shendi in the north to Sennar in the
south passing through the Butana, the other an east-west route
which crossed the Blue Nile at this point. The goods which
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were carried by caravans on these overland trade routes did
not derive from nor impinge on the subsistence activities of
local communities. The most highly valued goods were gold and
slaves. They also included natural products, such as rhinocer-
ous horns, ivory, ostrich feathers, skins, gum arabic, fragrant
woods and senna leaves. The goods which merchants brought in
exchange consisted chiefly of weapons, fine cloths, salt and
spices, of which only the last two were destined for a wider
circulation than the ruling groups. Some members of the Arak-
iyin may have engaged in trading activities, though the fact
that they could revert to pastoralism so easily during the Turk¬
ish period suggests that these activities impinged only margin¬
ally on their largely self-sufficient way of life and outlook.
Although slaves were one of the main components of long-dis¬
tance trade, their use in local production appears generally to
have restrained rather than encouraged the emergence of com¬
modity production. The dominance of local holymen helped to
ensure the maintenance of patriachal forms of slavery, i.e. the
labour of slaves was employed to a large extent in various dom¬
estic chores, and in cultivation only in so far as they helped
meet the consumption needs of the households to which they
were attached. Spaulding (1974, p.81) suggests that even mer¬
chants who employed slaves in cultivation were more concerned
with having their own subsistence needs met, thus freeing them¬
selves from such work so as to devote all of their time and
attention to their commercial pursuits, than with having sur¬
plus grain produced for exchange on the market.
During the latter part of the Funj period Spaulding gives evid¬
ence that with the expansion of towns and the more widespread
use of coins and other smaller units of exchange, a greater
range of commodities, including grain, were being drawn into
local market exchanges. However for the greater part of the
Funj period it would seem that Samir Amin's generalisation
(1976) stands as valid; that riverain villages in central Sudan
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comprised autonomous communities linked to wider state format¬
ions through the latters' control of long-distance trade.1 In the
Blue Nile rainlands the dominance of local holymen, such as
the Arakiyin, combined with ecological factors, served to encour¬
age extensive cultivation, requiring considerable labour but
simple techniques, with surpluses used primarily for local redis¬
tribution and not for commodity exchanges.
The Turco-Egyptian invasion of the Sudan in the 1820s and its
subsequent occupation until the Mahdist revolt in the 1880s had
a far-reaching impact on the traditional economy and society.2
This is not surprising given that the invasion was closely tied
up with the attempts of Mohammad 'Ali Pasha to industrialise
and modernise Egypt. From Sudan's rich natural resources he
sought to obtain raw materials for his country's new industries
(cotton and indigo for textile manufacturing and gum arabic
for paper-making), grain to meet the needs of the growing in¬
dustrial centres, recruits for the new model army and gold
with which to finance these various developments. As a result
of these policies most of the riverain Sudan suffered an exact¬
ing military occupation, supported by forced levies, and much
more stringent taxes. Also in certain riverain areas technolog¬
ical changes were introduced. Contemporary accounts show that
forced labour was imposed on village communities for the pur¬
pose of building ships and water-wheels, for firing bricks and
the construction of garrisons; livestock were requisitioned for
transport, and labour conscripted for hauling ships up-river
(Hill 1970). Local merchants and riverain cultivators were re¬
quired to introduce water-wheels (sagia), and it was stipulated
that the lands that they irrigated had to be cultivated in part
with indigo, on which the government placed a monopoly. Mono¬
polies were also imposed on other products destined for the
1. Sarair Am in: Unequal Development. Hassock, 1976, p.318-30 passim.
2. See C. Issawi (ed): The Economic History of the Middle East, 1800-1914. Chicago
1966; and R.Hill; Egypt in the Sudan 1820-1881. London, 1959.
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Egyptian market, such as sugar and gum arabic. New crops
were introduced - a new strain of cotton, sugar-cane and var¬
ious vegetables. Some new industrial enterprises were set up
within the Sudan, such as the sugar, arak and soap-making
factories at Kamlin on the Blue Nile. Various new consumer
goods - tea, white sugar, rice and cheap textiles - circulated
in new markets that sprung up. (Hill 1959)
Not all of these changes, of course, occurred in the Blue Nile
rainlands, and it would take more detailed historical research
to ascertain the extent of such changes in this area. In spite
of the large Turkish garrison at Wad Medani, and the large
number of merchants conducting business there, the only sagias
known to have been installed, being referred to by name, were
those at Marangan, just south of Wad Medani, though it is like¬
ly that other ones were also installed in the vicinity. Follow¬
ing the reconciliation of Ahmed al-Rayyah with the Turks in
the 1830s, it appears that the Arakiyin, at least those living
in Taiba and Abu Haraz, were protected from some of the harsh
measures imposed on local communities. But other villages in
the vicinity were severely disrupted. The prospect of having
the greater part of their harvest seized as taxes, and of suffer¬
ing forced levies for billeted troops made many farmers reluct¬
ant to cultivate. On one occasion the inhabitants of two vill¬
ages in the Abu Haraz district burnt their homes and fled into
the Butana for fear of conscription or forced labour. Those that
did cultivate found themselves selling grain at low prices foll¬
owing the harvest in order to meet taxes, and then having to
buy from government stockpiles or merchants at much higher
prices later in the season. The wide fluctuation in prices en¬
couraged some merchants and rainland farmers to utilise hired
labour and slaves to produce surpluses which could be sold off
when the prices were most favourable. However, most merchants
preferred to extend credit to farmers, in the form of grain for
their immediate needs, and to claim partial repayment at har¬
vest-time, demanding a much larger quantity of grain since the
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price was much lower then. Many small-holding cultivators fell
into perpetual debt to merchants in this way, pledging their
future harvests in order to obtain further credit.1 Where this
practice, known as shail, was introduced, and where in gener¬
al mercantile activities spread, the position of local holymen
was steadily and increasingly undermined.
Considerable movements of peoples accompanied the spread of
commodity exchanges and the emergence of new kinds of relat¬
ionships where monetary transactions tended to replace older
social ties. Many northern Sudanese moved south and settled in
the Gezira and Blue Nile regions during the nineteenth century.
Many were Ja'aliyin but other groups from the north were
strongly represented - Shaigiya, Bidairiya, Mahas and Danag-
la. Some came in the wake of the Turkish army, as auxiliar¬
ies, pedlars, ship-navigators or craftsmen. Some came as polit¬
ical fugitives; one village on the east bank, El Tibeib, claims
descent from the followers of Makk Nimr who launched a revolt
against the Turks in 1822. The most significant group was the
Jallaba, the name by which northern petty-traders were known.
It is they, along with the effendiya - the western educated off¬
icials - who in the modern period have been foremost in chall-
enging the dominance of tribal and religious elites. During the
Mahdist uprising also there were great upheavals of populat¬
ion, with more northerners, mostly those who had supported the
Mahdists and who fled south before the encroaching British
army, settling in the Blue Nile area.
The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium witnessed a continuance and
furthering of trends already apparent in the Turkish period,
with the gradual monetarisation of the economy and political
incorporation of tribal groups in the hinterland. On the east
1. For an illustration of this practice already in the Funj period see Spaulding,
1974, p.82.
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bank of the Blue Nile indirect rule was established with the
delegation of authority to nomadic tribal chiefs (Shukriya,
Kawahla and Rufa'a al Sharq) in the rainland areas and in
the western Butana, and to local councils dominated by the loc¬
al elites, such as the Abu Sin family at Rufa'a, in the river¬
ain areas. This system of local government was inherited by
the post-Independence government, and was only abolished in
1971 when 'popular councils' (majlis sha'abl) were established
throughout the country which gave greater participation to
other social classes, notably the merchants.
The Condominium government had no overall plans for develop¬
ing the Butana or the Blue Nile rainlands. However, the govern¬
ment did try to improve conditions in the nomadic sector, since
it provided valuable exports, especially of livestock and hides
to Egypt, and because of its potential in providing a pool of
seasonal labour needed in new irrigation schemes. Various im¬
provements were carried out in the traditional pastures, with
wells being sunk, hafirs excavated and veterinary services in¬
troduced. These improvements, accompanied by the more settled
conditions, led to a great increase in herd sizes and in compet¬
ition for pasture lands. Decades of deforestation - for build¬
ing, charcoal-burning and brick-baking - contributed to the
impoverishment of resources. To alleviate the competition for
pasture the government established a central grazing area in
the Butana in which access to permanent wells during the dry
season was reserved to the Shukriya nomads. In spite of this
measure one government researcher estimated that extensive over¬
grazing had taken place in the Butana and that there was over¬
stocking to the extent of 50% (Lebon, 1965).
This situation was aggravated by the fact that many dry seas¬
on pastures and watering places were coming under increasing
pressure from the intensification and enlargement of lands
under cultivation. This was particularly the case in the Gezira
following the establishment of the irrigation scheme. But it was
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also true of many areas further south bordering the Blue Nile
where several private schemes and many riverain gardens were
established. Taxation of herds provided an additional con¬
straint on animal husbandry. From the government's point of
view taxation of herds achieved many purposes. Apart from rais¬
ing revenue, this taxation provided the Condominium authorities
with savings in local government expenditure. For the taxes
were collected by local tribal chiefs and village headmen who
enjoyed considerable discretion in assessing the contributions
owed by the members of their respective communities. Since con¬
siderable influence and power, and often material benefits,
accrued to these representatives of local government, the auth¬
orities felt it sufficient to reward them with small stipends for
their services. Taxation of animal herds also served to ensure
that sufficient livestock were brought to markets for sale. This
in turn encouraged both the export trade in livestock and the
supply of relatively cheap meat to the growing urban populat¬
ion. Finally, by discriminatory taxation of particular kinds of
livestock, notably goats, the authorities sought to reduce the
extent of harmful overgrazing. This discrimination fell particul¬
arly heavily on small herders who valued the goat for its plen¬
tiful milk.
On the other hand the replacement of the overland caravans by
mechanised transport depreciated the value of camels, though
to some extent this was compensated for by the opening up of
the market for camels for slaughter in Egypt. As a result of
these various pressures many nomadic sections on the east bank
became settled. Also sedentary groups that relied partly on ani¬
mal husbandry began to seek alternative forms of income.
Partly as a result of the increase in size and number of settle¬
ments on the east bank, and partly as a result of the attempts
of the traditional elites to take advantage of the opportunities
for commodity production, the number of sagias and particular¬
ly pump gardens in the riverain areas grew steadily. Accord-
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ing to a survey carried out in the early 1960s there were 36
gardens (17 sagias and 19 pumps) between Rufa'a and Abu
Haraz on the east bank (Hunting, 1965). However, no private
pump schemes were established in this area, unlike the area
to the south of Abu Haraz, on the east bank between the Rahad
and Dinder rivers, where pump schemes for growing cotton were
established at Malakiya (unsuccessfully), Shabarga and Horga,
the latter by the posthumous son of the Mahdi. But the most
far-reaching transformation in land usage took place not on the
east bank but to the west of the Blue Nile with the establish¬
ment of the Gezira Scheme irrigated from a main canal leading
from the Sennar Dam built in 1925. The history of this scheme
has been closely examined by others, and 1 do not wish here
to comment on the differing accounts rendered, but rather to
give some indication of the impact of the Gezira Scheme on the
inhabitants of the east bank.1
First it is worth noting that the first pilot scheme for the
Gezira Project was at Taiba, a leading centre of the Arakiyin
in the Gezira. The site where four large pumps drew water
from the Blue Nile for this experimental scheme is still clearly
visible just opposite Abu Haraz. Both in this and the main sub¬
sequent Scheme the Arakiyin and their followers obtained many
tenancies (howasha) through their title-right to large areas of
rainland in the Gezira. Gaitskell recalls the allocation of ten¬
ancies among the descendents of Ahmed El Tereifi, the uncle of
1. See Gaitskell, 1959, for an 'official' account, and Barnett, 1977, for a radical
view. Originally set up as a commercial venture, with strong Lancashire textile
interests and Condoninion government participation, the Gezira Scheme eventually
came to be wholly managed by the Sudanese Government through the Gezira Board. Plots
of irrigated land were allocated as tenancies on which the farmers had to follow
a strict crop rotation. The Gezira Board provided basic services, such as water,
machinery and marketing services, while the tenant was responsible for providing
or recruiting the necessary labour. Proceeds from cotton, the main crop, were
shared between the tenant and the Gezira Board, while the tenant retained all
the proceeds from other crops. In practice tenancies constituted hereditary but
inalienable land-holdings. Through the original system of allocation of tenancies
large holdings were avoided, though as I note below large clusters of tenancies
may be held by the various members and followers of particular families. This
broad outline of the Gezira Scheme is still largely applicable today, though there
have been attempts at crop diversification.
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Yusuf Abu Shara, in the village of Talha, seven miles south¬
west of Taiba:
Talha was a large village and, on the basis of 30
feddans gross per tenancy, the people were en¬
titled by right of ownership of some 3,000 feddans
to 100 tenancies... The biggest landowners in
Talha are the heirs of Sheikh Ahmed El Tereifi, a
local aristocracy owning some 730 feddans... An
owner can fill up his entitlement by nominating
his sons, relations, servants, or villagers who
used to cultivate his lands, and this he does...
(1959, p.100)
The nomination of relations or followers was necessitated by the
limiting of landowners to holding only two tenancies in their
own name. It allowed a considerable concentration of tenancies
in large, landowning families, as well, of course, as helping
to maintain their power and prestige among their clients and
followers. While some east bank families benefited either from
having title to land in the Gezira or through being nominated
a tenancy, the vast majority lost access to lands they custom¬
arily used for pasture or for growing subsistence crops.
Apart from the relatively small number employed in riverain
gardens, most east bank inhabitants came under strong press¬
ure to migrate at least seasonally in order to sell their labour
to meet all their needs. Domestic crafts, such as spinning and
weaving, were undermined by the large-scale production of cott¬
on as an export commodity and the import of cheap manufact¬
ured textiles. Income was needed to buy clothing and a wide
range of other consumer goods available in the markets. Sub¬
sistence crops grown in the rainlands were still as ever un¬
predictable, and increasing pressures encouraged individuals
to detach themselves from collective work parties and from trad¬
itional patterns of redistribution. Thus while labour migration
may be seen in part as a development of the traditional patt¬
ern of seeking dry season employment, it must also be seen in
the context of the growth of commodity production, both in the
Gezira and on the east bank, and of the process of socio-econ¬
omic differentiation.
Many inhabitants of the east bank migrate with their entire
family and family herds to the Gezira Scheme for the duration
of the cotton-picking season (January to April). Apart from the
income from this activity and from other forms of casual lab¬
our, these groups also obtain some fodder for their herds from
the stubble of previous crops; they sell milk from their herds
to the neighbouring villagers. From a 1973 census of cotton-
pickers, about 200,000 or a third of the total picking labour
came from outside the Gezira Scheme area but from within the
Blue Nile Province, and a large proportion of these must have
come from the east bank.1 A sample survey carried out in the
Rahad Project area on the east bank in 1967-8 revealed that
46.4% of adult males and 12.8% of adult females migrated for
work during the dry season, and that 74% of these went to the
Gezira Scheme and its extensions? More recently it seems that
more of the able-bodied young males have been involved in the
dura harvesting in the mechanised Schemes in the Gedaref
area.3 A sample of nine villages in the northern Rahad Project
area (east of Abu Haraz) in 1975 showed that 361 out of a tot¬
al of 1387 families were temporarily absent in the Gezira, while
485 adult men from the same total were absent working else¬
where, most of them in the mechanised Schemes, some being en¬
gaged in charcoal-burning in the southern woodlands, and a
few performing casual labour in towns.*
1. Ali Mohamed el-Hassan (ed.): Growth, Employment and Equity. A selection of papers
presented to the 110 Comprehensive Employment Strategy Mission to the Sudan, 1973—
75. Khartoum, 1977, p.146.
2. Dept. of Statistics, Democratic Republic of the Sudan. Report on sample survey
1967/8 of first phase of Rahad Project. Khartoum, 1969.
3. The Mechanised Crop Production Schemes in the Gedaref area are Government inspired
projects for the mechanised rain-fed cultivation of dura, which provide an outlet
for indigenous capital. 1000 feddan units of land are leased to entrepreneurs who
have the necessary capital and machinery for crop production.
4. Mohd. El Awad Galal El Din. The Human Factor in the Rahad Project Area: Results
of Population and Socioeconomic Survey. Khartoum, 1975.
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In the riverain areas, and particularly in the larger, longer
established villages in the northern Rahad Project area, such
as Abu Haraz, a somewhat different pattern of labour migration
prevails. Many adult males are engaged in full-time employment
in neighbouring Schemes and in towns, though they return at
regular intervals to their families in these villages. Many are
employed in the infrastructural services entailed in large-scale
irrigation projects, as irrigation controllers, canal-maintainers,
tractor-drivers, construction workers and mechanics. Others
find work in the towns, particularly Wad Medani and Khartoum.
Many of them work as casual labourers or as hawkers and ped¬
lars, and some of these return to cultivate their rainlands in
the wet season, though this is less common among the younger
migrants. Others are employed in various services, as tailors
and shop assistants, and a few as workers in factories. Also
from the more diversified background of the riverain villages,
illustrated in the following chapter, there has emerged a petty-
bourgeois strata of retailers and traders and also, through ed¬
ucational attainment, various categories of professional work¬
ers, including teachers, medical assistants and clerical work¬
ers. The last two groups have frequently been instrumental in
introducing various services, whether through entrepreneurial
or cooperative initiative, in their villages of origin. Thus the
east bank has witnessed local investment in pump gardens,
mechanised transport, brick kilns and the use of tractors in
rainland cultivation, and in various local and consumer ser¬
vices - schools, clinics, water supply, mills, bakeries, and re¬
tailing and butchers' services. Only some 40% of the working
population in Abu Haraz district are today employed primarily
in agricultural occupations.
Thus not only as a response to the impact of the Gezira Scheme
and other neighbouring projects, but also as an internal pro¬
cess stemming from the growth of local commodity production
and the expansion in local services, the east bank is today
characterised by an increasing degree of social differentiation
between and within villages. Some villages, especially the lar¬
ger ones in the northern Rahad Project area (e.g. Sharafa Bara-
kat, Abu Haraz, Umm Shaneg, Abu al Hasan) take on the app¬
earance of well-to-do tenant villages in the Gezira, with a fair¬
ly wide range of services, with a good many if not most houses
built of brick, and with considerable occupational variety.
Like their Gezira counterparts, these villages are internally
differentiated, with, for example, some farmers hiring labour
and machinery for all their tasks, and combining their agricul¬
tural enterprises with other, often more profitable ventures,
such as retailing, owning transport and tractors, slaughtering
livestock, etc; other farmers rely to a greater extent on their
own labour, and are more likely to supplement their income
from farming by selling their own labour or calling on the re¬
mittances of family migrant members. Other villages, especially
the more recently settled ones, take on more the appearance of
the immigrant and labourer villages in the Gezira, with a spar-
sity of services and most houses built of mud and straw, and
the inhabitants relying in the dry season on selling their lab¬
our in generally low paid tasks.
Thus the population of the east bank today can be categorised
according to three main socio-economic groups, between which
of course there is some mobility and overlapping. First, the
great majority who rely partly on their own subsistence activ¬
ities, which have been largely monetarised, and partly on sell¬
ing their labour in seasonal, low-paid migrant activities, such
as cotton-picking in the Gezira. Secondly there are those who
work outside the east bank for the greater part of the year,
but return in some cases to cultivate during the wet season.
Their migrant activities vary from various forms of wage-
labour to petty-trading and other services; a not insignificant
proportion may properly be called petty-bourgeois - such as
shop-keepers and tailors owning their own sewing-machines.
Thirdly there are those engaged in local retailing and ser¬
vices, and local entrepreneurs (owning transport, tractors,
brick-kilns, grain mills, etc.) Within this category may be in¬
cluded employees in local services, such as teachers, medical
assistants, clerks, etc. Many members of the traditional elites'
families have adopted these occupations, though some of them
belong to the previous group, having obtained salaried employ¬
ment in the towns. Finally there are those who have moved into
the ranks of the national bourgeoisie, elite professions and
state bureaucracy. While some of these retain some interest in
their village of origin, most have become thoroughly urbanised,
and are largely ignored for the purpose of this study.
The process of socio-economic differentiation is examined in
more detail in the following two chapters in which my focus
concentrates on two particular villages on the east bank of the
Blue Nile, Abu Haraz and Kumur.
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CHAPTER 3
ECONOMIC DIFFERENTIATION IN EAST BANK VILLAGES
In the last chapter I argued that socio-economic differentiation
had taken place on the east bank largely as a result of the
impact of neighbouring agricultural schemes utilising more in¬
tensive methods of production, and as a result of the general¬
isation of monetary exchanges linking specialised areas of com¬
modity production. I maintained that the population of the east
bank comprised three major socio-economic groupings, the basis
of newly emergent classes in this rural area: the subsistence
orientated yet semi-proletarianised bulk of the population; the
proletarian, lumpen-proletarian and petty-bourgeois migrant
members supporting their families in the east bank; and the
small-scale capitalist entrepreneurs, local traders and govern¬
ment employees concentrated in some of the larger east bank
villages.
In this chapter I wish to examine the process of economic diff¬
erentiation at the micro-level by studying the development of
two villages on the east bank. One of these, which I have al¬
ready frequently referred to, is Abu Haraz, a riverain village
whose history dates back several centuries. The other is
Kumur, a smaller, more recent settlement, situated in the rain-
lands about five miles to the north-east of Abu Haraz. The form¬
er represents, if you like, the larger, more 'developed' kind
of village more prevalent in the northern Rahad Project area
which I suggested is analogous to the Gezira tenant village;
the latter bears greater resemblance to the majority of villages
on the east bank, and if a comparison is to be made with a
community in the Gezira, its counterpart would be one of the
labourer villages.
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To demonstrate the different paths of development on the east
bank, 1 would have preferred in some ways to have selected
a village further inland in the rainland area or from the less¬
er populated southern Rahad Project area, i.e. one where the
inhabitants conformed to a more homogeneous pattern of subsist¬
ence cum low-paid labouring activities. In fact Kumur is some¬
thing of an intermediate form between the villages like Abu
Haraz where the majority of the inhabitants are engaged in non-
agricultural activities, and the smaller villages of the east
bank whose members devote themselves largely to migrant agric¬
ultural labour, outside their own subsistence activities. But
time and difficulties of transport precluded the possibility of
initiating contact with and carrying out detailed studies in a
second village completely unrelated to the one of my main per¬
iod of residence. Kumur had the advantage of proximity to Abu
Haraz and of various ties - both economic and kinship - with
this larger village, and these factors facilitated my familiaris¬
ation with its inhabitants. These ties between the two villages
also serve to show how one village, or at least certain sections
of its population, tends to benefit at the expense of the other.
For the owners of various services concentrated in Abu Haraz,
such as mills, shops, transport and brick-kilns, benefit from
their customers and clients in neighbouring villages such as
Kumur. Moreover, as will be described more fully in the next
chapter, individuals in Abu Haraz hire labour from neighbour¬
ing villages, particularly in rainland cultivation, but also in
enterprises such as the brick-kilns on the river's edge, and
so there is a transfer of value through the purchase of labour-
power. Kinship ties between the two villages are activated both
as a means of realising economic exchanges, such as when kin
ties are called upon to recruit labour, and as a source of
assistance and patronage, such as when relatives are asked to
help maintain children when studying at school, or to help
find employment for thera afterwards.
Abu Haraz, as mentioned earlier, is an old village situated
_ 5? -
just below the confluence of the Rahad River with the Blue
Nile. In fact it comprises three separate villages stretching
westwards along the main river - in order, from near the Rah¬
ad River, Abu Haraz Abu 'Asha, Abu Haraz al Wastani and Abu
Haraz al Warrani. According to the Rahad Project Social Survey
(Galal El Din, 1975) the population of these three villages is,
respectively, 762, 1935 and 1668. The distance between the
former two is very small, two hundred metres or so, while the
distance between the latter two is greater, about a mile. The
space between the two r"in villages, that is Abu Haraz al Wast¬
ani and Abu Haraz al Warrant, is occupied by a large burial
area, containing hundreds of unmarked graves and sixteen
domed tombs of leading Arakiyin holymen. Between this burial
area and the river stand many impressive haraz trees, which
provide shade for the people and animals waiting to cross the
ferry or using the watering-point. While a large part of the
riverain lands on this side of the river are unsuitable for cult¬
ivation, being either too steep and rocky or too sandy, to the
west of Abu Haraz al Warrani lies a large cultivable area on
the high terrace. Beyond this area is the forest of Abu Haraz,
called locally Babalenge, which extends some three miles along
the northward curve of the river as far as the village of El
Eleila (See map). Between the forest and the river are jerfs,
silt banks which can be cultivated as the river recedes in the
early dry season. The rainland area stretches to the north and
north-east of the villages of Abu Haraz, and the method of cult¬
ivation employed there will be described in the next chapter.
Owing to the nature of the terrain terus cultivation commences
at a distance of about three miles from the river at this point.
The intervening land is not cultivated, with the exception of
seasonal water-courses (khor) which intersect this area and
small plots of land, known as bugur; these latter are situated
on slightly more pronounced slopes which ensure plentiful run¬
off in the rainy season. Banks are dug, up to five metres in
length, along these catchment areas, and are fenced off with
thorn scrub. Water-melons and various kinds of cucumber are
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grown in these small plots, and provide a good return when
the rains are plentiful.
Although many other social groups have settled in the area
over the last century and a half, the villages of Abu Haraz
are still strongly associated with various branches of the Arak-
iyin. The descendants of Sheikh Dafa'Allah Masuban (Dafallab)
provide many of the leading families in Abu Haraz al Wastani.
Similarly the descendants of Abu 'Agla al Kashif ibn Hamad al-
Nil ibn Dafa'Allah al Araki CAgliyin) provide many of the
leading families in Abu Haraz al Warrani. Abu Haraz Abu
'Asha is something of an exception. Although it is named after
one of the five sons of Dafa'Allah al Araki, and contains his
grave, it is inhabited mostly by Magharba; these are fair-
skinned people claiming descent from auxiliaries of the Turkish
forces who occupied the area in the 1830s.1 Abu Bakr Abu
'Asha in fact died without descendants - 'Asha being the name
of one of his pupils, and not his daughter as the name sugg¬
ests.
The 'Agliyin are themselves divided into the descendants of
Yusuf Abu Shara and those of his brother 'Abdallah Sarmoota.
Many of the former live in Taiba, and especially since the est¬
ablishment of the Gezira Scheme this has been a preferred
place of residence to Abu Haraz for these religious families.
Nevertheless several descendants of Sheikh Hamad al-Nil, who
was imprisoned by the Mahdi in Omdurman, continue to live in
Abu Haraz al Warrani. The ruins of the khalwa of Sheikh
Hamad al-Nil, which was destroyed on the instructions of the
Mahdi, still stand overlooking the river. Next to it is a large
mosque built to commemorate Sheikh Hamad al-Nil, though his
tomb is in Omdurman. His son, Sheikh El Eleish, who was also
a renowned holyman and teacher, divided his time between Abu
Haraz al Warrani and Kumur in both of which places he had
1. According to Hill (1959, p.9) they were volunteers from the Maghreb.
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a khalwa and had married. It is in these two villages that I
stayed for the greater part of my fieldwork, and on which my
studies focused. Henceforward when I refer to Abu Haraz it is
more specifically to Abu Haraz al Warrani that I am referring.
Before turning to the other groups which have settled in Abu
Haraz, I wish first to deal with the transformation in the pos¬
ition of these religious families. For their position today is
very different from the days when they used to mobilise extens¬
ive labour resources for rainland cultivation. In the last chap¬
ter I referred to the benefits which accrued to many of the
Arakiyin families by virtue of their holding title to large ar¬
eas of rainland in the Gezira affected by the irrigation
scheme. Not only did they receive compensation for their titular
rainland holdings, but also they were able to allocate tenanc¬
ies within the new scheme to the numerous members of their fam¬
ilies, and to their servants and followers. For several reasons
I found it difficult to assess precisely the number of families
in Abu Haraz receiving income from Gezira tenancies. For in
spite of official registration which requires tenancies to be
held in an individual's name, the returns from some tenancies
were often divided between numerous co-heirs. Other holdings
were disguised, having been allocated to nominated clients,
often former slaves, and it was not clear what share of the re¬
turns the latter retained. Moreover, some women did not always
receive the full share they claimed they were entitled to. For
example, an Arakiyin widow in Abu Haraz inherited a half-
tenancy from her husband who had two other wives in the vill¬
age of Manasir in the Gezira. The half-tenancy was managed
by a son of one of these other wives, and the widow in Abu
Haraz complained that he sometimes withheld from her the full
value of the returns from it.
The increase in importance of Taiba for many of the Arakiyin
certainly reflects the economic interests of many of the relig¬
ious families in their Gezira tenancies. The present khalifa or
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leader of the descendants of Yusuf Abu Shara lives in Taiba
where he dispenses impressive hospitality to his followers, and
to visitors and supplicants seeking his favour.1 The income
which religious families derive from Gezira tenancies, combined
with their orientation to new forms of employment which it has
facilitated, has further reduced their declining role in tradit¬
ional rainland cultivation on the east bank. For they no longer
coordinate rainland cultivation on a large scale along the old
lines. Those that still farm cultivate smaller areas mainly with
hired labour, and they collect tithes and rents from other
lands to which they have title. This shift must be seen in the
broader context of the disappearance of recruitment of labour
through ties of kinship and clientage and of collective work
parties. The main forT|ls of land-rent are 'ushr and dugundi.
The former is a payment of a tenth of the rainland harvest;
this is the proportion of a man's income which a Muslim is ex¬
horted to give as alms (zakat). Today, when this payment is
made, farmers consider it as a voluntary offering, though pres¬
cribed by Islamic teachings, rather than a tithe owed to a
specific religious family. 1 did not ascertain the extent to
which these offerings are actually made, since the harvest in
question was a very poor one, and so for many farmers the
problem of tithes did not arise.
Dugundi was originally a payment made in recognition of the
labour expended by a previous occupier in improving the land,
i.e. in clearing the land and making terus ridges (Matthew,
1921). Latterly the term has become more widely used to refer
to the practice of renting land from a landowner. In the Abu
Haraz rainlands the rent for land cultivated by dugundi is gen¬
erally between £S1 and £S2 per gada'a.2 In the case of river¬
ain lands, i.e. jerfs, money rents have almost universally re-
1. The Arakiyin of Abu Haraz al Wastani have a separate khalifa.
2. 1 gada'a - 5 feddans. 1 feddan - 1.038 acres - 0.42 hectares
£S1 ■= 100 pt. (piastres). £1 sterling - 79 pt.
A
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placed share-cropping arrangements. The jerfs between the
forest and the river at Abu Haraz are owned by various fam¬
ilies of the 'Agliyin Arakiyin, but are rented out to non-
Arakiyin farmers living in Abu Haraz. Only one jerf was share-
cropped, while all the others were rented at an amount varying
from lOpt to 20pt per 'ood.1 The religious families to whom
these rents accrue place little emphasis today on this income
from undeveloped riverain or rainlands. On the other hand, as
we will see shortly, religious families are concerned to in¬
crease their income from lands put to more intensive use.
Members of the religious families have increasingly adopted new
occupations. This has been facilitated by their high level of
literacy and educational attainment, the availability of capital
for commercial ventures deriving from their landed wealth, and
their wide-ranging influence and connexions. Many of the Arak¬
iyin both in Abu Haraz and in Taiba are now employed in
professional or clerical positions. A smaller, but not insignific¬
ant number are engaged in commercial activities, following the
example of Ishag Hamad al-Nil, the son of the Arakiyin leader
imprisoned in Omdurman, who established himself as a whole¬
sale merchant in agricultural produce in the capital. The pos¬
ition that these families once enjoyed within the local commun¬
ity has become increasingly circumscribed. Modern education,
judicial and medical services have all undermined the inter¬
locking range of services formerly provided by the religious
families. There are no longer active khalwas in either Abu
Haraz or Kumur, though some of the Arakiyin find work as rel¬
igious teachers in Wad Medani, attaching themselves to various
mosques there and receiving salaries for their services. There
are, however, people in Abu Haraz that are still referred to
as fekis; they provide charms and amulets and other tradit¬
ional cures for clients who come to them when they are sick or
have a particular problem. In addition their services are still
1. 'ood is a measurement of river frontage, of about 4 metres.
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widely called upon during life-cycle ceremonies. Only two of
these fekis in Abu Haraz al Warrani cultivated during the 1977
season, and their cultivation strategies differed little from
those of other farmers in the village. Both hired tractors and
wage-labourers. One derived cash for this purpose from the
shared income from a Gezira tenancy, supplemented by rents
from local jerfs; the other derived this cash mainly from the
earnings of sons working in Khartoum. Other fekis who did not
cultivate support themselves through the salaries or remittances
of their sons, or through rents from lands used more intensive¬
ly, i.e. riverain gardens, riverain lands used for brick kilns
and Gezira tenancies.
Since the descendants of Sheikh Hamad al-Nil claim ownership
of the lands on the high terrace west of Abu Haraz and share
with the Sarmoota branch nearly all the jerfs, they have bene¬
fited from developments in these areas. However, they them¬
selves have not generally been the initiators of these develop¬
ments, and it is necessary here to trace the significance of the
other non-Arakiyin groups who have settled in Abu Haraz.
These other groups comprise many immigrants from the northern
Sudan, but also some local tribal groups of which some were
formerly nomadic.
The forbears of these groups came and settled in Abu Haraz
during the latter part of the Turco-Egyptian occupation and
during the period of Mahdist rule, which as noted earlier were
times of considerable upheavals of population. Some smaller
groups also settled in the village at the beginning of the Con¬
dominium Many of the original settlers took wives from the
Arakiyin, while later settlers married from these newly estab¬
lished groups and from other immigrants in neighbouring vill¬
ages. Thus although in succeeding generations many close
marriages have been enacted, there has been considerable inter¬
mixing of these groups; indeed, the not infrequent practice of
marriage with a non-relative followed by a close matrilateral
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marriage in the next generation has counteracted the statist¬
ical preference of close patrilateral marriages, and consequent¬
ly diluted the strength of patrilineal descent groups. Actual
families living in the village today are in many cases descend¬
ed from members of different tribal groups, and their heterogen¬
eous background is usually acknowledged by the actors with no
attempt by them to formulate a descent ideology. Descent is
only stressed by those groups, such as the Arakiyin, seeking
to legitimate their material and symbolic patrimony.1
The part of the village occupied by the various immigrant
groups is often referred to as fariq al Dongolawi both by the
occupants themselves and by the Arakiyin. This is in recognit¬
ion of the fact that the earliest settlers of non-Arakiyin desc¬
ent came from the Dongola area of northern Sudan, and many
of the other incomers were also northerners. In fact, this fariq
comprises people of diverse tribal and geographical origin, in¬
cluding Khandagawi, Mahas, Ja'ali, Shaigi, Bidairi, Kawahla,
Khawalda, Ja'afra, Batahin and Kinana. Separated from this
fariq by a wadi is the older part of the village, known to the
Dongolawi as fariq al Arakiyin. This part of the village which
is closest to the river is occupied in fact both by the Sarmoota
and the other main branch of the 'Agliyin and by a group
descended from a Jimi'ab feki who settled in the village. This
feki came to Abu Haraz in order to extend his religious know¬
ledge, anc* given an Arakiyin wife by Sheikh Hamad al^Mi'L Sub¬
sequently he established a khalwa in the village. His descend¬
ants gathered enough funds so that with some government help
they built a mosque on the site of the khalwa. In spite of the
association of the older mosque with Sheikh Hamad al-Nil, this
newer mosque is today the most widely patronised in the
village.
The non-Arakiyin settlers in Abu Haraz came from various back-
1. P.8ourdieu: Outline of a theory of practice. Cambridge, 1977.
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grounds, became established in the village for different reas¬
ons, and subsequently followed quite varied occupations,
though nearly all of them took up rainland cultivation as a
major economic activity. I do not propose to give an account
of all the groups that settled in the village, but rather I wish
to concentrate on those groups who were largely responsible
for the introduction or expansion of new economic activities.
The new activities I am referring to were primarily the intens¬
ification of crop production through the operation of sagias
(Persian wheels) in riverain gardens, and the trading of sur¬
plus produce - whether vegetables from riverain gardens, dura
from rainland cultivation or livestock; traders in vegetables
procured produce from local gardens following the installation
of sagias and traded this produce in local markets, while trad¬
ers in grain and livestock procured these goods both locally
and from other regions and similarly traded them in both local
and more distant markets. 1 am not arguing that the impetus
for these changes had to come from exogenous sources, that
only newcomers to the area could initiate the intensification of
local production and exchange of commodity goods. In other
east bank villages local religious elites established new gar¬
dens. For example, Sharif families of the Sammaniya order were
responsible for introducing pump gardens in the vicinity of
Sharafa Barakat. Religious families of the Khatmiya order in
Sharif Ya'qub engaged directly in large-scale mercantile oper¬
ations. Moreover I do not want to suggest that all the new
settlers in Abu Haraz played an innovatory role, that they all
adopted or brought with them new skills and assets. Indeed
most of them took up the local customary livelihood of combin¬
ing rainland with jerf cultivation, supported by a varying deg¬
ree of reliance on family herds; others, as we have seen,
adopted the role and life-style of the religious teachers. How¬
ever it may be said that the general orientation of the tradit¬
ional elites towards monopolising political offices, and through
their compromise with modern education towards acquiring salar¬
ied posts left something of a vacuum which entrepreneurs and
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petty-traders were able to fill in respect of the widening econ¬
omic opportunities which stemmed from the conquests and
changes in state formation in the nineteenth century. The move¬
ment of peoples certainly was a conducive factor in the spread
of new transactions, especially those which entailed monetary
exchanges.
The impetus for irrigating the high terrace on the lands to the
west of Abu Haraz appears to have come from some of the north¬
erner settlers, and in particular those from the Khandaq area.
During the latter part of the nineteenth century Mohammad al
Khandagawi came to Abu Haraz and married an Arakiyin girl.
He had two sons and several daughters. The eldest son, Dafa-
'Allah, joined the Mahdist army and was killed at Tokar in
1891. The other son, Abdelrahman, engaged in rainland culti¬
vation and local trading. The daughters were married to other
northern immigrants, one to an officer in the Mahdist army,
originally from the north but whose family had settled in the
Wad Nabawi district of Omdurman, and another to a Ja'ali
cultivator and livestock-owner. During the early Condominium
the sons of Abdelrahman, assisted by their patrilateral cous¬
ins, one of whom had been appointed Sheikh el hilla (village
headman), obtained permission from Sheikh Abdelbagi Hamad al-
Nil to install a sagia on the lands adjoining the village.
This form of irrigation entails the yoking of a pair of oxen to
a horizontal wheel which drives a vertical wheel attached to
which are water buckets; these buckets raise the water from
the river and deposit it in a major channel. From this channel
the water is then distributed to the cultivated ground through
a network of minor channels which can be opened or closed as
required. Up to five acres of land could thus be irrigated dur¬
ing the season of the river's high water; during the dry seas¬
on, when the water had to be raised from a much lower level,
considerably less land would have been cultivated.1 Various
1. See J.D.Tothill (ed): Agriculture in the Sudan. London 1948.
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vegetables were grown on this irrigated land, and later orange
and lemon trees and date palms were planted. The most import¬
ant vegetables grown were bamia (okra), khodra (Jew's mall¬
ow), tomatoes and chillies, since these could all be dried and
thus used as articles of trade. Randell emphasises that many
merchants in the Blue Nile region began their operations
through the accumulation of a regular surplus from such river¬
ain crops; these they then exchanged both for grain and live¬
stock and for imported goods in the markets of Omdurman." How¬
ever, other vegetables were also grown in the garden, such as
egg-plants, onions, marrows, cucumbers, potatoes, salads,
water-melons, various bean plants and berslm (a kind of clov¬
er). These crops were mainly for consumption within the vill¬
age, though petty-traders from the village visited neighbouring
villages, on both sides of the river, on donkey carrying bask¬
ets of such produce. Some older men in the village recounted
to me numerous anecdotes and incidents which occurred to them
during such trips.
The returns from the sagia garden at Abu Haraz were divided
according to customary usage between the landowner, the owner
of the water-wheel, the owners of the oxen, and the providers
of the necessary labour. Other settlers in the village, notably
Ja'ali and Kawahla, contributed to the extension of riverain
lands under cultivation. From the traces of past civilisation it
would seem that over 150 acres of land to the west of the vill¬
age came under irrigation. Other water-wheels were installed
both on the riverside and at the side of wells (matara), and
at high water shadufs were also used; these were wooden
frames supporting a vertical beam with a weight at one end
and a container for lifting the water at the other. Apart from
providing surplus produce which could be traded, the riverain
gardens also encouraged the development of local crafts - car¬
pentry, pot-making, building and leatherwork.
1. J.R.Randell: El Gedid - a Blue Nile Gezlra Village. Sudan Notes and Records,
Vol. 39, 1958.
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Other settlers in the village, however, turned their attention
to trading in goods derived from the traditional sector of rain-
land cultivation, and animal husbandry. Mohammad 'Alim was
an adviser to the Mahdi, and though originally from the north
of the Sudan, lived in the Wad Nabawi district of Omdurman.
He came to Abu Haraz at the beginning of the Condominium. His
son, Abdelrahim, who was married to the daughter of a Mahdist
judge (qadi) also from Omdurman, was a trader in dura which
he bought in the south near Roseires and sold in Omdurman.
Realising the potential of Abu Haraz as a local market, for
buying in years of plenty and for selling at times of shortage,
he built a shop and store in the village. This was the first
shop to open in Abu Haraz. The descendants of this family occ¬
upy a large area in the northern part of the village.
Before the mechanisation of transport during the middle and
later parts of the Condominium, the carrying of bulky goods
like grain was done in ships. The forbears of several families
in Abu Haraz, particularly Bidairi ones, worked on boats on
the Blue Nile. Abdallahi 'Abu Shillukh'1 and Abdelghenni 'Ali,
his cousin (FBS), both worked on these boats and both told me
many tales of their exploits in the southern Blue Nile area and
the Ingessana Mountains in their earlier days. Abdelghenni
also used to cultivate dura in the southern rainland areas
around Jebel Moya with another cousin (FBS), 'Awad al Karim,
whose sister he had married. They used to sell this grain to
merchants, and share the returns. But when 'Awad al Karim
opened a shop in the southern Gezira, this family partnership
broke up. Abdelghenni complained that his cousin had sold
grain in his shop and not given him a fair share of the re¬
turns.
Trading in livestock was also a lucrative occupation in which
both recent settlers in the area and local large herd-owning
1. Nicknames are very common. Abu Shillukh means the bearer of facial scars.
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families participated. The present-day butchers in Abu Haraz
are descended from Ja'ali and Ja'afra livestock-trading famil¬
ies. The father of Hasan Manawir, who has a shop in the vill¬
age and is chairman of the village committee, traded in
livestock in the west of Sudan, and during the Second World
War supplied cattle to the British Army.
Thus the latter part of the nineteenth century and the first
half of this century witnessed an intensification of local prod¬
uction and an increase in commercial and non-agricultural act¬
ivities, which were partly related to the first factor - the
production of local commodities for exchange. This coincided
with the influx of many non-Arakiyin families into Abu Haraz.
The accumulation of mercantile capital by several families in
the village was accompanied by the setting up of retailing bus¬
inesses in the expanding towns, particularly Wad Medani and
Khartoum, and the branching out into related activities, such
as tailoring. It also allowed sons to follow full-time modern
education thus improving their chances of gaining salaried
employment, just in the same way that the rents and other
sources of income of many of the religious families allowed
them to diversify their interests. The loss of labour that this
entailed to rainland cultivation and other household productive
activities could be made up by the hiring of labour, both from
within the village and from neighbouring villages.
The development of government irrigation schemes in the Gezira
and elsewhere required both skilled and unskilled labourers
and clerical workers, and the patronage of the Arakiyin, in
the form of contacts and references, ensured the acquisition of
reasonably paid jobs if villagers wished to find work outside
the village. During the latter part of the Condominium many
villagers availed themselves of these opportunities. Given that
an ever increasing number of consumer goods had to be pur¬
chased, and that peoples' expectations of their standards of
living steadily rose, households required considerably more
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cash than they could raise from selling local produce or anim¬
als from their herds if they still had them.
These developments, however, led to tensions between the land¬
owning religious families in Abu Haraz and members of the non-
Arakiyin who sought to develop further the resources of the
riverain lands. It is not exactly clear how the conflict about
the lands on which the sagias were situated came about.1 It
seems that the Arakiyin landowners sought a greater share of
the produce, or at least a larger money rent from the existing
sagias. At the same time they took measures to install a pump
to irrigate part of the land, and it seems they expected the
sagia cultivators to work as paid labourers in this garden.
The sagia cultivators may themselves have wished to have
installed a pump; such an intiative could have been brought
about, either by one or more of the partners wishing to termin¬
ate their share of .the joint enterprise, or by one of the part¬
ners with capital to invest seeking to buy out the other part¬
ners. For most sagias were complex contractual arrangements,
with 6 or 8 men each providing two oxen for a water-drawing
shift, the owner of the wheel itself, the provider of the tools
and seeds and finally the tenant labourer all having shares
in the enterprise. (Hunting, 1965). Whatever may have been the
case, the result was that the lands cultivated by sagia were
abandoned, and Sheikh Hamad al-Nil Abdelbagi . enclosed an
area of about 60 acres and installed a diesel pump. This occ¬
urred shortly after the Second World War. Today villagers
attribute the abandoning of the sagias to a dispute over who
owned the lands, and also to the low prices obtained .for,.the
garden produce. In spite of the marriage of Sheikh Hamad al-
Nil to the widow of Gasmallah al Khandagawi (her FBS), who
was the sister of the main cultivators of the garden, the Arak¬
iyin Sheikh was not able to mobilise sufficient labour to work
1. I received varying accounts of this dispute. Further research in local court
files would probably clarify the issues at stake, and the positions adopted by the
parties involved.
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in the garden, and so it never realised its potential. Recently
the present owner, Abdelrahman 'Abu Shenub'1 Sheikh Hamad
al-Nil tried to resuscitate the garden, but he was obliged to
bring in labourers from the neighbouring village of Fedasi and
offer them a 50-50 sharecropping arrangement, under which he
provided the water and they the seeds and labour.
The constraints which conflicting land claims, and particularly
the overriding claims of the religious families, placed on land
development was again illustrated during the year of my field-
work. It concerned the son of one of the village butchers who
was a lorry-owner and the operator of a brick-kiln near the
village of El Eleila. Since he sold many of the bricks from his
existing kiln to Abu Haraz villagers for new buildings there,
he decided he would try to open up a new brick-kiln on the
disused sagia lands adjoining the village. He approached sever¬
al of the Arakiyin families who had claims either to the jerfs
or to the high terrace and offered them payments for the use
of the land. He also made a formal application to the village
committee, on which was represented, as Sheikh el hilla, one
of the descendants of one of the original Khandagawi sagia cult¬
ivators. The outcome was that the village entrepreneur
found he had to negotiate with so many different people, all
claiming vested interests in the land, that he eventually gave
up the plan.
The collapse of the sagia gardens encouraged further labour
migration from Abu Haraz, particularly of young men. They
went to work in neighbouring irrigation schemes and in the
towns, and sent back remittances to their families in the vill¬
age. Contacts with previous migrants from the village, and esp¬
ecially with the traders from the village who had established
retailing businesses in the towns facilitated this process. More¬
over, the relative ease of transport between these places of
1. Abu Shenub means one who has a beard.
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work and Abu Haraz allowed married men also to work outside
the locality and return to their families at regular intervals.
As outlined in the previous chapter, in common with the rest
of the east bank, the inhabitants of Abu Haraz were able to
rely less and less on their traditional economic activities and
were pressurised more and more to sell their labour.
These wider factors which encouraged in the first place sedent-
erisation and in the second place the adoption of migrant wage
labour were primarily the constraints placed on animal husband¬
ry, the commoditisation of rainland cultivation of dura, and
the increasing need of the population for cash. The loss of
traditional pasture lands through the utilisation of large areas
for intensive cultivation and depletion of remaining pastures
through overgrazing and deforestation placed severe pressures
on the viability of animal husbandry. As we have seen, the
political hegemony of the Shukriya in the Butana, which was
sustained and extended by the Condominium authorities, led to
the exclusion of other tribal groups from dry season watering-
points over a large area of the central Butana. Discriminatory
taxation of particular kinds of livestock created a particularly
heavy burden for settled communities. For example, in the late
1960s the annual tax on goats in the Rahad Project area was
80pt per head, compared with 135pt on cattle, and only 60pt
on camels and lOpt on sheep.1 This tax fell particularly heav¬
ily on the settled population in villages such as Abu Haraz,
since they relied greatly on goats, and to a lesser extent on
cattle, to supplement their subsistence from rainland and river¬
ain cultivation.
The commoditisation of dura cultivation, with cheap grain
brought by traders from the southern rainlands, and the grow¬
ing need for cash to buy an ever increasing range of commod-
1. Abdel Razig El Basheir: Agricultural manpower and economic development in Sudan:
some case studies on present and prospective patterns of labour utilisation in the
Rahad Project area. M.Sc. Khartoum, 1970.
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ities have already been referred to. What I wish to stress here
is that the traditional economy entailed for most households a
combination of economic activities, namely riverain and rain-
land cultivation, animal husbandry, domestic crafts and some
cash labour. Some of these activities were strongly interrel¬
ated. For example, extensive cultivation encouraged growth of
herds, since even where crops were a failure from the point of
view of grain for human consumption, the stubble and poor
quality grain provided fodder for animals; in turn these anim¬
als in providing milk, contributed a major element to the peo¬
ples' diet in times of grain shortage. Where too great a press¬
ure existed on just one element in this combination, the tradit¬
ional livelihood no longer remained viable. This happened in
the case of Abu Haraz. With the collapse of the sagias, the
destruction of local crafts, and the constraints placed on anim¬
al husbandry, the pressure on rainland cultivation was too
strong, especially in view of the fact that collective work part¬
ies no longer operated.
From the perspective of the individual household the migration
of one or more of its junior members provided a strategy by
which it could maintain its own viability. The specific strategy
followed by a particular household with respect to the allocat¬
ion of labour of its members would depend on its status and
resources and on the number of children, particularly sons. Up
until the present young generation it has been common for at
least one son to engage in rainland cultivation and to help
manage the family herds; and often the father has facilitated
the early marriage of this son. The solidarity between sib¬
lings, especially where they have followed different occupat¬
ions, varies considerably. It does not necessarily follow that
sibling ties have weakened as a result of this occupational
differentiation. In fact often quite strong cooperative ties exist
between brothers following different occupations both among fam¬
ilies with established religious status and among those which
enjoy a sizeable family patrimony. In these cases the sharing
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of symbolic and material interests encourage the maintenance
of close kinship ties. For example, three brothers of a respect¬
ed Ja'ali family in the village have succeeded in linking their
separate family enterprises to mutual advantage, and thus
have all stood to benefit from the understanding they origin¬
ally came to as to how best allocate their labour. The eldest
brother remained in Abu Haraz, cultivated his and his broth¬
ers' rainlands, and from the nucleus of the family herd set
himself up as a butcher in the village. The second brother
worked for a time as an irrigation controller in the Gezira and
then opened a shop in the village. The third brother has al¬
ways worked outside the village, and now has his own clothing
store in Khartoum. The latter two have combined to install a
new electric grinding mill in the village adjoining the second
brother's shop. Several marriages and engagements have been
made between the offspring of the three brothers. However, this
kind of cooperation does not always exist where there are over¬
lapping property interests between siblings. For example, the
sons of the introducer of the first shop to the village assert
a considerable degree of independence from each other in spite
of their inheriting a substantial patrimony. The eldest brother
assumed responsibility for the shop which today he has made
completely his own. The second brother is the caretaker of a
government cement warehouse at Mafaza which is a large vill¬
age near the railway to the south; though his first wife is
from Abu Haraz, he spends most of his time at Mafaza where
he has taken a second wife. The two other brothers are both
tailors, one working in the village and the other in Khartoum,
though the latter returns to cultivate in the rainy season
albeit independently of his brothers. In spite of three of the
brothers having married daughters of their father's brother,
little cooperation exists between them. When the senior brother
installed a new mill near his shop, this was entirely his own
enterprise; and it only served to widen the gulf between him
and his brothers.
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Kinship ties may be utilised in attempts to establish new relat¬
ions of dependence. For example, the shop-owner just referred
to, wished in the past to open up a new shop in Wad Medani.
So he acquired a shop in the central market, purchased the
necessary stock and arranged with his cousin (FBS) for him to
work in it in exchange for a share of the profits. This cousin
had in fact wanted a loan with which to establish such a busi¬
ness of his own, and was not very happy with the arrangement
agreed upon. So he saved up enough money to cover the costs
which had been expended on setting up the shop and handed
this over to the Abu Haraz shop-keeper. In another case a
tailor from the village who had his own stall in one of the mar¬
kets in Khartoum agreed at first for his brother-in-law to
bring his own sewing-machine and work with him, since the
latter was both a good tailor and also a witty character who
attracted a lot of clients. But when this brother-in-law became
regularly absent through heavy drinking, his affine asked him
to find another place to work. He then proceeded to install a
sewing-machine of his own and find a more reliable worker in
the space occupied by the indulgent brother-in-law.
Kinship ties certainly provide the channels for a wide set of
economic relations. For example, kinship ties can provide the
framework for the linking of urban enterprises with the family
farm, for assisting the transfer from rural to urban employment
and, through providing job patronage, for maintaining family
businesses. However, in the long run economic interests tend
to predominate over kinship interests; social and economic mob¬
ility ensures that patronage is not given the scope to perpet¬
uate the existence of large kinship groups whose members ident¬
ify their interests with the interests of their respective groups.
Rather kinship ties are utilised for more immediate ends - rely¬
ing on a sibling to look after aging dependents so as to seek
work away from home, seeking accomodation in the town, find¬
ing work and so on.
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Today Abu Haraz is marked by increasing economic differentiat¬
ion, which in turn, especially with the introduction of modern
services,1 is reflected in different standards of living. These
changes in the mode of consumption will be examined in Chap¬
ter 5. Four out of five male householders, and an even higher
proportion of the total active male population, are primarily
employed in non-agricultural occupations. Incomes from salaried
employment vary at least tenfold, from £S14 a month for a care¬
taker in one of the village schools to over £S120 a month for
a School Director. Income from trading activities varies even
more markedly, as one would expect, if one compares the seller
of firewood or vegetables in the village with the wholesale
dealer in Khartoum. Although there were no large farmers in
Abu Haraz (the maximum area of rainland cultivation by any
one farmer in the village was 60 acres) a marked difference is
now apparent in the amount of capital invested in farming act¬
ivities; no longer are variations in farming strategies attribut¬
able primarily to the respective labour resources and consump¬
tion needs of individual households (see next chapter).
The extent of permanent migration from the village is difficult
to assess precisely, since kinship ties are evaluated largely
in terms of actual contacts and communication. No doubt some
informants omitted certain relatives when asked whether any
had moved out of the village. But in general permanent migrat¬
ion seems to have been most common among the extremes of the
social spectrum, i.e. persons of traditionally low social status,
particularly some ex-slaves, and those that have attained prof¬
essional status or become members of the mercantile bour¬
geoisie. One family has placed great emphasis on educational
attainment and salaried employment; most of the Diyeb family
moved to Wad Medani many years ago, and the first generation
of educated members took up work in the various Ministries,
1. Abu Haraz al-Warrani has four schools, a clinic, a Cooperative Shop, three mills,
twelve private shops, and a youth club. Piped water and electricity have been extend¬
ed to many households. (See p.
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the Municipality and the Railway. The present generation in¬
cludes ten graduates or persons still engaged in higher educat¬
ion or further training. This is the only family associated with
Abu Haraz where a significant number of female members are
employed. A few individuals have entered the ranks of the
bourgeoisie through steady accumulation of capital from trading
activities. One is a major contractor in Khartoum, who has
built offices and hotels in the capital and also owns a plastic
factory there. Another is a wholesale dealer in imported tex¬
tiles, who also does some contracting in Khartoum. Another,
having left a senior post in the Ministry of Agriculture, has
set up a company trading in agricultural goods with Saudi
Arabia. Although these individuals may help to finance various
village developments (the contractor built the boys' secondary
school, and a wholesale merchant endowed a new clinic follow¬
ing a successful heart operation in London), their interests
force them to take up residence in the capital. In the case of
other migrants the most pressing factor which predisposes tak¬
ing up new residence is marriage into a family from the new
work location.
The maintenance of residential ties with the village has been
encouraged by the introduction of modern services and amenit¬
ies - notably the schools, clinic, water pump and piping, and
most recently electricity. Most of these services have been in¬
troduced through cooperative efforts under the impetus of trad¬
ers, shop-keepers and teachers. The absence of government pat¬
ronage such as is enjoyed by the neighbouring village, Abu
Haraz al Wastani, required the villagers of Abu Haraz al Warr-
ani to call on their own efforts to improve the level of services
and amenities within their village. Faced with the alternative
of moving their families to their places of work in the towns
- with the disadvantages of higher costs entailed in obtaining
family accommodation, and of greater isolation for the women¬
folk - or of leaving their families in Abu Haraz, but seeking
to improve living conditions and the range of services, these
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groups have sought the latter course. In the case of many mig¬
rants the choice does not exist, since moving their families is
impractical either because their work entails bachelor condit¬
ions or because their income is so low that they can only
afford bachelor accommodation.
The retention of residential ties in Abu Haraz by most of the
migrants has led to considerable variety in the social and econ¬
omic composition of the village. The pattern that migration from
the village has taken has contributed significantly to occupat¬
ional diversification, and in the main to a raising of stand¬
ards of living in the village. I have stressed that this is
largely due to the specific conditions which facilitated the pur¬
suit of alternative livelihoods to subsistence activities; in part¬
icular I have drawn attention to the background of petty-trad¬
ing of riverain and rainland products, and in the case of
many of the religious families, the benefits they derived from
the intensification of agricultural production, notably in the
Gezira. While these patterns of labour migration and occupation¬
al diversity are found in some of the other large villages on
the east bank, they differ from the prevailing pattern of lab¬
our migration in this area - which is predominantly seasonal
agricultural labour and casual work. In later chapters I will
seek to demonstrate that the form of socio-economic differentiat¬
ion that I have examined here has special implications for
domestic organisation. This centres around the question of the
sexual division of labour. For it will be noted that the women
in Abu Haraz are no longer productively active. In later chap¬
ters I will examine how provision for women and the different¬
iation of life-styles has affected domestic and marriage patt¬
erns. But first I must examine the line of development that has
occurred in the other village that I studied, Kumur.
In its physical appearance Kumur differs markedly from Abu
Haraz. The broad sweep of the river, the impressive haraz
trees and the white domed qubbas provide a pleasing approach
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to the villages of Abu Haraz; the settlements themselves afford
a varied landscape, with long, low school buildings, shops
with verandas and houses of differing style, age and grand¬
eur. On the periphery of the settlement are some isolated
houses, mostly surrounded by walled enclosures; in the centre
the houses press closely on each other and can only be app¬
roached through a maze of twisting paths. In these older parts
of the settlement walled enclosures usually contain several
houses each with its own sub-dividing inner wall and interlink¬
ing enclosures and passages. Shade is provided by the dense
foliage of the nim tree (Azadirachta indica), which from a dis¬
tance appears to give unbroken cover to the centre of the vill¬
age, but which are in fact scattered between the various
buildings.
Kumur on the other hand is situated inland amid the rain-
lands, and from a distance appears as an undifferentiated
raised mass on the horizon. Approached more closely the settle¬
ment reveals a collection of unenclosed round huts made of mud
and straw (gutiya); the homogeneity of these buildings and of
the open space between them is offset by a few square unen¬
closed buildings scattered among these gutiyas, and at the cen¬
tre of the village by a cluster of more substantially built
houses. There are very few trees. The only public building is
the water pump and tank. It is situated in isolation equidis¬
tant from the three settlements which in fact comprise Kumur.
On all sides of these settlements lie the rainlands which for
most of the year provide a bare dun backcloth, but which dur¬
ing the cultivation of the rainy season break up the monotony
of the landscape.
Kumur comprises three settlements, Kumur el Batahin, Masara,
and Kumur Sheikh el Eleish, although the latter two are pract¬
ically contiguous. Kumur el Batahin lies to the north-east, con¬
taining about sixty households of the Batahin tribe. Most of
these Batahin families still practise a nomadic way of life,
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travelling with their herds far into the Butana in the wet seas¬
on and crossing over into the Gezira during the dry season.
To the north-west lies the settlement of the Masara, a branch
of the Juhayna tribe; about half of these households rely prim¬
arily on rainland cultivation and income from casual local lab¬
our rather than on animal husbandry, but the other half, like
their relatives encamped near Taif thirty miles to the south¬
east, migrate with their herds. More or less contiguous with
this settlement on the south side stands Kumur el Eleish, named
after Sheikh el Eleish ibn Hamad al-Nil. Like his father he
was a renowned Arakiyin holyman. He lived part of the time
in Abu Haraz and part of the time in Kumur where he married
a Masara girl. He died in 1967. This is the largest of the
three settlements, comprising a population of 435 and including
households of Arakiyin, Masara, Ja'ali, Khawalda and Shukriya
descent, though many are intermixed, as well as families of
former slaves. It is to this latter settlement that I am referr¬
ing, rather than to the other two predominantly nomadic settle¬
ments, when I use the name Kumur.
The name kumur is used quite frequently on the east bank to
designate settlements, and has different shades of meaning; in
general it can be said that the name refers to a settlement
which originated as a dry season camp but to which were att¬
ached various clients who cultivated the adjacent lands in the
wet season and who through time provided the nucleus of an
autonomous settlement. These 'clients' comprised the former
slaves of various nomadic households. But they also included
nomadic families who, through lack of adequate animal or hum¬
an resources, were no longer able to pursue a viable nomadic
career.® In many cases the land occupied as the dry season
camp was situated in the tribal dar, i.e. the area to which
the particular tribal group enjoyed communal right of access;
1. Mohamed el-Hadi Ahmed Abu Sin: The Regional Geography of the Butana North of the
Railway. M.A. Khartoum, 1970.
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in these cases the occupants of the new settlement gradually
asserted their own rights to use of the adjacent lands, cultivat¬
ing for their own needs rather than for the groups to which
they had been formerly attached; they thus became autonomous
in the sense of being independent of wider tribal rights and
obligations. Kumur first came to be used as a summer camp by
the Masara in the 1920's or early 1930' s when a well was con¬
structed there. Politically these settlers were subject to the
Arakiyin of Abu Haraz. For it was the Arakiyin, rather than
a nomadic group that laid claim to large areas of rainland in
the vicinity of the new settlement. Formerly the inhabitants of
Kumur contributed substantially to the large work parties mobil¬
ised by the Arakiyin holymen. During the life-time of Sheikh
el Eleish Kumur had no autonomous village organisation, but
was administered and taxed directly from Abu Haraz. Since
then it has had its own village headman; he is the son of
Sheikh el Eleish. Today when the inhabitants of Kumur render
labour to farmers from Abu Haraz it is for wages; moreover the
plots they cultivate for their own needs have become effectively
their own.
This is not to suggest that all the inhabitants of Kumur derive
from inferior traditional status groups or from impoverished
socio-economic groups. It is true there is a larger proportion
of families of ex-slave descent there than in other villages (8%
as against 4% in Abu Haraz). But in fact several individuals
who have settled in the village enjoy considerable wealth; for
example, it was asserted to me that one man, formerly a live¬
stock owner, owned property in the form of lorries and shops
to the value of £S60,000. Many of the Masara still own consider¬
able numbers of livestock. But in many cases there has come
about a division of labour, if not a division of property, be¬
tween the Masara living in Kumur and their relatives near
Taif. Larger herds of goats are found in the northern settle¬
ment where the occupants allocate more labour to cultivation,
while the herds of larger animals, cattle and camels, are cone-
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centrated in the southern settlement where more labour is alloc¬
ated to nomadism. Marriages between the two branches of Mas-
ara are very common, and in polygamous marriages it has been
common, especially among the older generation, to take a wife
from each of the two settlements.
The marriage of several religious men into the ranks of the no¬
madic and semi-nomadic Masara was of great significance in
the development of the settlement, both in so far as it raised
the status of the existing settlers and also since it encouraged
others to settle in the village. The most important marriage
was that of Sheikh el Eleish to Taiya Yusuf Namasid, the
daughter of a wealthy livestock owner and cultivator of rain-
lands in the Gezira. This marriage had been preceded by the
marriage of an important member of the Masara to the sister
of Sheikh el Eleish.1 When Sheikh el Eleish opened a khalwa
in the village, many people came to study with him. Other holy-
men were also attracted to the village where they married and
settled down. Unlike some of their counterparts in Abu Haraz
these holymen did not possess qualitatively different resources
from their followers; some of them had sizeable herds, and of
course they were assured of plentiful labour for cultivating
their rainlands. But they did not have income from jerfs, nor
from riverain gardens, nor from Gezira tenancies.2 Thus most
of these holymen remained primarily herdsmen and cultivators,
though they were held in esteem for their piety and religious
knowledge. In contrast to several of the religious families in
Abu Haraz, the sons of holymen living in Kumur are little diff¬
erentiated from other villagers; Sheikh el Eleish himself had
two sons, one of whom lives and works in Damazeen, and the
1. Host of the Hasara in the south are supporters of the Hindiya tariqa, and so this
marriage of one of the northern Masara with an Arakiyin girl possibly marked a shift
in interests and allegiances.
2. Hajwa Abu 'Agla Hamad al—Nil, the wife and FBD of Hamad al—Nil Sheikh el Eleish
inherited a tenancy in a Scheme near Sennar which in 1977 yielded ES500 worth of
dura. It was transported to the village in the lorry of her son-in-law, a non-
relative from Taif. She also owns one of the three stores in the village.
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other cultivates in the village; Mohammad al feki had two
sons, both of whom cultivate in the village and keep goats; al
feki Abdallahi had one son who is a goatherd; Ahmed al feki
Shiekh died leaving three young boys - they have since left
school and seek casual work in Kumur or in Abu Haraz al Wast-
ani, which is where his family were from.
Given that it has become increasingly difficult to subsist from
only rainland cultivation and animal husbandry, the villagers
of Kumur are forced to seek supplementary income from wage
labour. The relatively more favourable conditions that existed
in Abu Haraz for the accumulation of small capital which could
be utilised for petty trading have been absent in Kumur. Dur¬
ing the period of the sagias Abu Haraz farmers could trade the
surplus produce in local markets, and with capital they saved
embark on local retailing or other commercial ventures (e.g.
trading in grain or livestock). This basis for economic diversif¬
ication has, of course, been absent in Kumur. In Kumur some
of the owners of large herds of goats and of smaller herds of
cows sell milk to neighbouring villages, such as Abu Haraz,
and also in Wad Medani. However the difficulties of finding
sufficient grazing in the dry season, the costs of renting jerfs
for growing lubia (dolichos lablab) for the animals or, altern¬
atively, the costs of feeding the animals with grain, result in
small returns for these milk-sellers.
The selling of livestock is usually resorted to only when there
are pressing needs for cash in order to buy subsistence items,
or in order to meet extraordinary expenditure. The desire to
build up rather than to deplete herd numbers constrains the
use of livestock for other than mainly subsistence ends. The
value placed on the maintenance of animal stock is reinforced
by the contribution which milk makes to their subsistence, esp¬
ecially at times when the villagers' crops have given poor re¬
turns and when cash income is stretched to cover other necess¬
ary expenditure. Livestock and the milk they yield do provide
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a very real security in such difficult circumstances, which are
not infrequent. Only those individuals with very large herds,
such as Haj Yusuf Namasid, are in a position to appraise their
livestock as a resource to be converted into cash for some
other enterprise (in his case the purchase of a lorry).
Labour, of course, has to be allocated for the maintenance of
the herds. Collective herding is uncommon. This is partly be¬
cause of the difficulties of finding adequate grazing for a
large herd and because of the competition that shortage of graz¬
ing places the owners in. Also for each household maintenance
of livestock plays a different part in the overall strategy con¬
cerning allocation of members' labour and the meeting of con¬
sumption needs. Thus the members of one household may maxi¬
mise their labour resources by working in the Gezira in the
dry season, and so will take their animals with them; another
family, with less need for immediate cash, perhaps because of
a good harvest, may hire a jerf and even a herdsman, and
thus seek to increase the size of its herd; a third, requiring
cash but short of family labour, may sell milk in Abu Haraz
and so keep its herd in the locality and buy grain in order
to maximise its milk output. Only two families cooperated over
a long period of time in the joint herding of their goats; they
were brothers-in-law, and also first cousins (FBSs), who were
involved in selling milk to Abu Haraz.1
Even though women and children are frequently employed in
looking after the family herd, a considerable amount of male
labour has to be allocated to animal husbandry. Male labour
which can be released from these household productive activit¬
ies in order to acquire cash is free to seek employment
wherever it can be found. In this respect the inhabitants fof
1. By contrast in Abu Haraz where the number of livestock kept are much smaller and
where they are used almost exclusively for own milk consumption, the villagers coll¬
ectively hire a herdsman to take charge of all the village goats, at least during
the rainy season.
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Kumur are disadvantaged compared with the inhabitants of Abu
Haraz; for the former do not possess the wide-ranging network
of kin and contacts already working outside the locality which
are enjoyed by the latter. The very real difficulties which ex¬
ist even for Abu Haraz migrants in finding employment and acc¬
ommodation in the towns are all the more impingeing in the
case of prospective migrants from Kumur.
Thus most villagers seeking employment perform local casual
labour. Several work on local construction sites, such as the
new agricultural institute being built near Abu Haraz, or mak¬
ing bricks at the brick-kiln near El Eleila. Some get jobs as
labourers building houses, occasionally in Kumur, and more fre¬
quently in Abu Haraz. Others use donkeys or donkey-carts, for
transporting various things - water, firewood, sand and the
mixture of silt and animal dung used in building. Some work
in factories in Wad Medani, such as the cotton ginnery, work¬
shops for making sacks and the new Gezira tannery. Unlike
migrants from Abu Haraz to the towns, few of them are em¬
ployed in the services or retailing businesses. Those villagers
who go to the Gezira with their family herds during the cotton-
picking season find various occupations outside the care of
their animals and the sale of milk. Some work with their women¬
folk picking cotton on a piece-rate basis, while others work in
vegetable gardens.
Very few villagers have full-time non-manual employment out¬
side the village. Three grandsons of Sheikh el Eleish work in
the Sennar Sugar Refinery as clerks or work supervisors; the
father of one is the Director of the mixed primary school in the
neighbouring village of Kiran. Two grandsons of Haj Abdallah
Ibbudi are primary school teachers in the Gezira. A brother of
Haj Yusuf, the lorry-owner, is an accountant for the Gezira
Board. There are only two or three migrants from the village
who have regular employment in Khartoum; one works as a vet¬
erinary assistant, another as a shop assistant and a third as
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an electrician. The latter, unable to find rented accommodat¬
ion, stays in a cheap hotel. The lack of schooling facilities
within the village, and the lack of adequate resources with
which to support their children's education have limited the
number of villagers able to aspire to salaried employment. Some
of the young children in the village do in fact attend primary
school in either Kiran or Abu Haraz, making the round trip of
6-8 miles on foot. Those pupils who continue their education to
secondary level must either find relatives in Abu Haraz to stay
with, or meet the expenses of boarding in a school dormitory.
Most households in Kumur are obliged to rely heavily on their
own labour resources, including that of their women, both for
domestic and subsistence activities and for the income they ob¬
tain through wage labour. Women in Kumur make an important
contribution to a wide range of household activities. Much of
their time is spent in procuring fuel and water, both of which
by contrast in Abu Haraz have become commodities to be pur¬
chased with cash deriving from male incomes. Similarly much
time is spent by women and children in care of animals. In
the wet season single women (i.e. widows and divorcees) cult¬
ivate their own plots, while nearly all the women in the vill¬
age assist in the tasks of weeding and harvesting; this labour
is rendered not only on their family plots, but also to farmers
from other villages, notably Abu Haraz. Women also perform
various domestic crafts, such as rug-making and basket-work.
The women themselves market these goods either in Wad Medani
or at the qubbas near Abu Haraz. Also they often travel to
local markets to purchase subsistence items in the temporary
absences of their husbands. The women in Abu Haraz also make
frequent visits to markets, but more commonly it is to buy
household utensils and personal items of consumption.
In Kumur the standard of living is more uniform than it is in
Abu Haraz. Dura, milk, dried bamia (waika) and dried meat
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(sharmoot) are the staple diet for most households. Expenditure
on fresh meat, fresh vegetables and fruits, wheat flour, pasta
and rice is very rare. By contrast these food items feature sig¬
nificantly in many household budgets in Abu Haraz, especially
those supported by salaried incomes and regular wage remitt¬
ances. There are three small shops in Kumur, two owned by
villagers, one of whom is a woman, and the third by a Ja'ali
from the village of El Tibeib; these shops are stocked primar¬
ily with tea, coffee, sugar, soap, oil and kerosene. Housing
styles and furnishings are for the most part rudimentary, al¬
though there are now some houses built of brick. There is no
electricity. Water is carried by hand from the village pump,
though a few families hire a village boy to bring water by don¬
key-cart. These conditions contrast markedly with the changes
in consumption patterns and living standards in Abu Haraz
which I examine more fully in Chapter 5.
The greater uniformity in living standards in Kumur compared
with in Abu Haraz does not imply that a greater amount of co¬
operation takes place between households. As I will show in
the next chapter in relation to cultivation strategies in partic¬
ular, labour and services exchanged between households are
mediated by money payments; collective work parties reciproc¬
ated in kind no longer occur. Closely-related nuclear families
cultivate quite separately from each other. Today a more indiv¬
idualistic tone pervades social relationships in Kumur, just as
it does in Abu Haraz.
To conclude this chapter I wish to summarise the forms of econ¬
omic differentiation which exist in the two villages studied,
Abu Haraz al Warrani and Kumur el Eleish. The main differ¬
ence between the two villages is that in the former the major¬
ity of male adults have regular work outside the village. Most
of these have semi-skilled jobs or have regular employment in
various services; a substantial number have set up retailing
businesses through capital they have accumulated from previous
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wage-earning or petty-trading activities; a smaller number,
mostly the sons of religious families or of merchants, through
educational attainment, have acquired clerical or professional
employment. The men that remain in the village are mostly of
the older generation. Many of those with wage-earning sons
engage in rainland cultivation as a small-scale capitalist enter¬
prise, hiring labour and tractor services; others are engaged
in retailing businesses or are employed in the village services;
some still rely on the traditional subsistence activities of rain-
land and jerf cultivation and goat-herding, supplemented by
low-paid casual labour. In Kumur, by contrast, the latter cat¬
egory is the predominate one, though women there contribute
significantly to those activities. The number of salaried work¬
ers in Kumur is very small, as is those with businesses or
property other than livestock, e.g. tenancies, shops or lorries.
Whereas an increasing number of men in Abu "^raz are emp¬
loyed in non-agricultural activities, the labour force in Kumur
is mainly engaged in various forms of agricultural work,
whether as workers on family plots or as hired labourers or as
seasonal migrants. It is hoped that the last two chapters have
demonstrated how this economic differentiation has come about,
both from a wider historical and regional perspective, and in
terms of the specific conditions underlying the different develop¬




In this chapter I wish to examine the differential responses to
the commercialisation of rainland cultivation in the two vill¬
ages that I studied. While little change has come about in
patterns of land tenure and in access to the land, significant
changes have occurred in recent decades both in the form of
labour transactions and in the technology employed in prepar¬
ing the land and in planting. Collective work parties are no
longer mobilised as they were in the past to assist in turn
individual cultivators. Today wage labour is the dominant form
of labour transaction, although family labour plays an import¬
ant part among households where the ability to hire labour is
restricted. While sowing by hoe (seluka) is still practised,
hiring of tractors for preparing the land and planting is now
widespread. While the largest proportion of produce from rain-
land cultivation is for household consumption or related needs
(e.g. feeding of stubble and stalks to the family herds), a
large part is nevertheless sold locally. This commercialisation
of production has led to capital becoming the most important
factor in production. Actual strategies are examined in relation
to the other activities of households both to fulfil subsistence
needs and to raise cash. In particular, I examine the contribut¬
ion made by women's labour, both unpaid family labour and
wage labour, and the reasons for the withdrawal of this lab¬
our. In conclusion I criticise the conventional thesis that
women withdraw from productive labour for fear of having to
work alongside male hired stangers.
Traditionally rainland cultivation was organised according to
one of three patterns which we may refer to as household,
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patron-client and mercantile forms of organisation. The first,
the most widespread of the three forms, was practised by the
household as the basic unit of production. The amount of land
cultivated by individual households would vary according to
their respective needs and labour availability, in the manner
described by Chayanov as being typical of peasant farming.1
At peak periods in the cultivation cycle additional labour was
mobilised in the form of collective work parties (nafir); kin
and neighbours were summoned to assist the individual farmer,
in weeding or harvesting for example, and the recipient of this
labour would either feed the work party or provide it with nat¬
ive beer (merisa) during the period that it rendered its service
to him or her. The second form was an elaboration of the house¬
hold form and of these existing patterns of cooperation. A pat¬
ron, who almost invariably was a holyman, mobilised large lab¬
our groups from his pupils and followers who worked together
to cultivate very large areas, thereby producing a sufficient
surplus to support the extended needs of the holyman's house¬
hold. For in fulfilling his general role the holyman was ex¬
pected to support individuals and fragmented households which
came and attached themselves to him, as well as suppliants,
guests and other visitors. The third form was where merchants
employed either slaves or hired labourers to cultivate rainlands
in order to produce grain for sale in markets. This practice
was never so widespread on the east bank as in the Gezira
before the implementation of the irrigation scheme, or as in the
lands bearing heavier rainfall to the south.2
I have already referred in earlier chapters to the processes
whereby the traditional forms of rainland cultivation and the
social relations embedded in them underwent change: the chall¬
enge to the social dominance of the holymen posed by the activ¬
ities of traders, the changing role of the holymen as their
1. See T.Shanin (ed.): Peasants and Peasant Societies. Harmondsworth, 1971.
2. Barnett, 1977, p.90.
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educational and jurisdictional functions came to be assumed by
the State, the development of new forms of property (irrigated
lands) in former rainland and riverain lands, pressure on
households to raise more of their income in cash and the conse¬
quent pressure on labour to migrate.
Today it is predominantly the household-based form of rainland
cultivation which persists, though in a diversity of patterns
all of which are substantially different from the traditional
form. Collective work parties reciprocated in kind are no long¬
er operated; exchange of labour and services between house¬
holds are mediated by money, and a much wider range of culti¬
vation strategies are available to farmers who have capital res¬
ources. Today there are no holymen in Abu Haraz or Kumur who
cultivate very large areas as a result of being able to mobil¬
ise large work parties from their followers.1 Mercantile operat¬
ors of rainlands are more attracted by the conditions for invest¬
ment in the Mechanised Crop Production Schemes around
Gedaref; provided the entrepreneur has at least one tractor and
sufficient resources to cover the costs of labour, he can obtain
from the government the right to cultivate a minimum area of
1,000 feddans of rainland. Those with smaller resources can
hire transport and labourers and provide the latter with food
for rainland cultivation in the sparsely populated areas of the
southern Gezira around Jebel Moya. Although no farmer from
either Abu Haraz or Kumur cultivated more than 60 feddans, I
was told that among other rainland settlements on the east
bank there were farmers, using tractors, who cultivate several
hundred feddans. It was these large farmers who introduced
the use of tractors on the east bank for preparing the land
and planting the dura seeds. In the early 1960s there were
only twelve tractors in the whole of the area between Rufa'a
and Sharif Ya'qub. These were owned and used by the large
1. An indication of the less 'developed' conditions in the southern Rahad area is
the report of one fcki cultivating 1000 gada'a through the coubined labour of his
followers (Galal El-Din, 1975).
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rainland farmers, although they were sometimes hired out at
the rate of £S3-4 per gada'a (five feddans) (Hunting, 1965).
Today there are many more tractors operating on the east bank
during the wet season, and they are widely used not only by
large rainland farmers, but also by very small farmers. The
services of six tractors were utilised by farmers interviewed
from the two villages. These tractors were owned by people
from neighbouring villages, five on the east bank and one in
the Gezira.1 East of Kumur the lights of at least another six
tractors could be seen at night as they worked at the height
of the planting season. Before describing these mechanised cult¬
ivation techniques, the reasons for their widespread adoption
and the effects of their introduction, 1 must first describe the
traditional method of cultivation by seluka.
I am concerned here with the main areas of rainland cultivat¬
ion in which dura is grown by the villagers, and which are
called bildat. As described in Chapter 3, other kinds of rain¬
land are also cultivated, notably bugur in which vegetables
are grown and water-courses in which okra as well as dura is
grown. However, these areas of cultivation are very small com¬
pared with the lands covered by the bildats. Also I should add
that sometimes okra, and also dukhn (Pennisetum typhoideum)
or bullrush millet for animal fodder, are grown in the bildats;
but the area cultivated v/ith these other crops is tiny compared
with the area planted with dura.
The main topographical feature of the bildats are the low ear¬
then ridges (terus) which are raised to a height of up to two
feet along the contour and up-slope. These ridges are made so
as to increase the efficiency of rainfall by preventing normal
run-off of rainwater. Further ridges are raised within the area
1. Two from El Eleila, one from Feig, Sherafa and Una Shaneg, and one from Wad
Megdhoub in the Gezira.
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enclosed on three sides by the terus, so that in seasons of
heavy rainfall the water is distributed more evenly over the
bildat and thus prevented from collecting in one place where
it might break the terus. The size of the area enclosed by the
terus varies according to relief and soil composition since some
bildats consist of a more sandy soil which is more permeable
than the more standard clay. The size of bildats also varies
as a result of land fragmentation through the course of many
generations. But the minimum size for each bildat is generally
about one gada'a (five feddans), though some smaller plots are
cultivated by women. Ideally farmers have bildats located in
three or four different places so as to take advantage of the
variability of the rains. For it is quite feasible for one bildat
to bear a moderate to poor harvest, while another bildat, only
a mile from the first, attracts heavier rainfall and yields a
good harvest. However, ploughing has tended to rationalise
these scattered land-holdings; most farmers who hire tractors
cultivate adjacent bildats, their own and sometimes those of
migrant relatives. The best location for a bildat is where there
is no other bildat up-slope from it, for thereby it catches run¬
off of rainwater from a large area. But most bildats are sur¬
rounded by other cultivated lands, with the terus serving as
boundaries between them.
Access to cultivable land is not a significant problem for the
inhabitants of Abu Haraz or Kumur. Most farmers' claims to
their bildats are based on customary usufruct, the lands which
they cultivate having been used by their families before them;
some men cultivate lands by virtue of their wives' inheritance
claims. Large areas of the rainlands are claimed by the relig¬
ious families on the basis of ancient land charters granted to
them by the Funj rulers. In the past non-Arakiyin settlers
were allowed to cultivate part of the lands claimed by these
religious families in exchange for a tithe of the produce; this
is the source of the right of usufruct which most farmers
enjoy. However, during the Condominium usufruct cultivators
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were enabled to register these lands in their own names; reg¬
istration was provided on request at a fairly nominal charge
(20pt per gada'a). Farmers without customary or titular claims
can gain access to a bildat by renting land from another farm¬
er for between £S1 and £S2 per gada'a. About one in ten of
the farmers interviewed in the two villages rented the lands of
others in this way; this kind of tenure is known as dugundi.
Since many migrants, especially from Abu Haraz, have aband¬
oned their bildats, there is no shortage of land which can be
cultivated. Uncultivated land which bears no titular claim be¬
longs to the State, but usually no objection is made if it is
cleared of scrub and cultivated so long as no standing trees
are cut down. Women inherit bildats, though generally they re¬
ceive between a half and a quarter of the share their brothers
receive. Normally the women's shares are not claimed, but
their lands are left for their brothers to cultivate. However,
as already stated, if a man does not have any claim to land
himself, he can cultivate the land to which his wife has a
claim. Single women cultivate the lands which they have inher¬
ited from their husbands if they are widows, or from their own
families if they are divorced.
Although rainland is not a scarce resource, the complexity of
land claims does give rise to certain disputes. Usually these
occur when one of the claimants to a piece of land wishes to
alter the use to which it has been previously put. We noted an
example of this in respect of riverain land in the last chapter.
In the case of rainland, I witnessed a dispute which had come
before the local court where a farmer had ploughed over a plot
of land which a woman had already sown by seluka. In an¬
other case a religious family threatened legal action against
a trader who wished to develop a battery farm in the area cov¬
ered by his father's registered bildat; the religious family
asserted a higher claim on the basis of an ancient land chart¬
er granted to the Arakiyin by the Funj. Nevertheless, even for
the purposes of mechanised rainland cultivation, problems of
- 96 -
access to land are of minor consideration compared with the re¬
quirements of capital and labour.
The traditional method of cultivation entails first of all the
banking up and repair of the terus and other earth ridges.
Since nearly all surface vegetation and stubble from the prev¬
ious season has either rotted or been eaten by herds, the soil
itself requires little preparation, only a little cleaning. The
dura seeds are planted following the first substantial rains in
July. Pockets are made in the caked top-soil by means of the
planting-stick (seluka), and the seeds are inserted in clusters
at intervals of about a metre. It is estimated that two men
with selukas, accompanied by two seeders - usually women or
children - can sow one gada'a in a day if they work both a
morning and afternoon session (dahwa and duhuriya). Depend¬
ing on the nature of the rains and subsequent growth, two or
more weeding sessions are required. Heavy weeding is carried
out by teams of five or six hired labourers which have re¬
placed the earlier collective work parties; if the weeding is
very light family labour may of course suffice. Harvesting
takes place in October and November, depending on the distri¬
bution of the rains and the rate of growth of the crops. Teams
of women, again usually comprising five or six persons, remove
the heads of grain leaving them in piles from where they later
carry them in large baskets to the threshing-floor, which is sit¬
uated in a corner of the bildat. When the whole crop has been
collected at the threshing-floor, men beat the heads of grain
with threshing-sticks, and separate the chaff from the seeds.
The dura stalks are cut down with an axe-like instrument and
collected into bundles (kolleiga). Both the grain and the dura
stalks are then transported to the village, using whatever
means of transport are available and merited by the size of
the harvest; very small returns are transported piece-meal on
donkey-back, while more substantial returns are transported by
donkey-cart or by lorry. The grain is usually stored today in
mud-brick store-rooms; it is rare for it to be stored in under-
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ground pits (matmura) as was common in the past. The stalks
also are stored away out of the reach of goats in order to pro¬
vide fodder for the animals later in the dry season. Those
households owning few livestock and needing immediate cash
sell off these stalks to other villagers at the rate of £Sl-2 per
100 bundles; later in the year these bundles may be sold off
individually for fodder at the rate of up to 5pt. per bundle.
Planting, weeding and harvesting require the heaviest labour
in-puts, and in between these tasks - at least for any one
bildat - there are slacker periods. Nonetheless the crops need
regular attention for their preservation from marauding live¬
stock - the cause of many local disputes - and various pests;
especially during the final ripening stage, the grain is vulner¬
able to attacks from flocks of storks and other smaller birds,
and so a considerable amount of time needs to be devoted to
scaring off these pests.1
As already stated, the number of entrepreneurs with tractors
on the east bank has increased steadily from the period of the
early 1960s. Seeking to maximise their returns from their capit¬
al investment, these tractor-owners hire out their services to
other farmers as well as cultivating lands on their own acc¬
ount. Given that yields fluctuate markedly owing to the var¬
iability of rainfall, these entrepreneurs seek to augment the re¬
turns from their own farming enterprises with the income they
derive from hiring out their tractor services to other farmers.
In 1977 the standard charge for ridge-ploughing was £S5 per
gada'a, and for disc-ploughing and drill-seeding £S6 per
gada'a. When a tractor is hired out continuously during the
course of one day, the rental charges amount to about £S100,
from which a quarter must be deducted for fuel costs and the
driver's wages.
The widespread adoption of mechanised cultivation through the
1. For more details of rainland cultivation, see Tothill (1948) and Randell (1958
and 1961).
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hiring of tractor services can be accounted for by a combinat¬
ion of factors: the decreasing availability of local labour,
through labour migration, schooling of children and occupation¬
al diversification; the availability of cash necessary for hiring
these services, deriving from migrant remittances and savings
from other occupational activities; the awareness of cultivators
that ridge-ploughing in particular is conducive to better
growth and higher yields; and the readiness to take advantage
of a labour-saving service, the costs of which the recipients
expect to reimburse through other more rewarding forms of lab¬
our or income.
In terms of relative costing, ridge-ploughing and seeding by
hand or disc-ploughing and drill-seeding is about twice as ex¬
pensive as hiring labourers to plant with seluka. Ridge-plough¬
ing is more efficient than disc-ploughing, and is recognised as
such by the cultivators. Apart from breaking up the caked soil
more effectively, the ridging serves to concentrate the rain¬
water in the troughs where the seeds have been sown. With
disc-ploughing on the other hand there is nothing to compens¬
ate for the loss of internal ridges which distribute water more
evenly over the whole bildat, and so rain-water tends to conc¬
entrate near the main terus. Moreover, seeds sown by tractor
through filters attached to the front of the disc-plough tend
not to grow as well as seeds planted by hand. The main dis¬
advantage with ridge-ploughing is that, if rain intervenes be¬
tween the ploughing of the soil and before the seeding by hand
has been completed, further labour or expenditure is required
in planting the remaining seeds by seluka.
Compared with the subsequent tasks of weeding and harvesting,
there are a greater number of factors which limit the availabil¬
ity of labour for planting by seluka. In the first place, al¬
though the first rains are often scattered and intermittent, and
cultivators may choose to start planting at different times, the
optimum period for planting is much shorter than the periods
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for weeding and harvesting if the village bildats are taken as
a whole. For because of differential growth rates, the timing
of weeding and harvesting in each bildat varies considerably.
Consequently more labour is free to circulate around different
bildats for these later tasks. Moreover, a greater reserve of
local labour can be called upon in weeding and harvesting,
since it is in these tasks that women make their most signifi¬
cant contribution. By contrast, with the exception of some plots
cultivated by single women, planting by seluka is predominant¬
ly a male task, though women and children assist in seeding.
Furthermore, not only is planting by seluka an arduous and
monotonous activity, but also it is largely associated with cult¬
ivation for subsistence and men will not readily do it for
money. Most of the cases I recorded of this labour service be¬
ing sought and rendered for wages were those in which the soil
had become compacted through heavy rains following ridge-
ploughing. Traditionally the amount of land a man cultivated
reflected and accentuated his social standing, in so far as the
amount depended on the social resources - family, kin, clients,
slaves or followers - he was able to mobilise to labour for and
with him. Today ready cash is recognised as the most import¬
ant resource for effecting a successful cultivation strategy, and
there is a reluctance to admit one's own deficiency of cash by
hiring out one's labour to plant another man's crops. Exchange
of labour services for wages in subsequent activities are not
constrained by the same considerations, since it is recognised
that assistance must be rendered in furthering the growth and
in harvesting the crops planted.
The mechanisation of land preparation and planting obviates
the difficulties and constraints referred to above. Those with
sufficient capital can cultivate considerable areas of land
which in the past would have required complex labour strateg¬
ies. The results of the farming survey I carried out in Abu
Haraz and Kumur show that farmers in Abu Haraz tend to res¬
ort more to hiring tractor services and to cultivate larger
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areas than the farmers in Kumur. In Abu Haraz 44 out of 50
farmers surveyed cultivated with plough only; five cultivated
some plots with plough and other plots with seluka; only one
cultivated using only seluka. In Kumur 15 out of 30 cultivated
with plough only; 8 cultivated with plough and seluka; 7 cult¬
ivated with seluka only. The total amount of land cultivated
by the 50 Abu Haraz farmers was 158f gada'a, of which 1477
were cultivated by plough and 11 by seluka. This gives an
average of just over 3 gada'a (15 feddans) per farmer in Abu
Haraz. The total amount of land cultivated by the 30 farmers
in Kumur was 59i gada'a, of which 37i were cultivated by
plough and 22 by seluka, giving an average of just under 2
gada'a (10 feddan) per farmer.1 The greater amount of land
cultivated by Abu Haraz farmers, and their greater use of trac¬
tor services can be accounted for by the fact that there is
greater occupational diversity in this village, and farmers
have access to larger cash resources. Although household sizes
are larger in Abu Haraz than in Kumur (6.6 persons per house¬
hold, compared with 5.2 persons), this does not mean that Abu
Haraz farmers have more family farm labourers, thus allowing
them to cultivate larger plots. What they have are more family
members who are generally wage or salary earning, with whose
savings they can hire machinery and labour, and in this way
cultivate larger areas. Of 60 farmers in Abu Haraz 21 have
some regular form of employment or income from a retailing act¬
ivity in the village;2 some are shop-keepers or butchers; some
are vegetable-sellers, bringing vegetables from the market in
Wad Medani everyday and selling them in the village early in
the morning the next day; some are employed in the village's
1. In the two villages combined 108? gada'a were disc-ploughed and 76^ were ridge-
ploughed. The larger area disc-ploughed can probably be related to the greater avail¬
ability of this service, since four out of the six tractors used had this attachment.
2. 10 farmers were not available for interviews, in some cases having left the vill¬
age to work in the towns. Information on income was gathered from household surveys
which had been previously carried out.
- 101 -
schools as caretakers and night-watchmen; some have regular
employment as craftsmen and gardeners at the nearby Agricult¬
ural Institute. 39 farmers have no other regular form of income
or employment; many devote time to the care of their goats,
and most of these cultivate jerfs so as to provide lubia for
these animals; some are inactive for the rest of the year,
being old or infirm; some perform casual labour often related
to building work in the village; some work casually in the
towns for the rest of the year. 34 of the 60 farmers have sons
with regular employment in the towns, and the remittances they
send are crucial both in assisting their families with their sub¬
sistence needs and in providing cash to be used by their
fathers in their farming ventures. Only 17 of the 60 farmers
are without regular monied income either from their own or
their sons' alternative economic activities.
By contrast in Kumur only four of the 30 farmers enjoy income
from other forms of property or regular employment; two are
teachers in local primary schools, one has a small shop in the
village, and the fourth can rely on income from his wife's ten¬
ancy in an Irrigation Scheme near Sennar. Three of these four
farmers and three others have sons in regular employment in
Sennar, Wad Medani and Khartoum. Thus 23 of the 30 farmers
have to rely for cash on their own and their family members'
casual labour activities. Hence many of the Kumur farmers rely
considerably on their own and family labour in planting. In
some cases, particularly that of single women, there is a close
relation between the amount of land cultivated and the needs
and labour resources of the cultivator. However, in most house¬
holds rainland cultivation, because of its very uncertainty, is
only one resource among others for providing basic subsistence.
Thus even during the wet season the labour of some family mem¬
bers may be allocated to tasks other than those required by
the cultivation cycle.
Since the 1977 rainy season was a very poor one, many farmers
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were able to rely on their own labour as sufficient in carrying
out the necessary weeding and harvesting tasks. It is not nec¬
essary here to examine all the factors which affect the efficien¬
cy of rainland farming.1 Here I am concerned with the labour
recruitment strategies of those farmers with moderate to good
yields who were obliged to hire labour. The majority of hired
labour engaged by Abu Haraz farmers was from neighbouring
villages, in particular Kumur. All the hired labour performed
by women was recruited from neighbouring villages.
If a substantial amount of labour is required, the cultivator
usually contacts a person from one of the neighbouring villages
and uses him or her as a labour agent (wasta) to recruit the
required number of other labourers. No special advantage
accrues to the wasta in performing his mediatory role. This
form of labour recruitment occurs with both male and female
hired labour groups. It is common for the women's harvesting
groups to work successively on neighbouring bildats, especially
if the crops ripen about the same time. A cultivator in need
of a picking group contacts a wasta working on an adjacent
bildat and asks her to bring her team to his bildat when they
have finished their current work. Normally there is no special
relationship between cultivator and wasta. In one case a culti¬
vator from Abu Haraz, the manager of the Cooperative shop
there, engaged a cousin (FBS), who had married in Kumur, to
act as wasta for a weeding group that he required; later he
engaged this cousin's daughter to act as wasta for a women's
picking group. In return the man in Kumur worked part of the
cousin's lands for his own needs free of payment.
1. The following factors at least would have to be taken into consideration:
A. The amount of land cultivated and its distribution.
B. The location and relief of the bildats and the type of soil.
C. The attention paid to terus repair.
D. Type of seed used.
E. Method of land preparation and sowing.
F. Timing of planting.
G. Amount of labour applied to weeding, protection from pests, etc.
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Some farmers utilised different labour strategies for different
labour processes. One cultivator from Abu Haraz - the only per¬
son from that village who owned a considerable number of
cattle, which were looked after during the wet season by one
of his sons - cultivated 5i gada'a by plough. He hired local
labour, mostly from Kumur, for weeding, but brought in three
Bergo labourers from the west of Sudan, that he had found in
Wad Medani looking for work, to harvest the crop and cut the
dura stalks; he gave these labourers a daily wage and various
food provisions. For threshing the grain he reverted to local
hired labour. For transporting both the grain and the stalks
to the village, where he stored them, he hired lorries from Abu
Haraz al Wastani. For a total outlay of £S166 for labour and
hiring charges, his grain returns alone were worth £S306 at
the then market value; in addition he obtained 10,000 kolleiga
which were of great value to his cattle herd.
Only one cultivator from Abu Haraz came to a kind of share-
cropping arrangement in order to relieve himself of the problem
of finding adequate labour. His partner, from the village of El
Eleila, not only procured the necessary labour from his vill¬
age, but also provided the use of a tractor which he owned,
and a lorry which his brother owned. They cultivated 7 gada'a
of fertile land near El Eleila. Working together with the labour
teams they hired, and sharing all expenses, they acquired a
net profit of £S375 from the 35 ardebs of grain which they har¬
vested;1 in addition they reaped 12,000 kolleiga.
Since in Kumur there existed a greater potential pool of lab¬
our, more labour was recruited by cultivators there from within
the village. However, labour was not noticeably recruited along
the lines of kinship. In fact villagers generally preferred to
sell their labour to cultivators from Abu Haraz since they could
obtain rather higher wages from the latter. Not infrequently
1. 1 ardeb = 20 keila « 508 kg.
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cultivators in Kumur found themselves obliged to hire labourers
from other villages. Those with traditional high status, such
as the Arakiyin core families, were best placed to recruit sub¬
stantial amounts of labour from within the village. Both the
Sheikh el hilla and his brother-in-law, the recognised religious
leader in the village and the Director of a nearby primary
school, recruited large labour teams from the village. The form¬
er found it necessary in addition to hire two labourers from
the village of Amara, providing them with food and accommodat¬
ion for the best part of a month, in order to help with the
weeding of the 6 gada'a which he cultivated. At harvest-time
he recruited men and women from the village, though the women
in his family did not participate in this work. His brother-in-
law, feki Tom, who had cultivated 4 gada'a by seluka, re¬
cruited only village labour; he worked alongside the men he
hired in planting and weeding, and the labour of the female
members of his family, together with some of their cousins,
sufficed for harvesting. Another Kumur man, who had cultivated
4 gada'a by plough, was able to carry out most of the early
labour tasks himself, since the weeding was light. One of his
sons was caring for the family herd of goats, and the other
adult son worked in Khartoum as an electrician. At the harvest
he hired a man from Tibeib village to cut the stalks, while the
women members of his family recruited other women villagers
to help them do the picking. For labour costs of £S36, com¬
bined with a lot of own labour, he had returns of grain worth
£S180 as well as 3000 kolleiga, which were easily the best re¬
turns enjoyed by any cultivator in Kumur during this season.
Cultivators of slave descent tend to be forced to rely on kin¬
ship ties as a source of labour to a greater extent than the
other villagers in Kumur. Memories of their former status are
still sufficiently strong for the other villagers to be reluctant
to render paid labour to these families. As a result, if they
require more extensive labour, these cultivators must seek ass¬
istance either from families of similar status, from such kin as
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they possess, or from other villages. An example of such strat¬
egies is provided by the family of the deceased slave, Allah-
jabu. This family, comprising 31 persons in total, consisted of
five separate economic units, at least as far as cultivation
strategies went. These latter groups consisted of the widowed
mother with her unmarried children, the two married sons' fam¬
ilies and the two married daughters' families; a third married
daughter lived in another village. Each of these groups cultiv¬
ated a separate plot, even though several of them were conti¬
guous; labour, however, was exchanged between them for
wages. In particular one of the married sons, who had cultiv¬
ated by seluka and had the most successful crop, hired the
labour of his brothers and brothers-in-law for weeding, cutting
the stalks, threshing and transporting his crop. Weeding was
heavy, and so he hired two other labourers from the villages
of Tibeib and Gara for six days. The harvesting of the grain
was carried out by family members and other village women of
slave descent.
Each family, therefore, acts as a separate productive unit. The
possibility of earning wages for agricultural labour encourages
the spread of monetarised labour services between closely-
related families and even within the family. Just as Culwick
observed in respect of Gezira tenant households, there is a
marked tendency towards the independence of wage-earning
sons.1 Her remarks concerning the effect of economic conditions
in the Gezira are just as applicable to the east bank:
Economic conditions within the Gezira Scheme are,
of course, chiefly responsible for the tendency of
the patriarchal household of the traditional subsis¬
tence economy to break down into the multiplicity
of patterns found in the Gezira village... The
ready availability of money-earning occupations
naturally loosens ties and encourages the independ¬
ence of what would formerly have been parts of
one composite household. (1954. p. 118)
1. 6.M.Culwick: Some Problems of the Social Survey in the Sudan. Sudan Notes and
Records, Vol. 35, 1954.
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Barnett (1977) found no evidence of related households cooper¬
ating to run their respective tenancies as a joint enterprise in
the Gezira. Likewise I found no example of closely related
persons operating their rainland plots as a combined venture.
At marriage, if not before, a son claims part of his father's
bildats and cultivates this part separately from the bildats re¬
maining to his father. Thus father and married sons each head
separate productive units. For example, Ibrahim Tayib and his
three married sons, El Imam, Tayib and Mustafa cultivated
quite independently of each other; they also managed their
herds quite separately - the father had several cows, and El
Imam had the largest number of goats by virtue of his having
expended the greatest time and labour with the family's herd
in the past. Where a household possesses both rainland and
livestock resources, the independence of that son on whom falls
the main responsibility for maintaining the family herd may be
delayed. The father may facilitate the early marriage of that
son on the understanding that he will continue to undertake
this responsibility, leaving the father and other sons free to
concentrate on rainland farming and other income raising activ¬
ities. Ibboudi Elamin facilitated in this way the marriage of
his son, Kharafallah, to a cousin in Taif. However, sons are
increasingly reluctant to play the role of family herdsman for
an indefinite period, and they often insist that the father hire
a herdsboy. For example, in Abu Haraz Mohammed Nasr, who
was in his late teens, had assumed the main responsibilities
with regard to his family's herd of goats for three or four
years. His two elder brothers worked in Khartoum and his
younger brothers were still at school in the village, but he
decided that his own career prospects were not being enhanced
through this lonesome activity. His father was obliged to hire
a herdsboy, and Mohammed moved to Wad Medani, staying with
relatives of his mother until he found work in the town.
The payment of wages to family members who share the same
cooking-pot is not uncommon practice. Women and adolescent
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children use these wages, as well as other income they obtain,
to purchase clothing and other items of personal consumption.
Payment of wages to family members tends to occur when the
amount of free labour they contribute to the family farming ent¬
erprise is reduced or threatened through their offering labour
for wages to other cultivators. It 'pays' the farmer to give a
wage to his family members for some activities, often those
which are piece-rated, in order to retain their free labour in
other activities. In the case of wives, who are of course con¬
strained from offering all their services to other men, this arr¬
angement finds a neat balance - the women will weed and sow
seeds for her husband for free, but at harvest-time, particular¬
ly if other women are hired the wife will charge the husband
for her labour. In the case of adolescent sons the transformat¬
ion is progressive; at first the son is an unpaid family help¬
er; then he combines paid with unpaid labour for his father;
then he hires out his labour to others, during which time he
will contribute something towards the cost of living born by
his family; finally he works on his own account and meets the
full costs of his own subsistence (i.e. at marriage).
The calculation as to which activities ought to be rendered for
free and which for payment naturally weakens ties within and
between families. Similarly tensions often arises when a son is
earning wages regularly, but his cost of living is being met
by his family; the amount that he contributes whether in money
form or unpaid assistance is often seen as too much by the son
and too little by the rest of the family. With the same "pro¬
nounced streak of economic individualism" that Culwick noticed,
"operating within the general social framework of the wider fam¬
ily responsibilities",1 it is not surprising that quarrels and
disputes often of a petty nature are frequent - such as the re¬
quest for something being refused and it being taken arbitra¬
rily in response. Tension often surrounds the smallest financial
1. G.M.Culwick: A Study of the Human Factor in the Gezira Scheme. Unpublished
report. Barakat. Not dated.
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transactions, and this can explode in ugly incidents. Wry hum¬
our greets the man who can further his own interest even at
the expense of the old and weak. Barnett recalled how small
sums of money were often the subject of disputes and provided
the idiom in which social relationships were defined and broken
off.1 Many examples could be given to portray a similar state
of affairs on the east bank. During the 1977 cultivation season
there were several accusations of theft and fears voiced of peo¬
ple stealing grain. One oldish woman slept out in her bildat
beside the grain she had harvested for fear of it being stolen.
When I pointed out her discomfort to her nephews, they found
her situation rather amusing though without wishing her any
malice. The ensuing spectacle which derived from our attempts
to transport her grain on a borrowed cart to the village
caused even greater mirth.
Taking the two villages as a whole, an important variation in
farming strategies exists concerning the participation of women.
The extent of women's productive labour today is conditioned
by the strategies households must adopt in order to meet their
total cost of living needs. In the case of most Kumur house¬
holds this entails both labour within the family farming enter¬
prise, and wage labour rendered to other farmers. The 'wages
paid to women workers are low; women harvesters, employed in
removing the heads of grain and in transporting them in bask¬
ets, receive 20-30pt a day, which is a third of the average
male wage for most other agricultural tasks. The low value
placed on this female labour can be accounted for by various
factors. The range of opportunities for paid work by women are
limited, but the number of women in villages such as Kumur
who need to engage in paid labour so as to provide sufficient
income for their families is very large. Thus women provide a
reserve army of labour for what are seasonal activities, and
this has the effect of deflating their wages. The fact that
1. Barnett, 1977, p.99.
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women do also perform unpaid agricultural labour has the same
effect.
Women in Kumur certainly contributed significant amounts of lab¬
our to their families' farming enterprises. It was common to
see a wife sowing, following behind her husband digging with
the seluka, or a father and daughter engaged in these activit¬
ies; or a mother and son, or husband and wife weeding to¬
gether. Many women assumed the major productive role in the
absence of the husband. For example, Mabarak, a teacher in
a village in the Gezira, provided his wife sufficient money
with which to cultivate l£ gada'a by plough; assisted by two
adolescent sons, she sowed, weeded and harvested the meagre
crop from this plot. In fact eight women from the village man¬
aged their own farming enterprises throughout. Three were
widows, one was divorced, two had voluntarily separated them¬
selves from their husband, an old feki living in Taif, and two
had husbands working elsewhere - one a gardener in the Ge¬
zira, and the other the school-teacher just referred to. Seven
of them planted one gada'a, while the divorced woman planted
two gada'a, one by plough and one by seluka; three of the
others, all widows, also planted by seluka. Most of these wom¬
en relied on their own labour and unpaid labour from unmarr¬
ied children. One had assistance from a married brother, and
another from a married son, but most stressed that they had
to rely on their own resources. For some of the more arduous
tasks, such as threshing and cutting the stalks, several of the
women hired the services of other villagers, usually non-
relatives. No assistance took place between the women, even be¬
tween those who were related and cultivated adjacent bildats.
For example, Zaineb Yusuf (separated) and her daughter, Hajja
(husband absent), planted adjacent plots by disc-plough. They
hired the services of the same tractor, and when it came to
paying the driver a heated argument took place between the
mother and daughter as to who should pay exactly how much.
In the subsequent tasks of weeding and harvesting they app-
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lied their labour to their own plots quite independently of each
other. Women cultivators, therefore, were not immune from the
prevailing rationality which informed cultivation strategies;
they applied their own labour and that of family members when
it could be enlisted, and they sought cash with which to hire
labourers whenever more extensive labour was needed.
The fuller participation of women in Kumur in social production
gives them a more prominent role in public life; and their
greater self-reliance encourages more forthright behaviour. In
the home their opinions and judgments have considerable force
in a wide range of affairs, and not simply domestic ones. The
simple housing style, which in most households allows no phys¬
ical division between male and female quarters, makes the pres¬
ence of women all the more clearly felt. On the other hand, be¬
cause of the very fact that women are seen to be productively
active, capable of earning wages, and even capable, if necess¬
ary, of managing independent households, they have fewer
claims on menfolk to provide for them. For example, if a wom¬
an wants a new tob or dress, she is normally expected to pay
for it out of her own earnings. In most cases men can not
afford to support women in such a way as to allow them to be¬
come dependent consumers. Only the family of the Sheikh el
hilla diverged from this prevailing pattern in Kumur. The fe¬
male members of this household did not work outside, even
though the area of rainland the village headman cultivated
was the largest in the village and it was situated closest to
the village. The mother had a small shop within the family
compound. The two eldest daughters were married, one living
nearby with her builder husband, and the other in the Gezira
with her shop-keeper husband. Two other daughters were en¬
gaged, one to her cousin (FZS) in Abu Haraz, a court clerk,
and the other to a non-relative from Taif, a lorry-owner. Their
approaching marriages provided them with the prospect of sec¬
urity, and the knowledge that their labour would not be re¬
quired by their husbands in order to contribute to family
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income. The considerable amount of dowry paid to them, which
was five to eight times the average amount in the village, and
the quantity and quality of the trousseau already given them
testified to their future status. A greater part of their time,
compared with other women in Kumur, was given over to food
preparation in view of the obligation of their father to entert¬
ain all manner of visitors to the village. Two younger daugh¬
ters were still studying at school, and stayed with relations
in Abu Haraz (the family of a son of Sheikh el Eleish by an¬
other marriage). Thus different factors combined to condition
the primary domestic role of the women of this household: the
fact that both parents were from religious families; the fact
that this household enjoyed important resources, including fer¬
tile rainlands, the wife's tenancy near Sennar and her shop
in the village, and the salaried income of the eldest son work¬
ing at the Sennar Sugar Refinery - and that these resources en¬
abled the hiring of machinery and labour in the bildat; the
fact that more domestic duties were entailed by virtue of
Sheikh Hamad al-Nil being the village headman; and finally
the fact that the status which the family already enjoyed had
helped bring about the marriages of three daughters to men
who could assure them of a standard of living which made un¬
necessary their own contribution to income-raising.
In Abu Haraz only one woman, a widow, cultivated, and one
other woman, from a Kumur family, but married in Abu Haraz,
assisted in the bildat which her husband cultivated. What ex¬
planation can be given for the marked difference in the contri¬
bution of women's productive labour in these two villages? Such
differences of ethnic or tribal origin as exist between the in¬
habitants of the two villages do not warrant such a significant
contrast in the participation of the womenfolk in cultivation.
In fact the majority of the inhabitants belong to tribal groups
common to both villages, such as the Arakiyin, Ja'ali and Kha-
walda. In spite of the two villages' different history of settle¬
ment, it cannot be said that all or even the majority of the
- 112 -
inhabitants of Kumur possess a lower traditional status than
the inhabitants of Abu Haraz. The proportion of families of
slave descent is somewhat higher in Kumur than in Abu Haraz,
but such persons comprise only 15% of the total population of
Kumur. In the past women in Abu Haraz, and not only those
of slave descent, used to participate in rainland cultivation.
Today, with those isolated exceptions noted, they no longer do
so.
To explain such disparities it is often said that the employment
of women in agriculture is congruent with work on family
plots, since such labour is seen as an extension of unpaid dom¬
estic work; but that when agricultural work becomes commercial¬
ised, with the hiring of labour and the commoditisation of the
product, women tend to withdraw their labour, especially if it
entails their contact with male strangers or persons of a lower
status. The women of certain families may be obliged to sell
their labour as a result of their households' low income. But
these women would not engage in this work if they could afford
not to do so. This line of argument is often allied to, or even
underscored, by explanations which place emphasis on the
spread of values and beliefs which are held to be antithetical
to women's paid work and employment outside the home. I have
discussed the broader implications of the latter argument in
Chapter 1. Here 1 wish to examine the arguments concerning
the constraints placed on women's work as a result of their
likely contact with stranger men and concerning their need to
work in relation to women's participation rates in Kumur and
Abu Haraz.
It is true that part of the labour provided by women in Kumur
is applied to their family plots often at times when it is not
necessary to hire additional outside labour. When they join
hired labour parties whether on their own family bildats or on
those of other villagers, it is generally with other women from
the village. By virtue of the system of recruitment through
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work party organisers (wasta) that I described, contact with
unrelated male farmers and labourers is fairly minimal, even
when women work for farmers from other villages, such as Abu
Haraz. Not all these wastas, I should add, are older women;
one was an unmarried girl in her late teens, though this case
entailed the recruitment of a work party for the girl's father's
cousin (FFBS). Thus the system of recruitment and the degree
of sexual division of labour discourage extensive contact be¬
tween women workers and unrelated men. However, in travelling
to the fields and in performing certain tasks, a certain amount
of contact between women and unrelated men is unavoidable.
The prospect of such contact clearly does not deter women in
Kumur from assisting in sowing, weeding and harvesting, nor
does it shame their menfolk into discouraging such participat¬
ion. If they were so inclined, the wives of farmers in Abu
Haraz could work under similar conditions, that is, in the com¬
pany of other women familiar to them, and with relatively
little contact with stranger men. When questioned why they did
not take part in cultivation as the women of Kumur did, wives
of farmers in Abu Haraz generally replied that they were too
occupied with their domestic chores, or that they did not know
how to do the tasks involved, or simply that they were not
accustomed to doing so. They made no distinction between work¬
ing on the family bildat and working for others for wages.
My data on cultivation strategies in the two villages showed
that farmers in Abu Haraz tended to cultivate rather larger
areas, and hired tractor and labour services more extensively
than farmers in Kumur. I attributed this to the larger cash re¬
sources which they derive from the remittances of migrant sons,
from local retailing businesses, and from salaried positions
they occupy for the rest of the year in the village services.
Some farmers in Abu Haraz can clearly afford to dispense with
the labour of other family members in the farming enterprise.
But about a third of the farmers' households in Abu Haraz are
very little differentiated in access to ready cash and in income-
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raising ability from the bulk of households in Kumur. Scattered
through Abu Haraz are the mud and straw homes of farmers
who eke out their subsistence from rainland cultivation with
small herds of goats and local casual labour. In relation to
their needs there should be strong pressure on their dependents
to participate in cultivation. Inversely there are households in
Kumur which in terms of their income and resources can afford
to dispense with the contribution which their womenfolk make
to cultivation. Thus the argument that the women of Kumur and
Abu Haraz only work through the pressure of need cannot, un¬
less elaborated, account for women's participation rates in
these villages.
On the other hand, it seems fairly clear that economic different¬
iation in Abu Haraz, with the adoption of new occupations and
the attainment of higher standards of living by most of the in¬
habitants, has been mainly responsible for the withdrawal of
both men and women from manual labour in cultivation. For it
is-to be noted that while most of the farmers still work on their
family plots, some adopt a solely managerial role in relation
to the various tasks which they "have performed during the cult¬
ivation cycle. The reason for the withdrawal of female labour
among those households in Abu Haraz that still rely primarily
on cultivation and animal-herding lies, I would argue, in the
particular development of occupational diversity within the vill¬
age. Today only one household in five engages in rainland cult¬
ivation. The households that do farm are not clustered within
a closely related group of families, but are distributed among
many unrelated or distantly related families. As I explained
in the last chapter, occupational diversification has often foll¬
owed the pattern of one son remaining in the village and cont¬
inuing to farm, while other sons migrate to find work else¬
where, though generally marrying in the village. The wives of
migrants give up agricultural work, since they are provided
for through their husbands' monied income. Consequently these
women involve themselves in elaborated domestic routines, and
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devote a greater amount of time to life-cycle celebrations and
social visiting. The wives of farmers gradually adopt a similar
life-style, partly through emulation, but more importantly
through everyday pressures of sociability and the practical con¬
tent of relationships with close relatives, friends and neigh¬
bours. To take just one example of these pressures: women in
Abu Haraz place great value on reciprocal visiting, especially
in the event of something out of the ordinary happening; relat¬
ions between two women become strained, if not bitter, if one
woman fails to visit another on a particular occasion, such as
at giving birth. It is not difficult to imagine, therefore, that
a woman should insist on fulfilling such an obligation rather
than agreeing to help weed the bildat. Emulation of the more
secluded life-style of mercantile families and successful mig¬
rants is probably also a significant factor. But 1 must leave
discussion of the adoption of new consumption patterns and life¬
styles to the next chapter.
To summarise my arguments concerning the commercialisation of
rainland cultivation and the sexual division of labour of the
two villages studied: different cultivation strategies, which are
themselves strongly conditioned by the degree of access to cash
resources, encourage the participation of women in Kumur, but
not that of women in Abu Haraz in farming activities. In Abu
Haraz most farmers are able to generate more cash from other
sources in order to hire tractors and to hire labour and to cult¬
ivate larger areas; consequently family labour, including that
of women, is relied on to a much lesser extent. In contrast
both men and women in Kumur work more intensively on their
own plots and provide considerable amounts of labour to other
farmers. These divergent patterns in the two villages, I ar¬
gued, exert a tendency towards conformity in each village con¬
cerning the participation of women. In the case of Abu Haraz,
with the withdrawal of women's labour, I suggested that this
tendency was less a matter of emulation, though it is certainly
involved, but more the consequence of actual connexions and
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relations between domestic groups, with the wives of migrants
and merchants absorbing other women into an elaborated round
of domestic routines and activities.
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CHAPTER 5
PATTERNS AND TRENDS IN HOUSEHOLD ORGANISATION
In this chapter I wish to examine the changes which have
occurred in household organisation and in consumption patterns
as a response to and in conjunction with the economic changes
described in the previous chapters. At the outset I should
stress that I am not proposing that there is a one-way causal
relationship between the economy and forms of domestic organis¬
ation. Variations in family and domestic patterns play a part
in facilitating economic differentiation. For example, size of
family and sex ratio within individual households are factors
which may favour differential responses to new economic condit¬
ions. Where there are opportunities for wage-earning occupat¬
ions, a household with a favourable ratio of productive mem¬
bers can use the savings of its members as capital; or it can
devote greater resources to the education of certain of its mem¬
bers, and thereby attain new forms of income. Age at marriage
has a bearing on patterns of employment. Delayed marriages
are both a response to, and also a contributive factor to a pro¬
longed period of wage-earning by young men. (Hajnal 1965)
Patterns of consumption act back on the system of production
and exchange. For example the increase in household and per¬
sonal consumption may impede the channeling of wealth into
more productive ends; at the same time, by increasing the cir¬
culation of consumer goods, it serves to widen the scope of
money, and to further the interests of merchants involved in
commodity exchanges. On the other hand the decline in the re¬
distribution of goods outside the household allows the retention
of a greater share of wealth by individual households. Wolf
has remarked of peasant societies that part of the fruits of
labour is given over to some form of ceremonial fund which
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serves to reproduce the values of that society.1 Often the cere¬
monial fund is dispensed at celebrations within the domestic
cycle; these occasions are marked by the distribution of goods
to the wider community in exchange for the recognition that the
latter gives to the domestic group concerned. Wolf argues that
if, as a result of cultural changes, a smaller part of a house¬
hold's resources is used for these ceremonial purposes, a great¬
er amount of wealth may be devoted to productive ends, and
this encourages the differentiation of households. 1 argue that
an increase in expenditure on domestic cycle celebrations is
compatible with new forms of socio-economic differentiation.
Elaboration of domestic cycle festivities in which the wider
community participates may underline and provide recognition
of the differences in property and status which exist between
members of the community. This 1 try to show is the case in
Abu Haraz. Attempts to curtail expenditure on festivities have
been made, not by individual households seeking to limit con¬
sumption within their respective domains, but as a result of a
collective initiative by members of the community. In the case
of expenditure connected with marriage celebrations, which I
consider in detail in the next chapter, the concern to limit and
standardise transactions has arisen from the awareness of the
social consequences of increased expenditure and delayed marr¬
iages. Given the discrepancies in wealth between different
households, it is not surprising that these attempts to limit
expenditure on marriage payments and celebrations have been
only partially successful.
Thus I would accept that changes in family and domestic org¬
anisation have important implications for wider social and econ¬
omic relations. But the perspective that I am pursuing here
and trying to substantiate is that certain trends and patterns
in domestic institutions may be best accounted for by reference
to changes in the system of productive relations. Broadly speak-
1. E.R.Wolf: Peasants. New Jersey, 1966.
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ing in this chapter I am concerned with the way in which the
means of obtaining goods has affected the household as a unit
of consumption. For here I wish to consider the emergence of
new consumption patterns, the organisation of household bud¬
gets, the allocation of social space within the home, and the
significance of extraordinary expenditure relating to domestic
cycle celebrations. In the following two chapters I examine the
changes in matrimonial payments and the formation of new dom¬
estic groups (Chapter 6), and related changes in the institut¬
ion of marriage, concerning age at marriage, divorce, remarr¬
iage and plural marriages (Chapter 7).
1 wish to pay particular attention to trends and patterns of
household organisation in Abu Haraz: unless otherwise stated,
my remarks concern this particular village. For it is in Abu
Haraz rather than Kumur that certain trends in domestic and
marriage practices have been most marked. This I would large¬
ly attribute to the greater prevalence of regular wage and
salary-earned incomes and to the accumulation of petty-capital
by a small but significant proportion of the population in this
village. The withdrawal of a large number of the inhabitants
from subsistence activities, and their need to purchase consum¬
er goods through the market provide at least the possibility for
the differentiation of life-styles. Expenditure on consumer goods
and durable household assets has in fact increased considerab¬
ly but unevenly. Attempts to maintain and enhance different¬
iated status have led in general to greater material and ideol¬
ogical investment in marriages. By contrast in Kumur the
forced reliance of the majority of the inhabitants on their fam¬
ily patrimonies of rainlands and herds, combined with the per¬
formance of local casual labour, has encouraged the mainten¬
ance of something more akin to traditional domestic patterns.
Living standards in Kumur have altered little. Most households*
domestic equipment is still of a limited and rudimentary nat¬
ure. Their homes themselves are simply constructed and easily
removable - which facilitates the seasonal migration of several
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households to the Gezira for the cotton-picking. Women in
Kumur still contribute substantial amounts of productive labour,
and there has arisen no strict division of male and female
space within the home. Marriage payments have remained relat¬
ively simple, and marriages are not subjected to the same kind
of pressures as in Abu Haraz, where the responsibility of hus¬
bands as providers has been greatly extended in scope.
In the previous two chapters I have shown the extent to which
commercial relations have penetrated local productive activities,
and how this has encouraged the adoption of wage labour, sal¬
aried employment and commercial ventures both within and out¬
side the locality. It is also necessary to point out that monet-
arised services have encroached on many domestic activities.
The processing of several goods for consumption, and many act¬
ivities entailed in everyday household maintenance have been
transformed into goods and services which have to be paid for.
The transformation of these domestic activities has meant in
many cases the replacement of unpaid female labour by goods
and services based on paid male labour. For example, grain
for human consumption is no longer ground by hand either in
Abu Haraz or Kumur; today it is milled. There are now three
grain-mills in Abu Haraz, each privately owned; two are owned
by shop-keepers in the village, and the third, the oldest, is
hired out by a migrant from the village, now working as a re¬
tailer in Khartoum. Most of the inhabitants of Abu Haraz, and
some neighbouring villagers from Kumur and El Eleila avail
themselves of these services. Other villagers have their grain
milled at local markets, held twice weekly at Hideiba and Umm
Shaneg, or in Wad Medani. From these places they can also
purchase grain at lower costs than in Abu Haraz. While milling
charges are not very expensive - 3-5pt per keila (25.4 kg) -
over a year they amount to £S3-5 for an average household.
Milling of grain has greatly reduced the drudgery of female
domestic work, just as has the introduction of bore-wells. Much
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less time is now spent in procuring drinking water, compared
with when water had to be manually raised from deep wells or
carried up from the river. However, for women in Kumur obtain¬
ing water entails a long walk to the government bore-well,
which serves not only Kumur el Eleish, but also the settlements
of Masara and Kumur el Batahin. A few households have water
brought to their homes by donkey-cart; this service is rendered
by small boys for payment. In Abu Haraz, in addition to the
government bore-well, the villagers have themselves installed
piping to central watering points, each serving up to twenty
households. Several households have at their own expense in¬
stalled further piping in order to bring water into their resp¬
ective compounds. In order to meet the costs of fuel and main¬
tenance of the diesel pump, each household contributes 25pt a
month for access to a communal watering-point, or 50pt a month
if piping is extended to their homes. This expenditure is met
from the household budget which is almost invariably supported
by male-earned incomes; formerly, of course, provision of
water, as with grinding of grain, was an unpaid female act¬
ivity.
Similarly a greater amount of fuel for household use is today
purchased rather than gathered by women. Especially in Abu
Haraz, many households use charcoal which can be purchased
in the village shops. This charcoal is brought by merchants
from the forested areas between the southern stretches of the
Dinder and Rahad rivers where the wood is burnt. Previously
most households used firewood collected by women from the near¬
by forest, and also part of the roots of the acacia tree
(tertus) which give off a dense heat like charcoal. The women
of poor families still collect both these roots and firewood from
the forest. The latter they use for their own needs, but also
they sell some to other households, for firewood is necessary
for the open fires on which the dura bread (kisra) is baked.
Some men take up wood-cutting as a casual form of employment,
selling the fallen and dead timber they have collected at 50pt
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a donkey load.1
Specialization of production has brought about the disappear¬
ance of several domestic crafts and industries. Spinning and
weaving of cotton, respectively female and male tasks, are no
longer practised. In Abu Haraz pottery used to be made by the
women, but today a wide range of metal and enamel pots and
bowls are preferred. Some clay utensils are still used, such as
the doqa for baking kisra and the spherical coffee pots
(jebena), but these are bought in Wad Medani and not made in
the village. Several other activities in which female domestic
labour has been displaced could be cited. For example,
changes in housing styles have made women's labour in house
repair and building less prevalent. Women used to be respons¬
ible for repairing mud-block walls (jalous) and for smearing
potash on interior walls as a method of white-washing.2
Bricks, whether dried mud or fired, have widely replaced
jalous, and whitewash and paint are more frequently used than
potash for interior decoration. The labour involved in these
new labour processes is invariably performed by men. This is
true both of the production of these new materials and of their
use.
Traditional craft activities performed by men have also been
affected by the changing need and desire for such goods, and
1. The forest next to Abu Haraz is government protected, and special permission is
required to cut down living trees. Two forest wardens in Abu Haraz and El Eleila
are employed to prevent unauthorised felling of trees. Periodically licences are
granted to merchants to clear mature trees. Nearly all these contractors are of
West African origin, and they employ West African labourers. These restrictions
account for why charcoal is not made locally.
2. Formerly when communities like Abu Haraz and Kumur followed a more nomadic exist¬
ence, women played an even more important role in house-building, since they wove
the mats or rugs of which their shelters consisted. Also the women of households
possessing herds used to expend considerable labour in processing milk products,
particularly clarified butter (semin). The women marketed these products and re¬
tained the proceeds. Today the marketing of milk is performed by men. In the
Rahad area there are groups of Shukriya, Batahin and Rufa'ayin that still pursue
a nomadic life, though many have become partly settled.
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by the availability of manufactured goods in the market. In
Abu Haraz one old man still makes the traditional leather foot¬
wear (markub), but most of the villagers prefer manufactured,
and often imported, shoes and sandals. The manufacture of
wooden bed-frames (angarib), sprung with either leather thongs
or palm-fibre ropes, still provides part-time employment for
some of the villagers. But metal-framed beds and chairs are
found in an increasing number of households. Several other
forms of traditional carpentry and craftwork have been super¬
ceded by the manufacture of various utensils and furnishings
in the towns, and by the import of cheap household goods.
Wooden tables and chests, farming utensils, riding gear, leath¬
er containers and water-skins are all examples of traditional
craftwork which have been made largely redundant, or replaced
by modern manufactured goods.
The people of Abu Haraz are dependent on the market for an
increasing proportion of their consumption needs. Both for the
equivalent of what they used to produce themselves, and for a
wide range of new commodities the villagers have to purchase
what they need. Those households not engaging in rainland
cultivation or animal husbandry, but which are supported
through the efforts of migrant labourers, need to purchase all
their food requirements. Those households that have herds and
have enjoyed a successful harvest are able to furnish them¬
selves with the staples of their diet - dura, milk and bamia
(okra), or waika, a natural species of bamia which grows wild
in the bildats. Culwick has made a detailed study of dietary
patterns in the Gezira area, and she records how the tradition¬
al diet has been supplemented and modified by the introduction
of various new foodstuffs.1 The most important modifications
consist of the wider availability and consumption of fresh
meat, vegetables, salads and fruits, wheat flour, pasta, rice
1. G.M.Culwick: Diet in the Gezira Irrigated Area. Sudan Gezira Board, Barakat,
1951.
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and white bread. Poor families minimise their expenditure on
these foodstuffs, and rely to a greater extent on the staples
mentioned above, plus dried meat (sharmoot), and warak and
rigla» two other stew relishes found locally. However, even
very poor families find the means to buy tea, coffee, sugar,
salt and spices, all of which are looked upon as essentials
though they have little nutritional value. This is illustrated
in Table I which gives the annual expenditure of six house¬
holds on food and basic household necessities.
Barnett (1977) notes that in the Gezira most household goods
are bought with cash, and he gives a list (p. 176) which illus¬
trates the fact that most household furnishings and utensils are
in fact imported goods, or at least derived from imported mater¬
ials and containers which are refashioned in the towns. The
same is true of consumer goods on the east bank, in villages
like Abu Haraz. The most common transformation in furnishings
is the replacement of the multi-functional angarib by metal-
framed beds and chairs, and the substitution of cupboards and
hanging-rails for chests and boxes. Wealthy families possess
lavish bedroom suites and suites for the diwan. Imported car¬
pets take the place of mats in these homes. The installation of
electricity in Abu Haraz in 1977 was followed by the purchase
of televisions and refrigerators by several households. It has
now become an established custom ('idda) for women to collect
numerous sets of crockery, pans and bowls, tea services and
glasses, all of which are imported goods. These objects are dis¬
played in glass-fronted cabinets. Most of the time they are not
used, but on special occasions when there are many guests
they will be used to serve the latter. These collections of cook¬
ing and eating utensils are an indication of the more pro¬
nounced domestic role of women; at the same time they refer to
the success of their husbands in providing for them.
Ibn Khaldoun remarked that the tailor was unknown to the




(Annual consumption per household in Sudanese Pounds
Head of 1 2 3 4 5 6
household Abdelgadir Nazir Nasr Tom Umm Batul
Kaltum







4ad 2ch 3ad 4>
Consumption
Units * 13 5 7£ 3 5 5
FOOD
V
Dura 220 70 90 30 54 30
wheat/white
bread 100 20 12 6 6 6
cooking oil 72 54 36 18 18 16
Fresh meat 220 110 75 35 45 35
Dried meat 24 , 10 8 6 6 6
Trad, relishes 100 30 30 18 35 40
Fresh veg.
& salads 225 60 60 25 30 25
Rice, pasta 45 10 15 5 10 10
Spices 20 8 8 5 8 6
Sugar 250 85 50 45 32 45
Tea & Coffee 130 70 25 18 24 24
Milk 220 45 30 20 20 20
Fruit 50 30 3 2 2 2
TOTAL 1576 602 432 236 290 265
FUEL
Kerosene 36 28 18 18 3 3
Charcoal 16 36 - 16 - 7
Wood 180 18 - - - -
Electricity 150 75 26 25 - -
TOTAL 362 157 44 59 3 10










Household Consumption Budgets (Cont'd.)
Motes on households.
1. Abdelgadir al-Nil. Shop-keeper and rainland farmer. L,
married sons merchants in Khartoum, but married in Abu Haraz.
Occupy seven red-brick rooms in large compound with lavish
diwan. Shop separate. Father budgets for all their households,
though sons contribute additional items to respective families.
Purchase items wholesale.
2. Nazir 'Alim. Shop-keeper, seller of grain, and, from 1977,
operator of electric mill in village. Occupies three red-brick
rooms, enclosed. Separate diwan near shop. Purchases items
wholesale.
3. Nasr Gasim. Rainland and jerf farmer, and keeper of goats.
Two married sons resident in Khartoum. Occupies one red-brick
room with enclosure, and one mud-brick room with veranda.
Purchases items from Coop. shop.
4. Tom Tireifi. Retired farmer. Two migrant sons in regular
employment return intermittently to village. Two red-brick
rooms, partly enclosed. Purchases from Coop. shop.
5. Umm Kalturn. Widow, rainland farmer. One son medical assis¬
tant, with salary of £S17 month, others still studying. One mud-
brick room and veranda. No compound. Buys from local shop.
6. Batul 'Ali. Widow of irrigation controller in Gezira. Lives
with widowed mother, and 5 children. One mud-brick room, with
delapidated veranda. No compound. Buys from local shop; many
items provided by sons of husband's brother, migrant workers
in Khartoum, who are engaged to two of Batul's daughters.
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have it cut to fit him. Certainly dress styles have become much
more varied, with different kinds of clothing appropriate to the
age, sex and status of the wearer, and the occasion and cir¬
cumstances of its use. The jellabiya is still popular, but it is
increasingly common for both sexes to wear western-style
clothes. In the case of women a long drape is drawn around
the body over these clothes outside the privacy of the home.
Traditionally this drape (tob) was of white cotton or dyed with
indigo in the case of older women. But today the trousseau of
a bride in Abu Haraz comprises several tobs of differing qual¬
ity, with the most expensive being of fine synthetic fibres with
beautiful coloured designs. According to a man's main occupat¬
ional role and social standing, he tends to wear different cos¬
tumes for work and leisure activities, for formal as against
informal occasions, and in private as against in public. Con¬
siderable attention is paid also to children's clothing, espec¬
ially at the 'eids and other festive occasions, and when visit¬
ing. New kinds of costume have been introduced in connexion
with recently accentuated ceremonies, such as weddings. In
some marriages the bride wears a white wedding gown (zeffaf),
while the bridegroom wears a western-style suit (as opposed to
the safari suit commonly worn by government officials).
As mentioned before, most of these new forms of clothing are
made from imported materials. The material is generally bought
in the towns, and then made up by tailors there or in the vill¬
age. In Abu Haraz there are normally five or six tailors resid¬
ent in the village, where they work in the verandas of the
village shops. Most tailors own their own sewing-machines and
pay rent to the shop-keeper for the space they occupy. Two of
the tailors own the buildings in which they work, and have on
display a selection of materials and a stock of ready-made
clothes. In Kumur there is no resident tailor, and when people
there want clothes tailored they must travel to one of the
markets.
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New housing styles are another important feature of emergent
consumption patterns. Brausch describes at some length the var¬
ious styles of housing which have spread through the rural
areas of the Gezira. He argues that the establishment of perm¬
anent villages and the greater access to water which facilitates
the construction and use of bricks have encouraged these
trends.1 Buildings constructed of brick, as opposed to mud and
straw, are valued for their greater durability, and for the
fact that they provide larger space and are more water-proof.2
In Abu Haraz most houses are built of a mixture of fired and
unfired mud bricks (gishra). The rooms are rectangular-shaped
with flat roofs. All the buildings in the village are single-
storied. Most homes are now enclosed by compound walls. Be¬
cause of shortage of space when improvements or extensions to
buildings are carried out, the old building is often pulled
down, and the new building erected on the site. However,
where space is not a problem, it is common to find houses com¬
prising buildings of varying age, and of different styles. By
contrast in Kumur most the buildings are constructed with cir¬
cular mud walls, and wood and straw conical roofs. Few of
them have compound walls. New buildings are only distin¬
guished by the fact that the straw is fawn-coloured in contrast
to the dun, weather-beaten roofs of older buildings. The except¬
ions to this pattern are a cluster of brick buildings in the
centre of the village, occupied by the descendants of Sheikh El
Eleish, and a few other isolated modern buildings of migrant
workers.
Households in Abu Haraz possess more rooms than those in
Kumur (2 rooms per household as against 1.5 in Kumur). En¬
largement of living space permits the allocation of space to
1. G. Brausch: Bashaqra Area Settlements 1963: A Case Study in Village Development
in the Gezira Scheme. Khartoum 1964.
2. Brausch estimates the life-span of a mud-brick or jalous building to be about
10 years, while that of a fired-brick building to be more than 30 years.
- 129 -
different functions, such as cooking, sleeping, entertaining and
general leisure activities. It also allows a greater measure of
privacy to the various members of the household as different¬
iated by sex, age and marital status. In a single-room house¬
hold cooking, eating, entertaining, resting, sleeping and pro¬
creation are all carried out in the same room. The extension
of living space, while partly related to the increased size of
families, also denotes the desire to differentiate functions with¬
in the domestic domain. Households with two or more rooms gen¬
erally employ one room as a guest-room (diwan). In this room
male guests are entertained, and meals are served to the adult
male members of the household. The diwan also generally
serves as a place of leisure and rest for any male members of
the household present. Removed from the distraction of small
children in the family, it is often used as a sleeping room by
the head of the household or his adolescent sons. The second
room of a two-room household retains much of the character of
the multi-functional room of a single-room household. Utilised
mainly by the women and children of the household, it is
where most of the domestic activities are carried on - child-
care, cooking, cleaning, etc. Women guests and close relatives
are entertained in this room. In one corner there is usually a
hole in the ground over which the women take their smoke bath
from the fragrant woods that they burn in it. This room also
contains the woman's personal belongings and household and
cooking equipment, if there is not a separate kitchen for the
latter. However, it is common for the woman's display cabinet,
containing her Jidda, to be kept in the men's guest room.
It is increasingly common for a dividing wall to be constructed
separating the diwan from the inner compound containing the
other living-rooms, cooking area and other space utilised by
women in the course of their various domestic activities. In
well-to-do households large metal gates are often erected to
provide a formal entrance to the compound, and giving access
to the diwan. One or more smaller entrances generally provide
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access directly to the inner compound, and often link the inner
compounds of related households. (See diagram). Thus this div¬
ision of space within the home gives greater freedom and priv¬
acy to men and women respectively in pursuing their pleasures
and interests. The construction of inner compounds also prov¬
ides greater privacy for young married couples, and at the
same time reflects their greater autonomy from parents and
other relatives.
This division of domestic space into "public" and "private"
areas, and according to "male" and "female" spheres is now
fairly standard in Abu Haraz; such tendencies are, of course,
widely referred to in the literature on Middle Eastern cultures.
Certainly the physical separation of the male and female dom¬
ains, and in particular the seclusion afforded women, both
reflects and accentuates social values which emphasise the diff¬
erentiation of sex roles. In this discussion I wish to allude to
the particular form of separation which has taken place be¬
tween male and female spheres of activity. For in the recent
past the possession of a diwan was a mark of special status
within the community. Only the leading religious families, the
village headman, and a few of the wealthier merchants had a
diwan. The menfolk of the village tended to gather at these
diwans, or at other public places, notably the village shops.
But in their homes there was less division of space according
to male and female spheres since their rudimentary housing
facilities allowed no such division to be made. In Kumur, for
example, where the housing is more simple and the number of
rooms per household fewer, it is common to find all the mem¬
bers of a household in close proximity, and a visitor witnesses
all the normal domestic activities being carried on around him.
In these circumstances, when male and female interests di¬
verge, men tend to gather in a house where the womenfolk are
out visiting, while the women may congregate, for instance, in
the home of a woman who has recently given birth.
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DIAGRAM SHOWING LAY-OUT OF RELATED HOUSEHOLDS IN
FARIQ KHANDAGAWI
1. 'el Asil' Fatna Gasmallah, old widow. Lives with 16 year
old granddaughter, daughter of a son of 'El Asil' living
elsewhere in the village.
2. 'El Basir' Abdelrahman Dafa'Allah, tailor in Khartoum, son
of 'El Asil'. Married MBD, two children.
3. Mustafa Dafa'Allah, merchant in Wad Medani, son of 'El
Asil'. Married MFZD; ten children, one daughter married to
NO.7 (FBS).
4. Sadiq Dafa'Allah, farmer and vegetable seller in Abu Haraz,
son of 'El Asil'. Married FBD, deceased. Remarried unrelat¬
ed woman from Gezira. 11 children by first marriage. 3
sons,. 2 daughters, married.
5. Haj Hashmi, baker in Khartoum. Brother of No.8. Married
daughter of 'El Asil' (FZD); 6 children.
6. Zaineb Ishag. Divorced. Distantly related to above. No
children. Brother's son lives with her during term.
7. Haj Sadiq Dafa'Allah, in army, son of No.4. Married dt. of
No.3 (FBD).
8. Ibrahim el Hashmi, sheikh el hilla. Nephew (BS) of 'El Asil'.
Married FBD; 9 children, one dt married to FBS in Khartoum.
9. Shamia Elamin. Widow, FBD of 'El Asil'. 6 children, one
son, one dt. married in Khartoum.
10. Hasan Manawir, shop-keeper in Abu Haraz. Related through
mother to 'El Asil'. Married her sister, MBD. 5 children,
2 dts. married.-
11. feki Jak Abdelgadir. Religious teacher in Wad Medani. Marr¬
ied sister of No. 10. 8 children; 2 sons married.
12. Babiker feki Jak, merchant in Khartoum, son of No. 11. Marr¬
ied MBD.
13. Dafa'Allah feki Jak, driver in Gezira Scheme, son of No. 11.
Married MBD.
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The aspiration of each householder to have his own diwan is
of fairly recent origin. While status considerations play a part
in this development, the elaboration of housing styles incorpor¬
ating a diwan must be seen in the context of the privatisation
of the domestic domain as a whole. Modern productive relations
encourage the growth of individualism and the assertion of new
personal identities in accordance with the differing interests
and worldviews of individuals. The home serves as an import¬
ant medium through which personal interests are expressed.
Problems of livelihood no longer reflect a communality of inter¬
est shared by all the villagers, nor even by large numbers of
kin. Village problems, such as the functioning of various serv¬
ices provide a measure of common concern, and public debate
about these is common at larger gatherings. But work and fam¬
ily interests are more appropriately communicated in the great¬
er privacy of the home where the individual has greater free¬
dom to choose his company. For the migrant workers, in partic¬
ular, the diwan provides a place where they can spend a rest¬
ful time with friends, attended to by their family and dis¬
tracted from outside problems. In a similar manner the youth
club (nadi) in Abu Haraz provides an environment where young
men are free to express their interests and life-style. Removed
from parental authority and household responsibilities, they are
free to organise their own leisure activities.
The adoption of new housing styles entails greatly increased
expenditure. A double-room brick house with compound costs
about £600 to build. In order to make it habitable according
to prevailing standards, additional expenditure must be made
to install water and electricity, and to purchase metal-framed
beds and chairs and other modern furnishings. By contrast a
mud-brick house with veranda, traditionally furnished with
angaribs, costs less than £100. Many inhabitants in Abu Haraz
have spent the greater part of their lives in the latter kind
of house. It is only through savings from many years of work,
and in many cases only when supplemented by the remittances
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of wage-earning sons, that they have been able to afford the
modern kind of brick house. Stacks of bricks and partial con¬
structions, such as a half-completed compound wall or a solit¬
ary room with bricked-in windows, are a common sight
scattered around the village. They provide evidence of the
accumulative process of saving capital, buying building mater¬
ials and piece-meal building. As the productive members of a
household gradually accumulate these savings, the number of
members they must cater for are at the same time increasing.
Moreover, as their ages advance, more sophisticated facilities
are required. Daughters used to be married off in their teens,
thus relieving the pressure on living and sleeping space, but
today many are still studying and unmarried. (See Chapter 7
for discussion of the delayed age at marriage). Similarly young
men still studying or working, and unmarried, swell the num¬
ber of adults in the household for whom accommodation must be
provided, albeit only for short intervals if these members are
migrant workers. The desire to provide suitable conditions in
the home to facilitate children's studies has also encouraged
the improvement in housing standards. All these factors, com¬
bined with the prevalence of earned incomes, have contributed
to the adoption of new housing styles.
The largest relative increase in expenditure within new consump¬
tion patterns has been on durable goods and assets, particular¬
ly the house and its contents.1 It is true that food consumption
has become more varied, and entertainment and consumption at
some life-cycle ceremonies has become more extravagant. But
the increase in costs of the latter are largely offset by the con¬
tributions which guests make on these occasions (nuqta). At the
same time there have been attempts to curtail, or at least to
limit expenditure on certain festivities, notably those connected
with intra-village marriages and feasts held at the end of the
1. See Medani, A.I. 1971. Consumption patterns of the Gezira-Managil tenants. Sudan
Notes and Records, Vol. 52, 1971.
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mourning period. In the realm of personal expenditure it is not¬
iceable that expenditure on material items, such as clothing,
is held in much greater favour than expenditure on forms of
immediate personal consumption which yield nothing tangible in
return. Personal indulgences, such as smoking and the partak¬
ing of alcoholic drinks, are criticised on religious and moral
grounds, but also because they are considered wasteful of a
man's earnings. A few bachelors and young divorced men in
Abu Haraz were noted for their heavy drinking; other villagers
frequently contrasted the behaviour of these non-conformists
with the prevailing idealised pattern of saving and expenditure
on durable, albeit 'luxury' goods, and devotion to family
duties.
In order to understand the implications of these new consump¬
tion patterns for domestic organisation it is necessary to dist¬
inguish between the residential and budgeting arrangements of
domestic groups. Thus I will follow the distinction that Seddon
makes concerning the family in northern Morocco:1 he dist¬
inguishes between
the conjugal family, as a bio-social unit; the
household, as a larger association of individuals
living within one haush, or homestead; and the
budget unit, as a group of individuals sharing a
common fund and exchanging goods between each
other without reckoning, (p.178)
The significance of the budget unit has been underlined, not
only because most consumer goods are purchased through the
market and distributed through the budget unit; but also be¬
cause expenditure on durable consumer goods has increased,
and thus differentiation of life-styles is expressed through mem¬
bership of different budget units. As will be examined shortly,
1. D.Seddon: 'Aspects of kinship and family structure among the Ulad Stut of Zaio
rural coasiune, Nador province, Morocco' in J.G.Peristiany: Mediterranean Faaily
Structures, Caabridge, 1976.
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the establishment of a conjugal fund at marriage generally
entails the formation of a separate budget unit.
But while household budget units are fairly clearly demarcated,
residential patterns tend to be more ramified and complex. The
majority of inhabitants in .^bu Haraz live in close proximity to
numerous close relatives, usually the parents of either spouse
and married siblings. Only a few newcomers to the village,
and a few others through want of space, have established a
neolocal residence on the perimeter of the village. But since
compounds take different shapes, and often contain inner com¬
pounds or dividing walls, it is difficult to define precisely the
boundaries between different homesteads. Some households share
the same water-tap, some the same cooking area for baking
kisra, some the same pit-latrine, and some the same diwan.
The tendency is for the duplication of these domestic amenities
by separate budget units. But, especially with the lengthy
absences of migrant workers, residential ties between closely-
related kin continue to remain strong.
In carrying out my household and budget survey in Abu Haraz
1 found that the informants themselves distinguished quite
clearly between those persons contributing to a common budget
and those persons living in close proximity, sometimes sharing
the same compound, who contributed to separate budgets. 80%
of all budget units consisted of members of a nuclear family,
that is a married couple and their unmarried children. Most of
the others included aging dependents, usually parents of one
of the spouses; very few common budgets were shared by two
still active generations, or by married siblings. I will refer
to these exceptions shortly. By common budget 1 refer to the
allocation of earnings and income to a common fund for the
purchase of consumption items shared between the members of
the budget unit. Not all the earnings of the members of such
groups are channeled through the common budget. Migrant
workers have to meet their own cost of living expenses at their
- 136 -
places of work, and these expenses may consume the greater
part of a migrant's income. In addition many wage-earning
bachelors have separate accounts at shops in the village where
they purchase goods for their personal consumption, particular¬
ly cigarettes and tobacco.
Women also retain control over their own earnings and income,
small though these usually are. This enables them to purchase
items for their own personal use and consumption, and to have
ready cash with which to entertain guests and to contribute to
ritual and life-cycle festivities. Unlike the women of Kumur,
women in Abu Haraz do not engage in agricultural wage lab¬
our. Most of their independent income derives from the sale of
handicraft items, such as baskets and mats, from the sale of
pigeons, chickens and eggs, and from services they perform for
other women, such as hair-pleating. Some women also engage
in petty-trading of small foodstuffs, such as sweets, biscuits,
nuts and berries; these they sell at the entrance to the schools
and at the qubbas. The small number of women employed in the
village services fall into two categories: the educated un¬
married women, mostly teachers, whose salaries supplement the
income of male contributors to their respective family budgets;
and the older women, mostly widows, employed as cleaners and
cooks in the girls' schools, whose income substitutes for that
of a male provider, and which represents the main in-put to
their family budgets.
The aspiration of women to enjoy a measure of financial in¬
dependence, and not to be completely dependent on the common
household fund is expressed in the increasing popularity of rot¬
ary savings groups in the village (sanduq al-ta'on). These
groups comprise 15-20 women who contribute a regular sum each
month to a collective fund supervised by one of the women.
This fund is then allocated to each of the members in turn to
dispose of as she likes. The normal contribution is about £2,
and so the lump sum eventually received by each contributor
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amounts to £30-£40. Many women use these savings to purchase
additional sets of items for their display of household goods
('idda). However, the sum received may be used for a wide
range of purposes, from purchasing a wardrobe or some jewelry
to meeting the costs of performing the pilgrimage to Mecca.
Half of a sample of 54 married women contributed to a sanduq.
Of these nearly all obtain the contributions they are required
to make from husbands or sons. While this system of saving re¬
veals an important aspect of women's social networks, it also
underlines the increase in expenditure within the nuclear fam¬
ily and the broadening scope of provision for women within the
family.1
Thus the common fund contributed to by the members of a house¬
hold does not preclude the existence of a degree of financial
autonomy by its members, especially in relation to various
kinds of personal expenditure. However, most forms of expendit¬
ure relating to everyday household needs are met from the
common fund. Most households have an account at one of the
twelve shops in the village, or more frequently today at the
village cooperative shop, which supplies most consumer goods
apart from dura. These accounts are settled at regular inter¬
vals, usually at the end of every month. Some transactons at
the local shops are also made in cash, as are all purchases
of meat and vegetables. Since many men are away working, it
is the women who make most of these cash purchases; they use
money allocated to them by their husbands from the common bud¬
get after the shop accounts and other expenditures have been
met from it.
The contributors to the household budget are usually the head
of the household and any unmarried wage-earning sons. After
1. Some men also contributed in their own right to these saving groups. I learned
of this only late in ay fieldwork, and did not discover the extent of this male
participation. For urban savings groups see F.Rehfisch 'A Rotary Credit Association
in the Three Towns' in Essays in Sudan Ethnograpy, ed. by I.Cunnison S W.James,
London, 1972.
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deduction of cost of living expenses in the case of migrants,
and of a further amount for personal spending money and sav¬
ings, the remainder of a man's earnings goes towards meeting
his family's general living expenses. Most migrants return to
the village at regular intervals, bringing with them their re¬
mittances. Even if a migrant is absent for a long period, he
can normally find a fellow-villager who is returning to take
a remittance to his family. On more than one occasion return¬
ing from Khartoum or Wad Medani to Abu Haraz I was asked to
perform such a service. Varying pressure exists on wage-earn¬
ing sons to contribute to the family budget. Depending on the
number of other productive members in the household, and on
the number of dependents to support, there is a greater or
lesser degree of urgency for a particular son to contribute to
his family budget. In families where the father has no regular
employment, but combines seasonal cultivation with some other
part-time activity, higher expectations fall on regularly em¬
ployed sons; only through their contribution can the family
hope to maintain, let alone improve their standard of living.
Where the father owns substantial resources, such as a shop,
or has salaried employment, the contribution of wage-earning
sons tends to take a different form, such as support for the
further education of siblings, rather than meeting everyday
household expenses. When a family is fortunate in having sever¬
al sons, pressure to contribute to the family budget may fall
unevenly, with most pressure falling on those closest to home.
However, if some major household expenditure is contemplated,
say for the construction of a new building, the head of the
household will try to call on the resources of all his family
members, especially those whose support he has not had to en¬
list for any length of time. In many households, because of the
low level of earnings of their productive members, and because
of the number of dependents to support, practically all income
has to be devoted to costs of subsistence. This is particularly
true during the main period of expansion of the domestic
group, when the father may be the sole provider and he may
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have ten or more family members to support.
Numerous demands are placed on the income of the single male
wage-earner. In the first place he must meet his own cost of
living expenses. If, as many of the young migrants do, he
works in Khartoum or one of the other towns, these expenses
will include rent for accommodation in a simple bachelor house,
sharing a room with three or four other young men, probably
co-villagers. They will also include the cost of his meals taken
in local canteens, transport costs, and personal expenditure on
clothing and toiletry, etc. As we have seen, a varying amount
of pressure will be exerted on him to contribute to his family's
budget. In addition family members make demands for loans
and gifts, for example a sister asks for a tob, or a mother for
some coffee, and these demands cannot be repeatedly refused
without causing resentment in the family. Furthermore, even if
a man does not indulge in expensive leisure pursuits, ties of
friendship and the obligations of hospitality require that he ex¬
pends some of his savings on entertainment; and occasionally
there are contributions to be made at weddings of friends and
relations. Over and above all these claims the person seeks to
save a proportion of his income, whether to further his work
prospects by saving some capital, or so as to prepare for the
heavy expenditure entailed in his prospective marriage.
In view of all these different demands it is not surprising that
some young migrants break off effective ties with their fam¬
ilies and contribute little or nothing to their household bud¬
gets. Sometimes this occurs in families where there are several
wage-earning sons, and thus there is not such strong pressure
on all of them to comply. But there are also families where the
pressures on a son are too great, for example where he has to
support a whole family practically single-handed, and so he
decides to opt out of his obligations. Parental authority varies
in its capability to enlist support from sons enjoying an in¬
dependent income, especially if they work away from home as
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most of them do. The objective difficulties of finding employ¬
ment, the problems entailed in migrant work, and the wide
range of demands on a wage-earner's income all serve to place
strains on filial obligations. However, most parents in Abu
Haraz acknowledged the devotion of their sons in the support
they provided. Sometimes I heard the complaint from a parent
that he was 'tired', implying that his sons were not doing
enough to help meet family expenditure. Frequently, on the re¬
turn of a migrant son to the village, the father would enumer¬
ate all the special expenditures that the family had to meet in
order to enlist financial support. But only a few families had
cause openly to condemn a son as 'no good'; and if there was
real cause for such a judgment, they would not hesitate to pro¬
nounce it.
At marriage most sons cease to contribute to their parents'
household budget, and begin to budget separately to meet the
needs of their own newly formed household. As will be shown
later, the age at marriage for men and women has become
later. To a large extent the delayed age at marriage is assoc¬
iated with the elaboration of the material conditions for estab¬
lishing a new conjugal unit. In the next chapter I will con¬
sider the increase in marriage payments and other expenditure
entailed in contracting a marriage. But the delayed age at
marriage is also related to the increase in household expend¬
iture, and the need to enlist the financial support of unmarr¬
ied sons to meet this expenditure. A prolonged period of wage-
earning in an unmarried state is thus largely the response to
certain characteristics of new patterns of consumption: the need
to purchase all consumer goods, the greater number of depend¬
ents owing to the prevalence of schooling and the non-product¬
ive role of women, and aspirations for improved living cond¬
itions. Hence for a substantial period after their schooling
ends sons are required to help support their families. If they
marry, they face new responsibilities and obligations, and
these necessarily detract from the assistance they render to
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their parents and siblings.
Most instances of early marriages, where the husband is less
than 25 years old, occur where the household still operates a
family patrimony and where the family has a number of sons.
In these circumstances the father may encourage and facilitate
the early marriage of the first or second son so as to ensure
the most productive use of the family patrimony. In these cases
there is a degree of cooperation in productive tasks between
father and son, though it may be expressed in the form of a
division of labour, with the son taking charge of the family
herd, while the father pays more attention to cultivation.
Correspondingly there is likely to be a greater measure of joint
budgeting, especially in the early stages of development of the
son's own domestic group. Fadhil Abdelmontolub, 29, is an
example of such an early marriage. He has assumed responsibil¬
ity for the family herd, and like his father, cultivates rain-
lands. He already has seven children while an older brother
and two younger ones, all working in Khartoum or pursuing fur¬
ther studies, are still unmarried. Similarly Ahmed Ja'afer, 23,
only recently got married; he works part-time as a court clerk
in Wad Medani, but also assists his father in working a gar¬
den that the latter has been given the tenancy of in the Rahad
Project. He contributes £8 a month to his father's household
budget. In the case of Fadhil and his father they budget joint¬
ly for staple items such as dura.
This pattern of joint budgeting between households comprising
the families of two or more married members reappears again
in some of the households whose members are engaged in com¬
bined trading activities. The el-Nil family, for example, is
noted for its combined budgeting; many villagers upheld it as
an ideal for its collective domestic arrangements. The father
is a shop-keeper in the village, and his four married sons,
the youngest in his early 20s, are engaged in wholesale dis¬
tribution and retailing of textiles in Khartoum. Their houses
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in Abu Haraz are all situated within one large encompassing
compound. They share one large diwan which is often used for
meetings of the village council, since the eldest son has been
influential in several projects concerned with the village's dev¬
elopment. The members of this household, who total 22 persons,
budget collectively for all their everyday household needs, and
this budget is supervised by the father. Apart from the fact
that the members of this family cooperated closely in what
amounted to a family commercial business, the lengthy absences
of the married sons also made practicable the sharing of a
household fund managed by the father. This last factor was
also significant in some of the other joint budgeting groups.
For example, Mohammad Haj 'All, a local carpenter, budgeted
for a total of 19 persons in his household, including the family
of a married son working in Libya and that of a widowed
daughter. In Abu Haraz there were half a dozen married men
working abroad, and a good many more unmarried men. The
absence of the former entails the activation of extended house¬
hold ties for budgetary arrangements. But as said before, most
migrants are able to return to the village sufficiently frequent¬
ly, or are able to send regular remittances, thereby maintain¬
ing the independence of their household budgets.
Evidence from the Gezira and Blue Nile regions shows that
there has been a general trend towards the economic independ¬
ence of the nuclear components of households, especially in re¬
gard to budgeting. Culwick records how neither the sharing of
certain domestic amenities, nor patterns of kinship and marr¬
iage provide clear criteria for studying the composition of
households; nevertheless she herself abides by the 1951 Sudan
Census definition of a household as those people sharing a
common cooking-pot.1 However the manner in which income is
obtained and budgetary arrangements tend to establish clear
1. G.H.Culwick: Some Problems of the Social Survey in the Sudan. Sudan Notes and
Records, Vol. 35, 1954.
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boundaries between the members of different domestic groups.
This she attributes to the spread of economic individualism with¬
in the Gezira Scheme and the prevalence of wage-earning occup¬
ations;
Economic conditions within the Gezira Scheme are,
of course, chiefly responsible for the tendency of
the patriarchal household of the traditional sub¬
sistence economy to break down into the multiplic¬
ity of patterns found in the Gezira village... The
ready availability of money-earning occupations
naturally loosens ties and encourages the independ¬
ence of what would formerly have been parts of
one composite household, (p. 118)
For budgetary purposes... the unit is now quite
definitely the household, with a marked tendency
to personal independence on the part of married
sons within that unit.1
Barnett (1977) too records how the consumption unit has tended
to become identified with the nuclear family, which provides
the basic productive unit in the operation of Gezira tenancies.2
Outside the Gezira but in the neighbouring Blue Nile region
similar trends have been recorded. Writing about a village on
the Blue Nile near Khartoum, Barclay suggests that there has
probably been a trend towards more nuclear households follow¬
ing the decline in the number of families subsisting primarily
from family farms.3 Already among many extended households
1. G.M.Culwick: A Study of the Hunan Factor in the Gezira Scheme. Barakat, not
dated, p.96.
2. Henin (1969) offers a different view; he records that in the Gezira it is the
custom at marriage for the son to remain living within his parents' compound and
to pay visits to his bride at her home. This practice nay have been more prevalent
in the past, and account for the earlier age at marriage in the Gezira (See p.
). But the other studies quoted suggest that the trend at marriage has been
towards the establishment of a separate conjugal household, whether it is of uxori-
local or virilocal residence.
3. H.B.Barclay: Buuri Al Lamaab: a Suburban Village in the Sudan, New York, 1964.
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their nuclear components are relatively independent, especially
in relation to household budgeting: "Extended families are often
a series of closely-related nuclear families with each nuclear
unit going about its separate business." (p.77) In his survey
of domestic and residential patterns in Gezira villages, Brausch
(1964) prefers the term 'co-residential kinship group' to
'extended household'. This usage conveys more accurately domes¬
tic patterns in which there are close residential ties between
related families, but where most nuclear families organise their
household budgeting separately from each other. As I showed
in the last chapter, closely-related families which cultivate
rainlands farm separate plots and often pursue different strat¬
egies. Thus among these families, as well as those which
obtain income from other sources, the budget unit most common¬
ly comprises members of the nuclear family.
The tendency for the budget unit to be based on the nuclear
family permits the emergence of different styles of living among
related households; it may also be argued that it encourages
considerable social and economic mobility, since it leaves indiv¬
idual families free to allocate resources for their own ends. On
the other hand delayed marriages enable households to pool the
resources of their productive members, and thereby to advance
the interests of all their members. Since a varying proportion
of household expenditure is directed towards the purchase of
durable consumer goods, the material assets of different house¬
holds vary considerably. The reproduction of the conditions of
everyday life embraces the need to preserve and enhance a
particular life-style which these material assets serve to indic¬
ate. In the long term the differentiation of life-styles tends to
override kinship ties and other social bonds. Where close kin
occupy similar economic positions their life-styles are more like¬
ly to accord with each other. In these cases close ties may be
maintained and intermarriages frequently arranged between the
families concerned. But in Abu Haraz there are many instances
of close kin having become economically differentiated. Some-
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times this is due largely to demographic factors, such as a
favourable ratio of wage-earners to dependents; sometimes it is
due to a division of labour between close kin, with one brother
managing the family patrimony while others pursue different
kinds of employment; sometimes it is due to the fluctuating for¬
tunes of small enterprises and businesses. Through whatever
circumstances this diversification of interests has come about,
kinship ties tend to become subordinated to the separate inter¬
ests of individuals concerned with maintaining the life-style of
their respective families.
The growth of individualism and of the privatisation of the
home is nevertheless tempered by norms of sociability which en¬
courage the sharing of others' company. Women who are
supported in all their needs by their husbands fill their leis¬
ure time with an elaborate round of visiting and entertaining
visitors to their own homes. Women also assist each other, or
at least share each others' company, in a wide range of dom¬
estic duties. This is particularly so among adjoining house¬
holds where the menfolk are temporarily absent. For example
each married woman normally cooks her own stew (mulah), but
preparations for this, as well as the baking of kisra are like¬
ly to be carried out in the company of other women. Similarly
with many other domestic chores, such as washing clothes, coll¬
ecting firewood, or weaving baskets, women tend to carry out
their various activities in the company of others. At these gath¬
erings domestic work and leisure activities are frequently
mixed; for example, hair pleating and hennaing are normally
carried out in the presence of other women who are occupied
with childcare or cooking or some other domestic activity, and
at the same time that a vigorous conversation is being held
about some event in the village or some affair of topical inter¬
est. Borrowing of various small items commonly takes place;
one woman asks for a lighted charcoal, and another for the
loan of a bowl. During special celebrations these forms of
cooperation are activated on a much wider scale. At festivities
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women bring their own cooking utensils and help to prepare the
food, which may amount to feeding a hundred or more people
at a simaiya or karama, and several times that number for a
large wedding reception.1
On the other hand many families today do lead a more secluded
existence than they were used to in the past. Relations between
neighbours are not always open and friendly. The construction
of compound walls impeding rights of way leads to numerous
acrimonious disputes between neighbours. Some neighbours are
held to be troublesome since they are continually asking for
things, and fail to return things they have borrowed. Such be¬
haviour conflicts with the general expectation that households
should be as self-reliant as possible. On the other hand the
withholding of small reasonable services from neighbours or kin
leads to suspicions a family is trying to make savings for its
own self-interested gain at the expense of sociable relations
with others.
Meal-groups express some of the ambivalence arising from adher¬
ence to norms of sociability and hospitality on the one hand,
and from more individualistic patterns of consumption on the
other. It is common for a man to eat alone, or perhaps accomp¬
anied by one or two of his young sons. The female members of
the family eat separately with the other children. In Kumur
this separation of the sexes at meals is less marked; I came
across several families there where husband and wife ate to¬
gether. The only time I ate with women in Abu Haraz was with
a religious family which comprised a young widow, several rel¬
ated bachelors and clients of the family, and some girls from
Kumur, also related, who were studying in Abu Haraz. On some
occasions, when a group of kin and neighbours are gathered
1. Simaiya is the name-giving ceremony held a Meek after the birth of a child.
Karaaa is a thanks offering held on diverse occasions to acknowledge good fortune,
e.g. following recovery after an illness, on return from the pilgrimage, on passing
an examination, etc.
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at a particular man's house, the former give instructions for
their respective meals to be brought to where they are all ass¬
embled. The food is then brought on covered trays from the var¬
ious homes, and shared between those present. Where a diwan
is effectively shared by several related families, this pattern
may become a regular practice. But if several of the male
adults are absent, the others are more likely to eat in their
own homes. If casual visitors are present when a meal is
served, the host will press them to stay and partake of the
meal. The visitors then either excuse themselves and leave the
company, or make a gesture of participation. Invited guests
and visitors who have come for a special purpose are urged to
satisfy themselves fully, and are given the best food the fam¬
ily can offer. If their menfolk are absent, women are more like¬
ly to eat together. Otherwise the women of each family eat sep¬
arately, attending the needs of their menfolk.
Evidence that the size of meal-groups has probably declined is
provided by the size of meal-groups celebrating the end of the
day's fast during Ramadan in 1977. It is the custom to break
the fast and to perform the sunset prayer (mughrib) in the com¬
pany of others. Since a large group is considered desirable,
considerable interest was shown by villagers in the size of cer¬
tain groups. Of fourteen breakfast groups that I joined the
largest had eight adult men partaking, while the average was
four or five per group. In contrast in Kumur all the men in
the village joined one of two very large groups. In the past
large groups were probably more prevalent in Abu Haraz too.
Of course at the festivities connected with domestic and life-
cycle celebrations large numbers of people eat together. At most
of these occasions the domestic group concerned prepares suffi¬
cient food for all those participating. At funerals the respons¬
ibility for providing the food is more widely shared. House¬
holds prepare their meals as normal, but then the food is
brought to where the mourners are gathered and the food
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shared among those present. The household which has suffered
the bereavement prepares additional food for the mourners com¬
ing from afar, and also serves tea to all those who attend.
These costs are met by the contributions which the mourners
make to the family of the bereaved. However, the festivities
held in connection with naming parties (simaiyas), male circum¬
cisions (tuhur), weddings (* arls) and general thank-offerings
(karamas) appear to contradict the thesis that consumption has
been directed inwards, rather than being channeled by redis-
tributive processes; that more consumption is confined within
the narrow boundary of the nuclear family, rather than being
distributed among a wider range of kin and neighbours. More¬
over, these festivities have little to do with the accumulation
of durable goods, which I claimed was a characteristic of new
consumption patterns. Also there is the problem that these cele¬
brations tend to be more elaborate and lavish in Abu Haraz
than in Kumur. Why should this be the case if differentiation
of interests and life-styles has progressed further in the former
village compared with the latter.
It is true, of course, that these occasions concern the sharing
and transmission of common values and beliefs, and that the
meal, taken if not prepared communally, underlines the social
significance of the occasion. However, these occasions also
serve to underline the differential status both of the host fam¬
ily and of the participants. Although there is a general format
for the conducting of such occasions, the quantity and quality
of the food served, the number of persons entertained, and the
range of facilities provided for the guests give each occasion
a different character, and this reflects the particular social
standing of the host family. The resources which different fami¬
lies can afford to devote to these occasions vary greatly. Some
naming parties and circumcisions are celebrated in the company
of a relatively small number of close relatives, while others
bring large sectors of the village population together.
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The status of the participants is underlined by the respective
contributions they make to defray the costs of the occasion
(nuqta). Contributions are invariably given at weddings and
funerals, and sometimes at other life-cycle ceremonies, but not,
of course, at karamas. At weddings contributions are made by
guests on the evening of the main reception and party when
food is served to the guests and the bride-groom is hennaed.
Each contribution is recorded in writing by a close friend of
the bride-groom, and the total sum received is made public on
the same evening. At funerals contributions are collected
throughout the first three days of mourning as the various
mourners arrive to offer their condolences. These contributions
are added up on the fourth day, and the various costs in¬
curred during this period are deducted from it. The balance,
as with the rest of the deceased's property, is then divided
among his or her family. Smaller contributions are sometimes
also made at naming parties and male circumcisions. Women
make separate contributions to the bride, though again these
are much smaller than what men give to the bridegroom.
The general ethos underlying these contributions is that they
should be reciprocated on similar occasions. The record of what
the various guests contributed at a wedding is retained by the
recipient so that it can be referred to when reciprocating at
a subsequent wedding of one of the donors. Similar amounts
tend to be given as have been received, though a wealthy per¬
son tends to reciprocate with somewhat more than he received.
Thus the continuing process of making contributions at these
special occasions, the variations in the amount given and in
what is reciprocated, serve to define relationships between per¬
sons of differing status. Although there is a net flow of con¬
tributions from persons of higher economic status to those of
lower economic status, this flow does not change the ordering
of status, but serves precisely to define differential status.
Thus while contributions at special ceremonies serve to defray
expenses and demonstrate a cooperative spirit, they also draw
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attention to the different standing of donors and recipients.
Given that socio-economic differentiation is more marked in Abu
Haraz than Kumur, this helps to explain why such celebrations
are more pronounced in the former village.
Though not constituting a system of redistribution of wealth,
the festivities held in connection with domestic and life-cycle
events do nevertheless entail the allocation of resources for
immediate consumption rather than purchase of durable con¬
sumer goods. In fact some attempts have been made to limit
and standardise the occasions in which immediate consumption
on a large scale is such a distinctive feature. These attempts
have taken the form of the discouragement of sacrifices, since
the purchase of sheep for slaughter forms a major component
in the expenditure of such festivities. For example, the end of
the mourning period is no longer celebrated with the slaughter
of a sheep. The attempts to limit marriage expenditure and to
restrain wedding festivities through the institution of the kora
will be examined in the next chapter. Barclay (1964) records
similar collective limitations on festivities in Buuri al Lamaab,
and claims that such agreements are a common practice in
many Gezira and riverain villages. To the extent that such
attempts have been successful, they permit the retention of a
larger share of household income and its allocation to other
forms of expenditure, notably the purchase of durable consumer
goods.
The most important of the ceremonies I have been referring to
is the celebration of marriage. On this occasion ceremonial elab¬
oration, festive consumption and heavy expenditure on consumer
goods of a more durable nature converge. In establishing a
new domestic unit, marriage arrangements reveal tendencies al¬
ready operating within and influencing domestic organisation.
The trends in consumption patterns and in household organisat¬
ion that I have described in this chapter are nowhere more
clearly expressed than in the very formation of new domestic
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groups at marriage. The dependence of women and the in¬
creased concern for developing the comforts of the home find
expression in the elaboration of the material conditions of
marriage. It is to the changing conditions of marriage that 1
turn in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 6
CHANGES IN MARRIAGE PAYMENTS
In this chapter I wish to examine the changes in the condit¬
ions necessary for getting married, trends in marriage pay¬
ments, and the components of these exchanges. In the last
chapter I showed how changes in consumption patterns have
been characterised by increased expenditure on durable goods
and assets. I also argued that with the shift in occupational
patterns, from reliance on traditional patrimonies to activities
providing income from regular employment or commerce, house¬
hold budgeting arrangements have tended to become centred on
the nuclear family. In conjunction with these trends there has
been a tendency towards the differentiation of life-styles as
expressed by the different standards of living achieved by sep¬
arate budgeting groups. The general orientation of these life¬
styles has been towards the privatisation of the domestic dom¬
ain. The widespread adoption of a more explicitly domestic and
dependent role for women I suggested should be seen in the con¬
text of the restructuring of domestic arrangements contingent
on the replacement of many unpaid domestic and subsistence
activities by purchased goods and services. These changes in
domestic organisation and in the relations between the sexes
are highlighted by the transactions entailed in establishing a
marriage.
I am primarily concerned in this chapter with marriages in
which both spouses are marrying for the first time. I will
attempt to show in the next chapter that there has been a
decline in the proportion of subsequent marriages, whether
polygamous and serial marriages of men or remarriages of
women. This tendency I will argue is largely due to the same
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conditions which induce the intensification of marriage pay¬
ments as at first marriages. Moreover the ideological invest¬
ment in first marriages militates against the contemplation of
other marriages. A serial or polygamous marriage contracted by
a man to a woman not previously married generally entails the
same expenditure as a first marriage. In some polygamous marr¬
iages, the bride's family demand a larger endowment for their
daughter by virtue of the fact that her prospective husband is
already married. Only when a woman is marrying for the sec¬
ond time, following divorce or widowhood, are the marriage
costs considerably less than for a first marriage. But a woman
who remarries is rarely a man's first wife; that is, usually
she marries a widower or a man already married.
First marriage for both spouses comprise the majority of marr¬
iages contracted today. This means I am mainly interested in
the manner in which new domestic groups emerge, and this en¬
tails consideration of various factors affecting the domestic cy¬
cle. 1 have already referred to the delay in marriages of most
wage-earning sons, and I will give further evidence of this
trend in the next chapter. I noted that exceptions to this patt¬
ern generally concerned families possessing substantial patri¬
monies which the father sought to exploit in the most effective
manner by retaining the labour of one of his sons; to this end
he facilitates the early marriage of one of them. In other cases
early marriages took place where the adult members of a family
had shared interests in the operation of a family business.
Common to both situations is a shared interest in family prop¬
erty. Under conditions where a father has numerous livestock
and rainlands which require extensive labour and attention,
and at the same time where there exist wage-earning opportun¬
ities which might attract his sons, the marrying of the latter
gives the father greater leverage in deploying his family's lab¬
our resources. In addition the alliances which these marriages
establish or reinforce with other individuals may further the
interests of the family patrimony. These conditions were, of
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course, more prevalent in the past. Today, in Abu Haraz in
particular the picture is reversed; achieved property plays the
crucial role in most family incomes, and the traditional patri¬
mony has become something of a residual category. Early marr¬
iages threaten to channel earned incomes into the new domestic
groups that are formed, and away from the existing family mem¬
bers.
Where father and son are both primarily involved in operating
the family patrimony, the domestic cycle tends to have certain
distinctive features. Marriages are contracted at a relatively
early age - at the age of about 20 or just over for the man
- but the domestic group established at marriage is neither
autonomous nor economically viable. The domestic group
achieves its viability through a gradual process as it builds
up its own human and patrimonial resources. This gradual pro¬
cess is generally marked by a shift from uxorilocal to virilocal
residence. In its formative period the new domestic group is
for many purposes an extension of an existing household. In
particular close ties exist between mother and daughter, with
the former continuing to supervise the latter in her domestic
dutiesa.ft.er her marriage. The term of address sometimes used by
small children to their maternal grandmother (haboba) is an
indication of these close ties; small children call their matern¬
al grandmother 'mother' (ummi) while addressing their actual
mother by her personal name. The traditional authority of
grandmothers (habobat) is proverbial, though several writers
have indicated that it is waning. Barclay relates this decline
largely to the increase in nuclear family organisation (p.77).
Barclay also records that there used to be strict codes of defer¬
ence and avoidance between in-laws, but that at the time of
his writing they were far less strictly observed in the village
where he stayed.1 I found that avoidance customs were confined
1. According to Barclay, the most pronounced avoidance relationship was between
mother-in-law and son-in-law: the extent of avoidance depended on whether a prior
kinship tie existed between the two persons.
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solely to the marriage celebrations. They may, however, have
been more elaborate in the past, particularly under the condit¬
ions I have outlined above.
The greater prevalence of money-earned incomes has changed
the course of the domestic cycle. As we have seen, there are
various pressures on a wage-earning son to marry at a later
age. One son's marriage is often delayed at least until another
sibling is able to contribute substantially to the household bud¬
get. We also saw that when a wage-earning son does get marr¬
ied he is more likely to head a domestic group which budgets
independently for its own consumer needs. Moreover, since the
wage-earner is likely to have met the bulk of his marriage ex¬
penditure himself, the father cannot use this leverage to in¬
fluence the running of his married son's household affairs. The
establishment at marriage of an autonomous and viable domestic
group is supported by various other trends. For example, it is
increasingly common for the newly-married couple to go on a
honeymoon; this is an indication of the separation of the cou¬
ple from their respective families of origin, as well as of the
enhancement of conjugal ties. Moreover, the immediate estab¬
lishment of a virilocal, or even neolocal residence is becoming
increasingly prevalent; this setting up of a more permanent
home, as opposed to the transitory occupation of a confined
space in the bride's family's home, is again indicative of the
greater degree of autonomy achieved at the outset of marriage.
Long engagements are now very common. This period allows the
prospective husband to accumulate the savings and goods nec¬
essary for his marriage. As a test of the viability of the marr¬
iage the period of engagement has taken on much of the char¬
acter of the early stage of marriage in marriages following the
traditional developmental cycle. With the former the conditions
for establishing the viability of the new domestic group have
to be entirely fulfilled before the marriage; with the latter
many of the conditions are established after the marriage, foll¬
owing the birth of children and the gradual accumulation of
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productive and household property.
Among those social groups which have neither substantial fam¬
ily patrimonies nor a regular flow of income from wage-earning
or commercial activities a different set of factors act on the
developmental cycle of domestic groups. I refer in particular
to those families in Kumur who do not have significant numbers
of animals and who supplement their cultivation of rainland
crops with seasonal casual labour. In these families the income
that sons and daughters contribute to the household budget
must be weighed against what they consume from it. Given fre¬
quent and lengthy periods of inactivity unmarried sons and
daughters are seen as threatening to consume more than they
contribute to family income. With marriage the parental respon¬
sibility for basic provision is transferred to the son or son-in-
law. Hence marriages are generally encouraged and welcomed.
Marriage expenditure is restricted to a small marriage payment
and the provision of the basic necessities required for establish¬
ing a new domestic group. This is also true of marriages
among families which rely on traditional patrimonies. In their
case the patrimony acts both as a surety and as the source
from which the new domestic group will gradually accumulate
its own property. With the exception of one or two families who
have salaried members, the majority of marriages in Kumur are
carried out for total costs of less than £S100. This sum in¬
cludes the dowry payment (mahr) which is used for the con¬
struction of a simple mud and straw room for the couple, and
for providing basic furnishings and household equipment; it
also covers the costs of new clothes bought for both bride and
bridegroom, and the costs of the wedding feast. By contrast
most marriages in Abu Haraz entail expenditure of several hun¬
dred pounds. It is with the changing nature of marriage pay¬
ments and with the more varied composition of marriage goods
as exhibited by marriages in Abu Haraz that I am mainly con¬
cerned in this chapter.
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In Abu Haraz, as we have seen, new pressures operate on the
domestic cycle: the increase in number of dependents to supp¬
ort, aspirations for improved standards of living and the
ability to fulfil these aspirations through accumulating savings
from monied incomes all serve to delay the emergence of new
domestic groups; on the other hand, when they do become estab¬
lished at marriage, they are more viable and autonomous than
formerly. For from the outset, because of the greater expendit¬
ure invested in them, they possess what Goody calls a conjugal
fund. Later I will examine the composition of this conjugal
fund by examining the nature of the marriage payments, the
composition of the goods exchanged at marriage, and the chief
beneficients of these goods. But first it is necessary to con¬
sider a custom operating in Abu Haraz which seeks to limit
marriage expenditure. For, as in other villages in the Gezira
and on the east bank, collective agreements have been made to
impose an upper limit on marriage payments exchanged within
the village and to standardise marriage celebrations. Marriages
subject to these controls are known as kora marriages.1 How¬
ever, the actual application of this custom varies considerably
in the different places where it is observed. Sometimes it en¬
tails merely the fixing of a ceiling on dowry payments. Some¬
times - usually under the direction of a local notable - it pro¬
vides a framework for facilitating and standardising a large
number of marriages on a particular occasion. The former is
the more common form the kora takes, and is essentially what
has been practised in Abu Haraz. However, it may help to
place in context this particular application of the kora, if I
relate some of the wider applications of the custom.
The most frequently quoted historical precedent for the kora is
the Mahdi's legislation concerning marriages.4 In 1882 he im-
1. The word kora means 'a ball' and thus implies regularity of pattern. But in my
inquiries I have been unable to discover more precisely why the custom has assumed
this name.
2. P.H.Holt: The Mahdist state in the Sudan, Oxford, 1966, p.115. This author re¬
counts the social legislation of the Wwtfi, and relates it to the specific conditions
of the time.
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posed limitations on the expenditure on wedding feasts, and
designated one day in the Muslim calendar - the 27th day of
Rajab - as a time particularly favourable for weddings. Follow¬
ing this he stipulated that the dowry paid by the bridegroom
should amount to no more than £E2 (Egyptian) for a virgin
bride and £E1 for a woman who had been previously married.
These and other edicts concerning the status of women must be
seen in the context of the disruption of traditional marriage
patterns brought about by the Turkish occupation and the wide¬
spread monetarisation of transactions; and also in the context
of the insecurity and loss of life created by the Mahdist upris¬
ing itself.
Unlike other of the Mahdi's social legislation which sought to
root out traditional non-sharia' practices and to impose more
orthodox Islamic observances, there is no explicit koranic pre¬
cedent for the regulation of marriage ceremonies and payments.
/
On the other hand the Prophet Mohammad's revelations concern¬
ing marriage, particularly the permission to marry up to four
wives, were very much a response to the unsettled conditions
of the time, and to the prevalence of widows and orphans and
the increased dependence of women in the urban situation. Of
the fourteen wives that the Prophet himself took, only one,
'Aisha, was not either a widow or a divorced woman.1 Similar¬
ly the Mahdi was faced with the problem of the maintenance of
women who had been deserted or taken captive or who had been
widowed during the uprising. But there were also other factors
which posed problems for the formation and stability of marr¬
iages. General insecurity and price inflation during the Turk¬
ish period were not conducive to stable domestic life and the
formation of marriages. In a contemporary account of the per¬
iod explicit reference is made to the effect of social conditions
on marriage payments; the passage refers to the tour of the
Turkish Governor-General in 1839 to the Blue Nile region, and
1. Naual el Saadawi: The Hidden Face of Eve. London, 1930, p.146.
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in particular to the vicinity of Wad Medani:
As the Pasha was passing through a village he
was surprised that no children came out to see him
and asked the shaykh of that place why. The
shaykh said that the womenfolk of the village were
extremely greedy and refused to marry unless they
were paid much money, so much that few of them
ever found husbands. The Pasha intends to issue
an order under which any man will be able to
marry a woman merely by paying a dowry of one
roll of cloth, a blue shawl and 20 piastres in
cash. (Hill, 1970, p.187)
No account is given as to the effectiveness of any subsequent
action. Likewise it is not known to what extent the Mahdi's
regulations were observed. However, Trimingham (1949), referr¬
ing to the continuing force of Mahdism both as a political force
and as a reformist movement, notes that
Attempts have been made to revive other of the
Mahdi's regulations, such as the £E.2 dowry cam¬
paign (called al-Kora), but with little success out¬
side the colonies (sic).1 The annual 'day of wedd¬
ings' (27 Rajab), instituted by the Mahdi in 1882,
has for many years been kept up by his son.
(p.162)
Turning to more contemporary accounts, Barclay gives an
account of the regulation of marriages in the village that he
studied in the early 1960s:
Bridewealth varies in Buuri al Lamaab from as low
as five pounds to as high as one hundred pounds.
The low figure occurs in kuura marriages in which
a number of men agree to marry their daughters
at a stated time and for a mutually-agreed upon
bridewealth. Marriages of this type oco.ir among
the very poor ana among others wt^en there
appears to be a surplus of unmarried girls. The
fact that it is a joint affair involving a number
1. Trimingham here refers to the settlements of West African immigrants in the Sudan.
Several of their early settlements were on the higher reaches of the Blue Nile; latt¬
erly many of these immigrants were encouraged to settle in the Gezira so as to pro¬
vide a seasonal labour force for the Irrigation Scheme.
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of families legitimizes what individually would con¬
stitute a shameful act, namely giving one's daugh¬
ter in marriage for an insignificant mahr. The
last kuura in Buuri al Lamaab occurred in 1957
when five servants of Sharif 'Abd ar Rahmaan
were married.1 Usually kuura marriages occur on
the twenty-seventh of the month of Rajab, a day
especially lucky for weddings, and are celebrated
with a common feast of fatta in the compound of
the mosque, (p.246)
An instance of kora marriages being regularly arranged by a
local notable comes from the village of Shabarga on the east
bank of the Blue Nile, fifteen miles south east of Wad Medani.
The initiative in arranging these marriages came from Yusuf
Jamil, the leader of an important Mahdist family in Shabarga,
one of the first graduates of Gordon College (later to become
the University of Khartoum) and subsequently a high-ranking
government official. From the 1930s till the 1950s he encouraged
the marriage of eligible young men and women in the village
with as little expenditure as possible; during this period the
dowry was never more than five pounds and usually considerab¬
ly less. First he would find out who were all the eligible part¬
ners in the village, and which of them wanted to marry who.
At the festival of the al 'eid al kabir he would summon all the
men concerned and their fathers, and address them stressing
the unity of the village and the common ties of kinship. He
would then allocate the young men to their fathers-in-law, say¬
ing to the latter "He is your son". The young man would be
asked to give from his pocket a pound or similar sum as dow¬
ry. A blessing would be made, and dates thrown, and so the
agreement was made. Up to forty or fifty couples were married
on such occasions. Following this the bridegroom would build
a simple house and provide some basic furnishings. The wedd¬
ing celebration itself would be very simple with just a few
chosen guests. Three or four days after the wedding the bride-
1. This religious leader was the son and successor of Sharif Yusuf al Hindi, the
founder of the Hindiya tariqa. This offshoot of the Samcianiya tariqa has many follow¬
ers in the Gezira and on the east bank of the Blue Nile.
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groom was free to build a more substantial house and to give
as many presents as he wished to his bride. In this way men
with larger incomes or greater wealth than that enjoyed by the
majority of the villagers were not prevented from adopting a
style of living in keeping with their social standing. Neverthe¬
less many of the educated men and salaried employees in
Shabarga were extremely reluctant to get married in the kora
since they considered the custom to be inappropriate to their
social position.1
To my knowledge none of the Arakiyin leading f&^iliss or any
other notable family in Abu Haraz has ever tried to coordinate
marriages in the manner just described. In Abu Haraz the cus¬
tom of the marriage kora has taken the form of a mutually-
agreed ceiling on dowries exchanged within the village. Before
1975 the maximum sum allowed was £S25> and when the custom
was reintroduced in 1977 the figure was raised to £5100. In¬
formation I gathered from other villages both in the Gezira and
on the east bank which had such agreements yielded figures be¬
tween these two amounts; in the Gezira, Nuweila £S60, Manasir
£S30, and on the east bank, Sharafa Barakat £S90, Sharafa
Foq £S50, Shabarga £S30 and Gara £S30. Barclay gives corrob¬
orative evidence that such agreements are reasonably wide¬
spread in the rural areas of the Gezira and Blue Nile regions:
The practice of mutual agreements within villages
to limit and more or less to equalize expenses in¬
curred in festivities connected with the rites of
passage is not uncommon in this part of the Sud¬
an. In several villages there are agreements which
place a ceiling on the amount of the mahr. An
attempt of this nature was once made in Buuri al
Lamaab, but no agreement could be reached and
the matter was dropped, (p.264)
1. I am indebted to Mr. Osaan Eid, Edinburgh University, for this inforaation relat¬
ing to the kora practice in Shabarga.
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Goode (1970) gives evidence of similar practices in other parts
of the 'Arab World'. And no doubt comparative material from
other regions could be presented to show that in many rural
societies characterised by social homogeneity prestations at
marriage as at other festivities are customarily fixed or, at
least, they vary little; furthermore that when social homogen¬
eity is threatened by individuals with newly acquired wealth
making larger marriage payments, attempts are often made to
standardise if not equalise these expenditures.
The material 1 have related concerning kora marriages in the
Sudan suggests that they constitute a collective response to var¬
ious forces of change, and in particular to economic and social
differentiation which is reflected in the emergence of different
life-styles; these life-styles tend to be embodied in differential
patterns of domestic consumption which are themselves high¬
lighted by differential marriage payments and celebrations. Dur¬
ing the discussions over the reintroduction of the kora in Abu
Haraz in 1977 villagers pointed out to me that while people
shared the same aspirations about marriage the ability of diff¬
erent individuals to meet these expectations varied; they said
that the effect of this was that while some people in the vill¬
age could afford to get married and incur heavy expenditure,
for most people it entailed gathering savings over many years
before they could get married; as a consequence the age at
marriage was getting later, and there was a growing pool of
eligible girls in the village. This situation was regarded as
undesirable both for the girls themselves and for their families
who had both to support them and to ensure their modest behav¬
iour. It was generally accepted that individuals' differential
earning power was part of a reality that had to be come to
terms with; but the proponents of the kora argued that the
basic conditions for marriage should be made easier while leav¬
ing individuals free to incur as much additional expenditure
as they wished and as they were capable of during the course
of the marriage itself. Moreover by proposing the curtailment
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of expenditure incurred in the wedding celebrations and fest¬
ivities, they suggested that there would be a general saving
of resources. I will return shortly to discuss how these propos¬
als were viewed by the women and young men of the village,
the agreement that finally emerged, and its effect on ensuing
marriages. First 1 wish to examine how the kora which was
practised until 1975 affected marriages in the village.
As stated previously the old kora limited the amount of mahr
to £S25. The kora was only applicable in marriages where both
partners were from Abu Haraz al Wastani; if either partner,
even if a close relation, were from another village, the restrict¬
ion was not binding. Most kora marriages were celebrated at
the time of the al 'eid al kabir festival, although this was not
stipulatory. One week after the wedding the bridegroom was
free to make any other payments he wished to the bride and
to incur additional expenditure in respect of house preparation,
furnishings and other household items. It should be pointed out
that the main purpose of the mahr is to provide the bride with
adequate goods and utensils for establishing the basis of a
home. Traditionally these goods comprised at least two angaribs
or a double bed, mattresses, mats, washing and cooking pans,
wooden chest (sahara), smaller wooden boxes for storing spices
(huqq), and an assortment of bowls, cups and glasses. The
home itself used by the bridal couple is in practice excluded
from these considerations. A room is usually provided by the
parents of either the bride or the bridegroom, normally the
former; or if a room is not available one will be built for the
use of the new couple. If the bride's parents provide it, it
will almost invariably become in time the effective property of
the bride. If the bridegroom's family provide it, even if it has
been built with the savings of the bridegroom, this is consider¬
ed to be a separate contribution to the marriage from the
mahr, and is not subject to the kora restriction. However the
kora penalised the transference of all other goods whether in
money or kind above the limited amount, i.e. £S25. 1 was told
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that if goods exceeding this value were exchanged before or
during the first week of the marriage, they were impounded by
the village elders and sold off in a public auction and the
proceeds given to village funds (for the improvement of var¬
ious services, such as the schools, the clinic, etc.) I was un¬
able to discover any case where this penalty had been actually
implemented. In the case of goods in kind the sanctions were
probably loosely applied, especially if the goods were not open¬
ly exchanged or displayed during the course of the wedding.
In the case of the payment of mahr, as will be explained more
fully later, this used to be a public recorded event, and it
was thus impossible to evade disclosure of the sum agreed upon
if the kora limit had in fact been exceeded. Of 122 marriages
enacted between I960 and 1975 100 consisted of a mahr of £S30
or less. In only two of the other 22 marriages - most of which
were with non-villagers - did the mahr surpass £S50. Some of
the intra-village marriages which appeared to exceed the kora
restriction were accounted for by the informants including add¬
itional payments made a week after the wedding. Thus it would
seem that one of the objectives of the kora - to limit formal
marriage payments - was achieved in the village during this
period.
However, by the early 1970s it was becoming increasingly clear
that the restriction of mahr to £S25 was incompatible with the
provision of even the most basic requirements for a newly marr¬
ied couple. The consensus for maintaining the kora at that
level began to break down, and from my data on marriage pay¬
ments it would seem that several marriages ignored the kora
regulations. By about 1975 the kora had been challenged suff¬
icient times for the village elders to decide to let it lapse. In
the following two years mahr payments increased steadily, with
payments reaching £S100 on at least two occasions.
During the month of Ramadan in 1977 the idea of reintroducing
the kora was raised following the intiative of various members
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of the village committee. A village meeting was called, and at
this it was agreed to reintroduce the kora at the sum of £S100.
All other payments beside the mahr itself were included in the
restriction; thus if golat al-kheir or fatha al khashm1 was
paid, this amount would be added to the mahr and the total
should not exceed £S100. However, as before, additional pres¬
ents and payments, could be made one week after the wedding.
It was also agreed as desirable that wedding festivities should
be kept as simple as possible, and it was proposed that only
tea and biscuits should be offered to guests. It was reaffirmed
that the al 'eid al kabir was the best time for kora marriages
to be celebrated; since families sacrifice sheep in any case at
this festivity, lavish entertainment of guests could be dis¬
pensed with. Also it was considered that by encouraging a num¬
ber of marriages to be held at the same time this would help
reduce the expenditure incurred in the festivities. Apart from
helping to facilitate already planned marriages, the proponents
of the kora hoped to encourage other marriages. It was ex¬
pected that the intervening period of some two months before
the al 'eid al kabir would be sufficient time for making the
necessary arrangements for any new marriages; the more inten¬
sive social interaction associated with Ramadan, with the gath¬
ering of neighbours for the evening prayers and meal and fre¬
quent visiting during the night, and the celebration of the al
'eid al saghir, the festival which concludes the month of fast¬
ing, meant that plenty of opportunities existed for the prelimin¬
ary contacts crucial to the planning of marriages. The choice of
the al 'eid al kabir as a suitable time for conducting marr¬
iages was also influenced by the fact that it is at such festiv¬
als that the village fills up with the many migrant workers.
For not all the villagers could be sure of being able to attend
a marriage if arranged outside one of the main festival holi¬
days.
1. The initial payment, usually £S20 or £S30, which seeks to secure the consent of
the bride's party, particularly her mother and female relations.
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Discussing the kora proposals with the villagers I found least
enthusiasm for them among the women and young men. The
latter tended to interpret the regulations as a potential in¬
fringement on their freedom of choice of a marriage partner.
Some of them stressed that newly married couples would be in¬
itially more dependent on their parents' households, and sav¬
ings might be channeled away from building up the couple's
own assets in order to maintain these larger households. Very
few young men supported the view more frequently expressed by
older men that a young man should gradually accumulate goods
and assets for his household as he earned and saved during
the course of his marriage, rather than prior to it. Young men
argued that once married their new responsibilities to their in¬
laws would eat up their earnings leaving nothing with which
to purchase the items they considered a household should be
equipped with. Some young men suggested that even £S100 was
an inadequate sum with which to equip a household with the
basic furnishings and household items. Others, especially those
with higher earning power, stated in principle that there
should be no restrictions on the amount of expenditure a man
chose to incur at marriage; they implied that to marry in the
kora was an indication of low status, since the declared ob¬
jective of the kora was to assist those on whom marriage ex¬
penditure placed a heavy burden. Thus in general married men
were in favour of the kora system, while unmarried men and
youths were at best unenthusiastic and at worst opposed to the
idea.
The women I spoke to, while not openly criticising the new
arrangements, were also generally unenthusiastic. Some pro¬
tested that they would not marry their daughters in the kora,
but would seek a wealthy suitor, whether a relative or a non-
relative, from outside the village. One woman suggested she
would agree to a mahr of £S50 for her daughter if an addit¬
ional sum of £S100 were paid over in the event of the marriage
being dissolved; this latter sum, known as sadag, is usually
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a purely nominal sum and an insignificant feature of the marr¬
iage contract in Abu Haraz, unlike in some urban marriages.
As with the young men, the women implied that the kora regul¬
ations would limit their influence concerning the choice of marr¬
iage partners for their daughters. For women can influence the
outcome of a marriage suit by their demands for a higher or
lower mahr and for the provision of various ancillary goods
and good-will payments, such as the golat al-kheir, and
through their concern that certain residential conditions be
met. By regulating these payments and gifts in kind, the kora
threatens to curtail women's negotiating power and hence their
ability either to encourage or to discourage a particular suit¬
or. In addition to this, the kora reduces or removes altogether
some of the payments of which they are the main beneficients.
Apart from the golat al-kheir, there are many other payments
and gifts which can be exacted from the bridegroom by the fe¬
male relatives and friends of the bride in the course of the
wedding celebrations. Mothers and daughters then generally wel¬
comed high marriage payments and lavish celebrations. Most of
those women to whom the kora did appeal had several daugh¬
ters, some advancing in years and not yet engaged to be marr¬
ied; in so far as the kora was seen as an effective inducement
to young men to marry thereby reducing the pool of eligible
girls, it can be understood that some families with unmarried
female dependents welcomed it.
However, ensuing events suggest that the kora does not provide
young men with sufficient inducements to marry, for it failed
to realise a large increase in marriages. Eleven marriages
were contracted at the al 'eid al kabir, but only three of them
were between village partners and thus subject to the kora
restriction. Moreover two of these were between close relatives
and had been planned long before the discussions of restoring
the kora. The third marriage concerned a migrant absent for
long periods from the village; his parents and siblings were
resident in the village, and it is possible that the kora encour-
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aged him to marry; he married a non-relative from the village.
Of the other marriages three were between close relatives, with
the bride residing in another village - Hilaliya, Kumur and
Gara, all on the east bank - and these also had been planned
long in advance. Two marriages were contracted between girls
from Abu Haraz and men, working and residing elsewhere (Ros-
eires and Wad Medani), but whose families originated from Abu
Haraz; one of these marriages derived from a long-standing en¬
gagement. The three remaining marriages were with unrelated
persons from outside Abu Haraz. In the first, a girl from the
village married a local government officer from the Gezira; the
second, a migrant from the village, who was a trader in Umm
Ruwarba in Kordofan, married a girl from Wad Medani; the
third, the middle-aged manager of the Cooperative shop in the
village contracted a polygamous third marriage with a girl
from Abu Haraz al Warrani.
Only four more marriages took place in the remaining five
months of my fieldwork, and three of these were celebrated
very quietly, two of them being polygamous marriages, and the
third having been elicited by a pre-nuptial pregnancy. One of
the polygamous marriages was contracted by a village shopkeep¬
er; he married the daughter of a widow, who was a neighbour.
The other one was contracted by a migrant in his early 30s
who worked as a trader in Khartoum; already married to a non-
relative in Abu Haraz, he married as his second wife a cousin
(FBD) living in Fedasi in the Gezira. The 'forced' marriage
occurred between a villager who worked as a builder and a
young divorced woman who, with her parents and sisters, had
moved to Abu Haraz some years previously. The fourth marriage
was between a girl from the village and a non-relative from
Wad Medani. In none of these cases could it be said that the
kora properly applied. None of them entailed first marriages
where both partners were from the village.






































































































































































































Wedding Expenditure, 1977-8 (Cont'd.)
Further details of marriages:
1. Mirghenni Sheikh Abu 'Agla (Abu Haraz) and Hadiyya Sheikh
Hamad al-Mil (Kumur). Both grandchildren of Sheikh el Eleish
Sheikh Hamad al-Nil. Mirghenni made savings from his salary
as a local court clerk over many years. Marriage celebrations
also took place over a long period: the marriage contract and
the bridegroom's invitation party were held in Nov. 1977, and
the final wedding party was not held until May 1978. This del¬
ay was partly due to the marriage of Hadiyya's sister (No.6)
in Oct. 1977. In turn the protracted arrangements for Had¬
iyya's wedding delayed the marriage of Mirghenni's brother,
Hamad al-Nil, to a cousin in Taiba (FZD). Although Mirghenni
eventually planned to build a new house on the perimeter of
Abu Haraz, a room was built for the couple by the bride's fam¬
ily in Kurnur during the winter of 1977-8.
2. Hussein Sa'id and Ihlam Sadiq Dafa'Allah, both from Abu
Haraz. This marriage took place before the reintroduction of
the kora. The son of a village butcher, and the owner of a
lorry and of a brick-kiln near El Eleila, Hussein built a large
new house next to his father's; this house comprised two
rooms, enclosure and large diwan. Ihlam, the daughter of a
rainland farmer and vegetable seller, was still studying at
primary school; both she and her grandmother wished to delay
the marriage until she was older, but the bridegroom was insis¬
tent, and the marriage went ahead.
3. Haj Sadiq Dafa'Allah and Najat Mustafa Dafa'Allah. Patri-
lateral parallel cousins, living in adjacent households in Abu
Haraz. A single room was built near their two families by Haj,
who served in the army and had saved for the marriage during
his service with the Arab peace-keeping force in the Lebanon.
4. Hasan Sa'id and Haiyat Bashir, both from Abu Haraz. A half-
brother of Hussein Sa'id (Mo. 2), and a shop-keeper and but¬
cher, and owner of a lorry-bus, Hasan was already married
with 8 children, the eldest of whom were of marriageable age.
He had performed the pilgrimage with his first wife some years
previously. This second marriage was to the daughter of a
widow who lived next to him - though, an unrelated family.
Hasan built a single room in the vicinity of the two families.
5. Mamoon Tom and Leila Osman. Maraoon worked in the Sennar
Sugar Factory. He was the son of Zaineb el Eleish and feki
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Tom, the director of the primary school in the neighbouring
village of Kiran, and the man held to have the greatest relig¬
ious authority in Kumur. He married an unrelated girl from
Atara, a village between Abu Haraz and Wad Medani on the
west bank; she was the daughter of a reputedly pious friend
of his father's.
6. Sa'id. Mohammad (Taif) and Bedriya Sheikh Hamad al-Nil
(Kumur). Sa'id was the son of a wealthy livestock-owner, and
himself a lorry-owner; he already had a wife and children in
Taif. His social position and existing marital status is re¬
flected in the large dowry he gave for the daughter of the
sheikh el hilla in Kumur.
7. Kharafallah Tbbudi (Kumur) and Fatna Elamin (Taif). Khara-
fallah looked after his father's herd of goats, and the marr¬
iage was largely facilitated by his father. For example, Ibbudi
went to Wad Medani and bought a pair of shoes and the mater¬
ial for two jellabiyas for his son. The total marriage expend¬
iture was very limited compared with the majority of marriages
in Abu Haraz. Entertainment at the celebrations held first in
Kumur, then in Taif, was provided by women singing and play¬
ing the deluka and men performing their traditional dance
(aridh) - leaping in the air, gesticulating with camel-sticks
and stamping their feet on the ground. This contrasts with the
performance of modern popular songs and dancing at marriages
in Abu Haraz. The bridal home was a simple gutiya which had
been erected by the bride's family in Taif.
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In the first place it appears that the kora regulations have
not had the effect of encouraging more marriages to take place.
The age at marriage for men and women has steadily in¬
creased. The large number of eligible girls in Abu Haraz in
1977 was not simply the result of the paucity of marriages in
the previous two years during which time the kora had lapsed;
it was the result of an accumulative trend over many years
which the old kora had failed significantly to arrest. If the
kora had been successful in facilitating more marriages one
would expect to find a higher proportion of marriages in which
both partners were from the village. But this is not the case.
As the marriages celebrated in 1977 show, the proportion of
intra-village marriages is rather low (only four out of fifteen,
and one of these was a polygamous marriage). On the other
hand there is no firm evidence to suggest that kora restrictions
encouraged a larger number of extra-village marriages to take
place in order to evade those restrictions. A considerable num¬
ber of extra-village marriages are with close relatives; rather
than attempting to evade kora regulations, many of these marr¬
iages are directed outside the village largely through incident¬
al factors - particularly the absence of suitably aged relatives
in the village - as well as the positive factor, of wishing to
strengthen a particular kinship relationship.
The question then arises, if there have not been sustained
attempts to evade the restrictions of the kora, does it mean
that the kora has been successful in limiting marriage expendit¬
ure in those marriages which have come about? 1 would argue
this has not been the case. The kora has merely limited the in¬
crease in certain formal marriage payments, notably the mahr,
but it has not really checked the total expenditure associated
with setting up a new household. As stated before, the mahr
is supposed to cover the costs of providing the new couple's
basic domestic requirements. Given the aspirations of most
couples in Abu Haraz, the mahr, even if increased substant¬
ially, is inadequate to cover all the necessary expenditure.
- 172 -
What has tended to occur is for various transactions of goods
to take place outside the payment of the mahr. We have al¬
ready noted the golat al-kheir, the preliminary payment often
exacted from the prospective bridegroom by the bride's mother
in return for her good-will. To the bride herself the groom
must provide a shabka malabis or shanta, comprising clothing,
shoes, perfumes, cosmetics and personal toiletries and accessor¬
ies. This may cost the bridegroom anything between £S150 and
£S400. This wardrobe usually comprises a specific number of
each kind of garment, for example tobs, good dresses, working
dresses, etc; usually the number is three or four of each type,
but in rich marriages many more are expected. A watch and a
gold ring are normally included in these presents. In addition
the bridegroom is expected to provide at least metal hanging
rails and a clothes-stand, if not a clothes wardrobe. (The
clothes themselves are handed over in one or more suitcases,
hence the name shanta, meaning a case.) Additional furnish¬
ings, such as beds, chairs and table are primarily the bride¬
groom's responsibility. The main contribution of the bride's
family is in providing sets of household utensils, various kinds
of mats and some traditional foodstuffs. This is known as the
dolab bita' 'eld or simply moi'a. The sets of bowls, plates,
cups and glasses become the centre-pieces of the wife's display
cabinet (JjLdda). However, the bridegroom may assist in con¬
tributing initially to his wife's 'idda. Moreover he is commonly
expected to provide several sacks of basic food items, such as
wheat flour, sugar, tea and coffee, as well as large cans of
cooking oil and kerosene, and boxes of soap. Apart from these
he must provide dates, biscuits and sweets as presents for the
girls who assist and entertain the bride (hagg al banat).
Where a marriage is subject to the kora regulations these trans¬
actions are made under cover of a long engagement, or, in the
case of some of the goods, by withholding them until a week
after the wedding. Quite apart from the costs of construction
of new buildings for the married couple, the expenditure in-
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curred by the bridegroom in contributing clothing, furnishings
and foodstuffs for the endowment of the bride and of their new¬
ly formed household may amount to ten times the formal pay¬
ment embodied in the mahr. (See table of respective expendit¬
ures of selected households). The standardisation of mahr pay¬
ments therefore conceals the differential expenditure on the
other items I have just considered. Certainly where no regulat¬
ion occurs the differences in expenditure are all the more
apparent.
Although the major part of the increase in expenditure falls
upon the bridegroom, it may be at least partly matched by in¬
creased expenditure by the bride's family; this may take the
form of increased expenditure on the wedding celebrations, or
of endowment of the bride with gold jewelry. In urban elite
marriages the father of the bride sometimes gives the bride¬
groom a car filled with presents as his contribution to the en¬
dowment of the conjugal couple (shayal). In these marriages
the bride's family may construct and furnish a sumptuous bed¬
room with a double-bed and fitted cupboards for the use of the
bridal couple. The costs of this suite are in effect transferred
to the bridegroom, since the bride's family demand a mahr
which is equivalent to the amount expended by them on these
preparations. In Abu Haraz the mahr rarely covers the cost of
building and furnishing a new room for the bride and her hus¬
band; these expenses are usually born by the latter outwith of
the mahr payment.
In most non-kora marriages there is considerable ceremonial
elaboration, with festivities frequently lasting several days.
Separate parties are held at the homes of the bride and bride¬
groom during which they are hennaed by their respective famil¬
ies; meanwhile the guests assemble, make their contributions
and take part in the festivities. On the evening of the final
day the bridegroom and his entourage arrive, inevitably late,
at the bride's village, and the main festivities take place at
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her home (salra). When the bridal couple are from the same
village, as in kora marriages, these movements are, of course,
much more simplified, and the parties tend to converge, espec¬
ially if the couple are related. At the main celebration, awn¬
ings, lights and chairs are hired, and entertainment is pro¬
vided by a hired group playing modern (Sudanese) popular
songs. Dancing takes a variety of forms, traditional at first
with the sexes somewhat set apart, but freer, more exuberant
and more mixed as the night progresses. At the women's part¬
ies held on previous evenings music is provided by the women
themselves, playing the deluka1 and singing.
Several old marriage customs and rituals have been reincorpor¬
ated during these festivities. For example the ceremony of the
cutting of the rahat is sometimes held. The rahat is a leather
thonged skirt worn long ago as the sole garment by girls be¬
fore marriage. Today at this ceremony the bride wears it over
her dress, and the bridegroom is required to break it in re¬
turn for a payment to the bride and her female relatives. Simil¬
arly at the bridal dance, which the bride performs for her hus¬
band, the bride is supposed to faint, and the husband must
catch her before she falls to the ground; if he fails he must
again give payments to the women present. Barclay (1964) re¬
cords that at the bridal dances he witnessed the latter custom
was never included, and concludes that it is probably rarely
practised today. That may well have been true at the time of
his writing, but clearly it has made a revival, especially at
large weddings. The incorporation of such customs reflects in
general the tendency to elaborate ceremonial in order to under¬
line the importance of the marriage union being celebrated,
and in particular the establishment of a conjugal fund.2
1. A kind of kettle-drum.
2. There are several articles on wedding ceremonies in the riverain Sudan, which
provide a wealth of details on the rituals and customs involved. See Crowfoot, 1922;
Zenkovsky, 1945 £ 1949; Abdulla El Tayib, 1955 £ 1956. It is not my objective to
explore the meaning or symbolism of all these customs, as this would prove too much
of a digression from my main theme.
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Modern elaborations include the coiffure of the bride and the
visit of the bride and bridegroom to a studio to be photo¬
graphed in their formal attire. The wearing of a white wedding
dress (zeffaf) by the bride, and a western-style suit by the
bridegroom is also now common at big weddings; seated togeth¬
er under a light-studded canopy and dressed in this attire,
they observe the surrounding festivities while guests approach
and congratulate them. Finally, of course, there is the increas¬
ingly common practice of having a honeymoon, usually in one
of the large hotels in the main towns, but sometimes abroad.
In respect of the wedding celebrations I must mention again
the contributions made by the guests to the couple getting
married (nuqta).1 It is customary at all marriages for the
male and female guests to give financial contributions, respect¬
ively, to the bridegroom and to the bride. The amount of the
contribution depends both on the nature of the marriage, part¬
icularly the extent of the festivities, and the status of both
the donors and recipients. If the wedding is a very large
one, with invitation cards sent out to the guests, and a wide
range of festivities and entertainment offered to the guests, the
contributions are likely to be much larger than, say, at a
kora marriage where no meal is served to the guests and the
festivities are effectively shared with other marriages taking
place at the same time; for the same reason contributions at
a first marriage are much greater than those at a second marr¬
iage, since the celebrations at the latter are generally far less
extensive. The size of the contributions also depends on the
status of the donors: older and wealthier persons naturally
give more than others. The contributions to the bridegroom are
publicly received during one of the evening's festivities, gener¬
ally on the night that the bridegroom is hennaed; they are re¬
corded in a book by the bridegroom's 'best man' (wazir), and
the total disclosed at the end of the evening. The list can then
1. See Chapter 5, pp. /- 5"0
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be used for reference by the bridegroom when the time comes
for him to reciprocate at the weddings of fellow villagers.
Fifty piastres was a fairly standard amount for male adults to
give at marriages in Abu Haraz in 1977» though more was
given if it was a close relative, and sometimes less if there
were weak ties between the persons concerned. Women gave
much smaller amounts to the bride. The bridegroom may of
course also receive presents, sometimes of substantial value,
from close relatives and friends. One of the brothers of my
chief assistant gave him two metal-framed beds at his wedding,
and a friend of the village brick-kiln owner gave the latter
a Seiko watch at his wedding.
These contributions and presents certainly help to reimburse
some of the costs incurred by the bridegroom, particularly with
respect to the wedding celebrations themselves. But, of course,
they have to be reciprocated at festivities subsequently cele¬
brated by the donors, and it is expected that the contribution
be at least matched if not surpassed. While spreading the
costs of individual marriages, this system of contributions prob¬
ably serves to increase absolute expenditure. Assured that
part of his costs are going to be offset by the prospective con¬
tributions, the bridegroom is encouraged to increase his outlay
on marriage goods and other expenses. The competitive element
in this system of contributions also tends to inflate the pay¬
ments made by all sides.
Connected with the increase in marriage expenditure and the
transaction of marriage goods before marriage so as to evade
the kora restrictions, has been the tendency for long engage¬
ments to become increasingly prevalent in Abu Haraz. Many en¬
gagements are characterised by preparations and transactions
for the endowment of the prospective couple which it was hoped
the kora would encourage to take place after the marriage. For
example, in several current engagements the fiance is involved
in constructing a house of two or more rooms either on a new
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site or near his own family. This constitutes a new trend. To
finance the building of a whole new house before the wedding
was unheard of in the past. As described before, the tradition¬
al pattern of immediate post-marital residence was and still is
predominantly uxorilocal. If the couple getting married are rel¬
ated, especially if first cousins, significant changes in resi¬
dence may not be entailed for either spouse. However, the re¬
moval of the bride from her family of origin by an unrelated
husband is an indication that if the bridegroom is able to
shoulder the costs of providing a new home, and has in fact
already done so, then the bride's family are prepared to
accept this de facto situation. A long engagement is adequate
preparation for this more abrupt move, which witnesses the
change in the bride's status from being a dependent in her
own family to becoming mistress of an independent household.
As I have said, engagements often provide a cover for the ex¬
change of marriage goods outwith the mahr. The most notable
of these transactions is the presentation of clothes and other
personal items to the bride (shanta). Frequently the shanta is
handed over well in advance of the marriage. For example,
Yusuf Ismail, who had been working in Saudi Arabia, gave a
shanta to his fiancee, his FBD, during her final year of prim¬
ary school. He was ready to marry her, but the girl, who was
supported by her widowed mother, wished to complete three
years of secondary schooling if she passed her primary exams,
which she did. Although the wedding has been delayed at least
three years, the girl, Nagat, wears the clothes that she re¬
ceived in the shanta. In some cases the giving of the shanta
may form part of a strategy to win a girl's favour with a
view to marriage. The return of the shanta may thus indicate
the refusal of the girl or her family to accept the suit. For
example, Mustafa al-Rayyah, the son of a relatively poor rel¬
igious family, wished to marry the vivacious daughter of one
of the village butchers. Following the provisional approval of
the marriage, he saved up and purchased the contents of a
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shanta which he gave to the girl. Without any reason being
given, the shanta was returned and the marriage plans were
called off.
Most long-standing engagements are between close relatives.
Only in a few cases is the engagement celebrated by a special
ceremony (khatuba), although this is more common in urban
marriages. Many engagements derive from a man's predisposit¬
ion to marry a particular cousin; through the passage of time,
and especially once the transaction of marriage goods has
begun, this predisposition develops into a definite intention.
Varying degrees of parental pressure act on the man's choice
and on the response of the fiancee. But though many engage¬
ments derive from what is considered a suitable match by par¬
ents and relatives, combined with the man's liking for a part¬
icular cousin, other engagements ensue from an initiative taken
by the man himself. For example, Yusuf 'Omer's engagement to
Zaineb Abu 'Agla stemmed from a childhood fancy; while still
at school he declared his intention that he would marry her.
Some six years later when Zaineb had finished her schooling,
the marriage took place between them. Not infrequently engage¬
ments are broken off. This generally occurs with engagements
which have a rather nominal status, if the man decides he
wishes to marry someone else, or if a favourably regarded suit¬
or wishes to marry the girl. For example, Mirghenni Abu 'Agla
had been thwarted in marrying the girl of his first choice; he
then decided to marry a cousin living in Kumur, even although
she was already engaged to another cousin from Sennar. The
latter was prepared to break off his engagement, and he is
now engaged to another cousin in Sennar. Some engagements
may drag on rather desultorily, especially if one or other of
the partners is not fully committed to the proposed marriage.
For example, Ibrahim Ismail had been engaged for a long time
to the step-daughter of his father's brother; for whatever reas¬
on is not clear, but he showed no signs of wishing to culmin¬
ate this long engagement. Normally, however, the length of the
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engagement is due to the need of the prospective husband to
save sufficient resources and to make the necessary preparat¬
ions for the marriage. The engagement is often prolonged by
requests by the fiancee, either on her own behalf or that of
her family, for payments to meet various extraordinary expend¬
iture. The average length of engagements would appear to be
about four or five years. 1 recorded over twenty current en¬
gagements in Abu Haraz. But since many engagements are tacit
agreements and are not widely disclosed, there are probably
the same number again which 1 failed to record. This amounts
to three or four times the number of first marriages annually
contracted. Half the marriages at the al 'eid al kabir derived
from long engagements.
An interesting development concerning the marriage contract has
occurred concerning the manner of payment of the mahr. Trad¬
itionally the payment of the mahr is made publicly at the same
time as the marriage contract ('agid); this formalisation of the
marriage is referred to colloquially as the sofah. Normally this
occasion takes place at the home of the bride early in the even¬
ing, and a local feki is invited to officiate the proceedings.
The celebration is usually marked by the sacrifice of a sheep,
which the bridegroom provides. The payment of the mahr is
made by a representative of the bridegroom to the guardian of
the bride. The former is usually a close relative or friend of
the bridegroom, and the latter the father, or next of kin, of
the bride. These two representatives make formal statements of
their agreement to contract the marriage for the sum of money
declared. The money, formerly in large silver coins, today in
bank-notes, is then counted out for all to see and witness, and
handed over. The feki who has been invited to officiate the pro¬
ceedings recites a few verses from the Koran, and finally leads
all those present in saying the fatha.1 I witnessed this cere-
1. The fatha is the opening verse (sura) of the Koran. It forms an essential part
of Muslim worship, and no contract or transaction is considered complete unless it
is recited. Other notable occasions when it occurs are on greeting a recently be¬
reaved person, and after the mediation of a dispute and the reconciliation of the
parties concerned.
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mony only once at the marriage of Mirghenni Abu 'Agla to
Hadiyya Hamad al-Nil in Kumur; it was officiated by the
couple's uncle, fekl al-Rayyah Sheikh el Eleish (the bride¬
groom's MB, and the bride's FB). But I was informed that all
marriages in Kumur involved a public payment of the mahr. On
the occasion of Hadiyya's sister's marriage to a non-relative
from Taif the bride's family expected feki Tom, a paternal rel¬
ative, to conduct the sofah. He declined to do this, however,
because the bride's family had pulled down the old disused
khalwa of Sheikh el Eleish in order to make space for the con¬
struction of a bedroom for the engaged couple.
In contrast, at most marriages in Abu Haraz the holding of the
marriage contract and the payment of the mahr are performed
on separate occasions and follow a different procedure. Payment
of the mahr is carried out by the women of the two families
concerned at the home of the bride. No ceremony as such is per¬
formed, though usually this transaction coincides with the dis¬
play of the gifts to the bride, notably the contents of the
shanta. These gifts are examined and admired by the various
female relatives and guests who are present at the time.
On the other hand the marriage contract itself is performed at
the office of the local mazum, the official registrar of marr¬
iages and divorces. This entails a journey to the neighbouring
village of Abu Haraz al-Wastani, since the mazum is attached
to the local Popular Council (Majlis Sha'abi). The registering
of the marriage contract is carried out in the presence of a
limited number of people, usually the representatives of the
bride and bridegroom and a few other close relatives and
friends. The amount of mahr agreed to is recorded, and in add¬
ition another sum is agreed to which is to be handed over to
the bride in the event of the marriage being dissolved; this
additional sum is known as sadag. Usually the sadag is a pure¬
ly nominal amount, but it is not uncommon in urban marriages
for the amount specified to be quite substantial. Although
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women in Abu Haraz are aware that in some marriages sadag
as well as mahr is asked for, they are generally content if the
former is a nominal amount. Barclay (1964) notes that this is
also the case in Suuri and that the sadag "usually amounts to
only a few pounds" (p.247).
I should make clear that according to the Koran there is no
distinction between mahr and sadag, the latter in fact being
the term used throughout; the deferment of part of the marriage
payment is seen as an elaboration of custom and, strictly
speaking, not upheld by the Koran. But the division of marr¬
iage payments, with part paid with the agreeing of the con¬
tract and part withheld until the dissolution of the marriage,
is widely recorded throughout the Middle East (Levy 1969,
Goode 1970). However, the significance of the delayed transmiss¬
ion of dowry seems to have been widely overlooked, and often
misconstrued. Frequently it is interpreted as a means of evad¬
ing part or all of the dowry being given to the bride, or as
a means of reducing the value of marriage payments and hence
the amount of expenditure incurred by the bridegroom.
This explanation is certainly not applicable in those marriages
in Sudan where more than a nominal amount of sadag is in¬
cluded in the marriage contract. In these cases the sadag is
seen as an additional endowment of the bride in the event of
the dissolution of the marriage; it serves both to discourage
the divorce of the wife by her husband, and, in the event of
her divorce or widowhood, to provide her with some independent
means of support at least in the initial period following the
termination of the marriage. The inclusion of sadag in the
marriage contract also serves to indicate the status of the marr¬
ied couple, as measured by the husband's economic position;
for it is only meaningful to include sadag if the husband has
sufficient resources to constitute the necessary payment to his
widow if he dies. This view is supported by the evidence that
Goode gives in his examination of marriage patterns in the
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Middle East; he claims that the practice of delayed transmiss¬
ion of dowry is most common in "middle- and upper-class cir¬
cles" (p.92). This supports Goody's general thesis that the en¬
dowment of property on the bride and the discouragement of di¬
vorce is most likely among higher status groups in socially
stratified societies (1976). These arguments I will develop fur¬
ther in the concluding chapter.
To return to the question of the inclusion of sadag, albeit only
as a nominal sum, in the marriage contract in Abu Haraz: the
origins of this delayed payment are not clear. In part it may
emanate from the office of mazum, which was introduced in the
Condominium and bears Egyptian influences. In Egypt sadag is
often an amount equivalent to the mahr (Barclay, 247). It may
also emanate from more indigenous riverain customs. Barclay
says that small plots of land were sometimes given as sadag
in the past, but that this practice was uncommon at the time
of his researches (p.34). Al-Shahi, writing about marriage pay¬
ments in Nuri in the northern Sudan, also reveals that part of
the dowry, which used to be paid in kind (land, palm-trees),
was often withheld in the past.1 This would perhaps suggest
that where land was the most important resource, and where
access to it was unequal, its endowment on women served to
differentiate families of different status. However, there is no
evidence that land, whether riverain or rainland, was ever en¬
dowed on women in Abu Haraz through marriage transactions.
Today, since the marriage payments I have been considering
are all monetarised, different questions are raised. If socio¬
economic differentiation has occurred, why have sadag payments
remained purely nominal? The nominal nature of the sadag in
Abu Haraz, I would argue, reflects the influence of two fact¬
ors: one, that kinship ties are still ideally considered to be
strong enough to provide support for widows and divorced
1. A.S. Al-Shahi: An Anthropological Study of a Sudanese Shaigiya Village. P.Phil,
Oxford, 1971,
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women; and second, that given the prevalence of wage and sal¬
ary-earned incomes, most families do not have the resources to
pledge the payment of sadag.
I should add here, in parenthesis, that the failure to endow
women with property, whether through inheritance or marriage
payments, among some nominally Muslim tribal groups is a diff¬
erent question which does not concern me here. Tillion (1966),
Goody (1973) and Peters (1978) * have paid attention to this
problem, and are in general agreement that the implementation
of Muslim property prescriptions by tribal groups subsisting on
relatively fixed patrimonies is incompatible with the corporate
basis of such groups and the forms of social cohesion and solid¬
arity that they express. In some such groups the evasion of
transference of property to women at marriage may take the
form of declaring a delayed marriage payment which is rarely
ever fulfilled. These cases should be clearly distinguished from
those marriages among particular social classes where deferred
marriage portions provide an additional source of endowment
for the bride.
The fact that in Abu Haraz the payment of the mahr has be¬
come separated from the marriage contract, and that the hand¬
ing over of the mahr has become more of a private female
event rather than a male public occasion is perhaps indicative
of the other changes in marriage transactions that I have
noted. In particular it is perhaps indicative of the fact that
women have become the main recipients of marriage goods. I
have argued that one of the. main functions of these marriage
payments is to endow the couple with the various requirements
entailed in establishing a new domestic group. A varying pro¬
portion of any marriage expenditure goes on the purchase of
domestic goods and equipment, and this is generally associated
1. E.L.Peters: 'The State of Horaen in Four Middle East Communities' in Xoaen in the
Hu»li» World, ed. by L. Beck and N. Keddie, Cambridge, Mass., 1978.
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with the domestic role of the wife. However, the increase in
marriage expenditure, as characterised by trends in Abu
Haraz, has been marked not only by the purchase of a much
wider range of general household goods, but also of goods per¬
taining exclusively to the woman's domain. The elaboration of
gifts in the shanta in particular is to be noted. The diversif¬
ication of the woman's 'idda is another indication of the wife's
enhanced domestic position. Moreover, since the woman's role
has become a more strictly domestic one, and the husband is
often working away from home, all the general expenditure on
the improvement of the home and the introduction of modern
amenities is of more direct benefit to women than to men. Also,
generally speaking, the home and all its contents becomes in
time the effective property of the wife. Thus it is only appro¬
priate that women should handle the mahr.
I would argue that the increase in marriage payments has been
most widely supported by women, and that pressure for higher
payments most persistently comes from them, usually through
mothers on behalf of their daughters. The indifference of women
in Abu Haraz to the introduction of the kora is evidence of
this, as are also the many empirical cases 1 could recount where
new or higher demands on the bridegroom emanated from the
mother of the bride, though no doubt with the approval of the
latter. Barclay (p.243) suggests that the delayed age at marr¬
iage for women is probably the result of their fathers' demand¬
ing too large a dowry. If the responsibility for this tendency
is to be attached to certain individuals' motivations and influ¬
ence, then it is almost certainly mothers rather than fathers
to whom this comment is applicable. Since Barclay does not any¬
where examine, in an otherwise comprehensive treatment of marr¬
iage procedures and ceremonies, the uses to which the mahr is
put, nor the composition of other marriage goods nor their main
beneficients, it is not surprising that he underestimates the
strength of women's influence on marriage payments. It is cert¬
ainly true that the father generally accords with the pressures
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exerted by the mother, and equally that the bridegroom also
accedes to the demands placed upon him. For it is in the
men's interests, or at least it enhances their status and pres¬
tige, if their women are well provided for, and that their
homes are as lavishly furnished and equipped as possible. This
is the point that Goody is making when he associates systems
of social differentiation with the endowment of women as indices
of men's relative status.
In Kumur, although there is no kora, marriage expenditure is
generally much lower than in Abu Haraz. Payments of mahr in
Kumur have been similar to the amounts of mahr in the kora
in Abu Haraz, i.e. less than £S30. However, other expenditures
incurred at marriage are markedly smaller. Expenditure on
building, furnishings, household goods, clothing and presents
for the bride, and on the wedding celebrations is much less
than in Abu Haraz. The payment of mahr is made in public at
the time of the marriage contract, since the transaction signi¬
fies the emergence of a new domestic unit and not primarily
the endowment of the bride. As will be shown in the next chap¬
ter women in Kumur appear more prone to taking the ini iative
to dissolve their marriage than the women of Abu Haraz. This
I will argue is because less value, whether material or ideol¬
ogical, is invested in their marriage; and this in turn reflects
the different economic conditions which prevail in Kumur.
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CHAPTER 7
TRENDS IN MARRIAGE STABILITY
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the trends that have
occurred concerning the duration and stability of marriages
among the population of Abu Haraz and Kumur. By marriage
stability I refer to the likelihood and frequency of marriages
being terminated through divorce, desertion or separation. I
consider a marriage to have been terminated through separation
in any of the following circumstances: where a migrant or
absent husband ceases to provide support for his wife and
children; where a man has undertaken a polygamous marriage,
is living with his second wife, and neglects to send assistance
to his first wife; finally a separation may be voluntarily init¬
iated by a wife, almost invariably an older co-wife, so that
she may go and live near her married children. I am also in¬
terested to examine marriage duration, which is related to the
degree of marriage stability, and also to other factors, name¬
ly, the age at marriage of the respective spouses, the fre¬
quency of widowhood, and the frequency of serial and polygam¬
ous marriages. For in general I wish to study changes in the
fluidity of marriages, by which I mean the relative ease with
which marriage bonds are formed, dissolved and reformed with¬
in the individual's life-span.
The concept of marriage 'stability' is inevitably a value-laden
term, and therefore I must make clear how I am using the
term. I do not wish to imply that marriage stability necessar¬
ily involves a conflict-free relationship between the spouses,
nor that it denotes a conjugal relationship with the western
associations of the term 'conjugal'. Nor am I primarily con¬
cerned to convey the values which the actors themselves
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attribute ideally to marriage. Regardless of the actual extent
of marriage stability, actors have no doubt at different times
expressed the desirability of the durability of marriage ties.
This is not to say that there have been no changes in the ex¬
pectations concerning marriage. For example there has been a
widespread change in attitudes towards polygamous marriages,
with far fewer people today emphasising the virtues of such
marriages and more people pointing to monogamous marriage as
being the ideal form of conjugality. But 1 am not primarily
interested in the changes in attitudes towards marriage and
sexual relationships. As I made clear above, I seek to detect
trends in the frequency of marriages; in particular 1 wish to
examine what effect the intensification of marriage payments
has had on marriage formation.
The arguments that I present in this chapter are based on my
findings concerning marital status in Abu Haraz and Kumur,
supplemented by more detailed case-studies from these and
neighbouring villages. I have sought to substantiate these find¬
ings by reference to the results of social surveys carried out
among much larger population samples. In particular I refer
to the economic and social survey of the Rahad Project area,
which contains the above-mentioned villages and which was
carried out in 1975-6, just two years before my own field-
work.1 I also make reference to social surveys carried out at
earlier periods in the neighbouring Gezira area. However, I
must mention certain problems concerning the collection and in¬
terpretation of data on marital status. With my own data coll¬
ection I found no problem in recording current marital status
of persons interviewed. But I did encompass problems when 1
tried to elicit all the marriages contracted by past generat¬
ions, and to a lesser extent previous short-lived marriages con¬
tracted by living persons. Informants tend to overlook past
1. Mahd. El Awad Galal El Din: The Human Factor in the Rahad Project Area: Results
of Population and Socioeconomic Survey. Khartoum, 1975.
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marriages if they have no bearing on present kinship configur¬
ations. As a result, I suspect that I have substantially under-
recorded serial and plural marriages of past generations. The
most frequent under-reporting of marriages probably concerned
those marriages of men and women with spouses from other
villages, and also marriages which failed to yield offspring or
whose male children died before marrying. A few of these un¬
reported marriages came to my knowledge through other incid¬
ental sources of information. An additional problem concerning
the recording of past marriages may have derived from the
issue I was investigating. If divorces, separations,remarriages
and plural marriages are in fact less common today, there may
have been a tendency among my informants in describing past
marriages to ignore practices which they considered conflicted
with modern trends. Thus they may have played down the great¬
er fluidity of marriages in the past. Those to whom I put the
question directly, whether more marriages were enacted in the
past, generally replied in the affirmative. This leaves out of
consideration the greater prevalence in the past of non-contract¬
ual unions, i.e. concubinage.
The information provided by the Rahad Social Survey, while
generally reliable, has certain limitations in relation to the
questions I am examining in this chapter. The tables on curr¬
ent marital status do not give any indication as to the frequen¬
cy of divorce and widowhood, or of subsequent remarriages.
Where the frequency of remarriages is high, many women who
have been divorced or widowed will appear among the category
of currently married women. Only where the frequency of re¬
marriages is very low, will the proportion of currently di¬
vorced and widowed women give some indication of the actual
frequency of divorce and widowhood.
I should at this stage give a general account of the basic
demographic features of the area studied. In the Rahad Project
area as a whole there is a slight preponderance of males to
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females: for the total population of 72,243 the sex ratio is
105.6. The sex ratio for Abu Haraz al Warrani is 109.3, and
for Kumur 94.5. In the Project area as a whole there is a
slight preponderance of males in all age-groups, except for the
20-24 age group, where there is in some areas a marked pre¬
ponderance of females. This possibly indicates a high rate of
migration of single men in this age-group. The Rahad Project
report suggests that part of this surplus may be accounted for
by polygamous and other marriages in which wives are brought
in from other areas. My findings on marriage patterns in Abu
Haraz and Kumur suggest that this is not a plausible explanat¬
ion, as there is no indication that more women are brought
into the area through marriage than the number of women who
leave the area through marriage. Anyhow this problem does not
arise in the case of Abu Haraz al Warrani, since, in spite of
a heavy pattern of male migration, there is a marked prepond¬
erance of males, not females, in the 20-24 age group. This i -
balance I can only attribute to natural variation. In Kumur,
although there is an overall preponderance of females, there
is no marked imbalance in any particular age-group. (See
Table 3).
The age structure of the population throughout the Rahad Pro¬
ject area follows a consistent pattern. Children under 15 com¬
prise more than 50% of the total population; this is also true
both of Abu Haraz district and of the two specific villages
which I studied. In larger villages, such as Abu Haraz, where
there tend to be better amenities and services (bore-wells,
clinics, etc.), there is a larger proportion of older people. The
crude birth rate is high, varying from 38 to 50 births per 1000
population in a sample of villages from the Project area. Fert¬
ility is shown to be high from the fact that the average num¬
ber of children still living born to women over 45 is over four.
In Abu Haraz the population appears to be expanding at an
even faster rate since the average number of children among
completed families is over six. The increase in family sizes
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TABLE 3
Population of Abu Haraz and Kumur by sex and age-group
(from Rahad Project Social Survey)
ABU HARAZ KUMUR
Females Males Females Males
0-1 18 14 8 6
1-4 89 94 28 30
5-9 134 142 43 31
10-14 127 140 35 38
15-19 110 121 33 31
20-24 37 78 17 16
25-29 55 52 16 16
30-34 40 37 11 19
35-39 45 41 13 12
40—44 32 31 13 6
45-49 30 32 11 8
50-54 38 38 7 13
55-59 26 44 6 2
60+ 16 7 6 5
Total 797 371 252 233
1163 435
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seems to be mainly the effect of higher standards of living.
The largest families, those with between eight and twelve child¬
ren, are almost invariably supported by men with regular em¬
ployment. Also greater marriage stability - which I will argue
has come about in Abu Haraz - may be conducive to larger fam¬
ily sizes, though this must be offset against the later age at
marriage for women, which would tend to reduce fertility rates.
Mortality rates are also high. Throughout the Rahad Project
area deaths vary from 16 to 20 per 1000 population. Infant
mortality rates average 70 per 1000 births, although in some
of the least developed areas the number is as high a3 200 per
1000 births; there is also a high frequency of miscarriages,
with one in ten married women recorded as having suffered at
least one miscarriage.
These factors influence marriage duration, since high mortality
rates increase the likelihood of a marriage being terminated
through the early death of one or other partner. The number
of marriages terminated through mortalities is further increased
if there is a large difference \.1 age between spouses. Remarr¬
iages are frequently characterised by an even larger different¬
ial age at marriage. Divorced or widowed men usually remarry
a woman younger than their first wife. Widows have often been
married by religious men, often of advancing years, with the
consequence that only a short period may elapse before they be¬
come widowed again. Polygamous marriages are usually marked
by an increasing differential age at marriage between the resp¬
ective spouses. Thus as has been frequently noted, a large
differential age at marriage which tends to produce many
widows is often found correlated with polygamy, with the sur¬
plus of single women being absorbed in plural marriages.
(Goody, 1976). In the villages that 1 studied the difference in
age between spouses was often at least ten years, and some¬
times appreciably more.
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The age at marriage for both men and women appears to have
become later in both Abu Haraz al Warrani and Kumur, though
more markedly in the former village. The median age at first
marriage in Abu Haraz is 24.6 for men and 16.1 for women,
and in Kumur 22.9 for men and 15.3 for women. In both vill¬
ages marriages in recent years suggest a substantially later
age. The average age of men and women marrying in 1977-3 in
Abu Haraz was 20 and 18 respectively. This trend is supported
by the data on marital status provided by the Rahad Project
Social Survey.
In Abu Haraz only a small number of women under 20 and men
under 30 are recorded as being married. The figures for Kumur
are similar with few women under 20 being married, though
there are relatively more men aged between 20 and 29 recorded
as being married. In the different parts of the Rahad Project
area there is considerable variation in the proportion of un¬
married women and ever-married women, and to a lesser extent
in similar categories of the male population. In the more re¬
cently settled communities and in the areas comprising small
villages whose occupants still rely heavily on traditional pat¬
rimonies the proportion of unmarried women tends to be lower.
In the larger villages, especially in the more developed north¬
ern areas where there is greater diversity of occupation the
proportion tends to be much higher. For example in one area
(Sharif Ya'qub), where 32% of the male population are des¬
cribed as farmers and shepherds, 21 % of the female population
over 12 years of age are recorded as unmarried. In Abu Haraz
district, where only 42.8% of the male population are engaged
primarily in farming or animal husbandry, 32% of the female
population over 12 are unmarried. In Abu Haraz al Marram 40%
of the female population over 12 are unmarried; in Kumur the
figure is 31.1%. A larger proportion of unmarried females in¬
dicates a later age at marriage, though it may also be partly
accounted for by greater population increase.
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TABLE 4
Marital Status - Abu Haraz and Kumur
(from Rahad Project Social Survey)
I ABU HARAZ AL WARRAN1
Men aged 16 and above
Never
Married Married Divorced Widowed Total
16-19 107 - - 107
20-29 116 13 1 - 130
30+ 10 212 3 5 230
Total 233 225 4 5 467
Women aged 12 and above
Never
Married Married Divorced Widowed Total
12-19 171 7 - - 176
20-29 28 57 4 3 92
30+ - 175 S 45 228
Total 199 239 12 48 498
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TABLE 4 (Cont'd)
11 KUMUR EL ELE1SH
Men aged 16 and above
Never
Married Married Divorced Widowed Total
16-19 22 2 — _ 24
20-29 23 8 1 - 32
30+ 1 64 - - 65
Total 46 74 1 - 121
Women aged 12 and above
Never
Married Married Divorced Widowed Total
12-19 32 12 — 44
20-29 10 19 4 - 33
30+ 1 50 2 8 61
Total 43 31 6 8 138
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My findings which suggest that the age at marriage has be¬
come later appear to conflict with the findings of Henin who
made a study of marriage patterns and trends based on a
series of demographic surveys conducted in 1961-2 in different
parts of the Sudan;1 the groups he covered in his samples in¬
cluded settled communities in the Gezira and nomadic groups in
the Blue Nile region, both of which belonged to the same set
of tribal groups. His study shows that the settled populations
have lower ages at marriage, lower marriage instability, and
lower incidence of polygamy as compared with the nomadic pop¬
ulations. Henin supports his argument that settlement of former¬
ly nomadic groups is conducive to lower age at marriage, by
comparing the age at marriage of different age cohorts among
the Gezira population. This comparison reveals that the older
cohorts who married before the implementation of the Gezira
Scheme had a higher age at marriage than the younger cohorts.
Men and women under 50 have tended to marry at about 21 and
15 respectively, while men and women over 50 tended to marry
at about 25 and 17 respectively (p.251-3). Unfortunately more
recent data on marriage patterns among the Gezira population
are not available, and so it is not possible to say whether
this low age at marriage has been maintained during the last
two decades. Henin refers to the low costs of marriage in the
Gezira at the time of his writing. He suggests that the fluct¬
uations in Gezira farmers' incomes "are not great enough to
affect contemplated marriages" and that "£5 is sufficient to
cover marriage expenses in the Gezira". (p.254). I would sus¬
pect that, since standards of living have risen and the costs
of establishing a new household have increased greatly, and
in many cases in greater proportion than the increase in in¬
come, there are today greater economic constraints on marriage,
and this has probably led to a higher age at marriage. This
is only a hypothesis, and the situation can only be truly
1. R.A.Renins 'Marriage Patterns and Trends in the Nonadic and Settled Populations
of the Sudan' in Africa, Vol.39, 1969.
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assessed through the analysis of fresh data on Gezira marriage
patterns.
The low age at marriage in the Gezira may be accounted for
by the relatively assured income that farmers derive from their
tenancies, and by the fact that being heritable the tenancy
acts like a patrimony. The income and security engendered by
the tenancies encourages farmers to facilitate the early marr¬
iages of their children. This is not so as to retain family lab¬
our on the tenancy, but so as to ensure that the income of
wage-earning sons is diverted back to the family through kin¬
ship channels. Thus the possession of tenancies may serve to
encourage a more traditional pattern of domestic developmental
cycle, just as the possession of traditional patrimonies does.
Henin indicates that after marriage the spouses remain living
with their respective families, with the husband visiting his
wife at varying intervals. While this may have been the pre¬
vailing pattern in the past, the evidence provided by Culwick
(1954 and n.d.), Brausch (1964) and other writers suggest that
these residential arrangements, together with the collective bud¬
geting that they imply, have undergone significant changes.
(See p. 143). These changes are related to the emergence of new
forms of property, particularly mercantile capital, and to the
greater prevalence of salaried incomes. Under these conditions,
1 argue, marriage expenditure tends to become more elaborate
and the age at marriage tends to become later. It is to be
noted that Barclay records a tendency to later marriages in
Buuri, where reliance on farming has steadily declined and em¬
ployment in market services and wage labour in the capital
have become prominent (p.243).
Informants in Abu Haraz and Kumur themselves referred to a
number of factors which were conducive to later marriages. The
increased costs of marriages were usually referred to as being
the main cause. They also mentioned the extension of schooling
and the requirements for job training as significant factors
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delaying marriages. Most boys in Abu Haraz complete at least
three years of secondary schooling, and an increasing number
continue with further education or training. The education of
girls is also regarded favourably in the village, as is shown
by the existence of two girls' schools both established through
self-help ventures. Most girls are involved in schooling at
least until the age of 16, and it they go on to higher secondary
schools in Wad Medani or Rufa'a until the age of 18 or 19. In
some instances girls are withdrawn from their schooling in ord¬
er to be married, although it is more common today for press¬
ure to be exerted to defer the marriage. The greater availabil¬
ity of educational services for both boys and girls does seem
generally to concur with later marriages. Some men expressed
the view that it was better to marry a slightly older girl in
the interests of compatibility and marriage stability. They sugg¬
ested that the character of a girl in her late teens is more
clearly formed, and that she is likely to be less capricious
and more responsible than a younger girl. At least one di¬
vorced man mentioned the young age of his wife as the main
reason of their incompatibility.
We may now turn to the question of the frequency of divorce
and examine whether there has been any trend concerning the
number of divorces among the population studied. The Rahad
Project Social Survey shows that in Abu Haraz district 2.5% of
women over 12 are currently divorced, and less than 1% of men
over 16. But as mentioned before, these figures do not reveal
the prevalence of divorce since variations in the frequency of
remarriages are not indicated. Thus these figures may conceal
the fact that in some areas and among particular social groups
divorces may be more frequent, but they are combined with a
high rate of remarriage. Turning to my own data from Abu Har¬
az and Kumur, 1 found no significant variation in comparing
the frequency of divorces among different generations. 1 have
already suggested that I probably failed to record several di¬
vorces of past generations because of the difficulty in eliciting
- 198 -
this information. Moreover my overall sample was probably not
sufficiently large to indicate accurately trends where they do
exist. My survey covered 247 men, who had contracted a total
of 290 marriages; 22 of these marriages ended in divorce. It
also covered 322 women who had contracted 343 marriages, with
23 of these being terminated by divorce. (See Table 5).
However, the correlation of divorce cases in Abu Haraz and Kum-
ur with the occupation of the men involved has more positive
implications. From the two villages I recorded a total of 31 di¬
vorces involving living persons. Fourteen of these cases in¬
volved partners from the same village; eight involved men from
these villages who had married elsewhere; and nine involved
women from these villages who had married men from elsewhere.
Twenty-three of these divorces occurred in Abu Haraz, and
eight in Kumur; this gives a higher frequency of divorces in
Kumur in relation to its much smaller population than Abu
Haraz. On the other hand the numbers involved are very small.
Seventeen, or more than half, of the men involved in these di¬
vorces are engaged primarily in farming activities; of the
others, five are traders, six are migrant workers and three
are professional employees. Three of the farmers are from the
Gezira, while the remainder are all rainland farmers on the
east bank; seven of the latter are from Abu Haraz, four from
Kumur and three from other villages on the east bank (El
Eleila, Masara and Umm Shaneg). Some of these farmers keep
small herds, and one or two kept much larger herds in the
past; some of them have sons who have regular earned incomes,
but none of them have other substantial economic interests
which might provide an alternative to their farming activities.
The fact that these farmers contracted more than half of the
total divorces recorded, while farming is practised as a major
occupation by less than a quarter of the married male populat¬
ion, suggests that divorces may have been more frequent in the
past when a much larger proportion of the population was en¬
gaged in agricultural production.
- 199 -
TABLE 5
Marriages contracted by men and women In




(218 => 1 wife; 17 « 2 wives;
1 = 3 wives)
Divorced: 7 15
Widowed: 4 56
Total (ever-married) 247 322
Total no. of marriages 290 343
Extant marriages 255 251
Terminated marriages 35 92
(terminated by divorce 18 26
terminated by death of spouse 17 66)
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Three of the divorce cases involving traders concerned marr¬
iages which had been contracted in places where the men were
temporarily based while carrying out their trading activities
(Damazeen, Roseires and Umm Rawarba). These trading centres
border on large areas which are still largely subsistence orient¬
ated, and they differ markedly in their social composition from
towns like Wad Medani and Khartoum where the majority of mer¬
chants and suq traders from Abu Haraz are concentrated today.
In the past more migrants from Abu Haraz in particular were
engaged in petty-trading activities in these frontier zones.
Their transitory periods of residence in these places were prob¬
ably conducive to marriages of a less durable nature. I sus¬
pect that marriages of this kind were under-reported by my in¬
formants. I will discuss shortly some of the divorces initiated
by men in the two 'modern' occupational categories, the mig¬
rant workers and professional employees. Here I wish to stress
that the number of divorces initiated by migrant workers in
particular is very small in relation to the proportion of the
adult male population that they comprise. All these indications,
therefore, suggest that there has probably been a decline in
the frequency of divorce.
The argument I am trying to substantiate from admittedly incon¬
clusive statistical evidence is strengthened if the reasons for
divorce are considered, and who it is that initiates them. Sever¬
al of the divorces in Kumur have been initiated, or at least
provoked by the women concerned. One girl refused to consumm¬
ate her marriage to a patrilateral cousin, and the mahr of
£S30 was returned. Another woman was divorced by a close rel¬
ative from Nuweila in the Gezira, but she insisted to me that
she had brought it about; other villagers confirmed this acc¬
ount and remarked that she was strong (gowi), a term usually
reserved for men. Following several years of separation, during
which she assumed responsibility for bringing up her two
daughters, though assisted by her own family, a reconciliation
was brought about between her and her former husband. Having
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learnt that she was prepared to renew their marriage, her hus¬
band brought some gifts of clothing and remarried her at a sim¬
ple ceremony officiated by a feki. Another woman in Kumur had
been described to me as having been deserted by her husband
who was from the west of Sudan, but in fact it was not as sim¬
ple as that. The husband had wanted to return to the west of
Sudan, taking his wife and six children with him, but his wife
had refused to go, and so he had left on his own. While she
may have had good reasons for wanting to stay in her village
of origin, her forceful attitude contributed to her separation
from her husband. Two other women also lived separately from
their husband; though not asking for a divorce, two co-wives
decided on their own initiative to leave their aging husband,
who lived in another village on the east bank (Taif), and to
return to Kumur, their village of origin. Since their husband
had a third wife in Taif, and since most of their own children
were now married and living in Kumur, this voluntary separat¬
ion was agreeable to all parties concerned. In two divorce
cases in Kumur I could not ascertain which party had intit-
iated the dissolution of the marriage, while in two other cases
it was the initiative of the husband. In one of these cases it
was because the wife was infertile; in the other case, where
a school director in Taiba divorced a warm-hearted but uneduc¬
ated girl from Kumur, no explanation was given to me. In the
neighbouring village of Masara I learnt of a marriage which
the girl was trying to get terminated though the young hus¬
band was reluctant to divorce her. These cases were reported
to me quite freely by both male and female informants, and
without undue embarassment. Indeed in Kumur love suits were
often related to me in a light-hearted, jovial manner. On one
occasion a very aimiable, but rather gawky character recounted
to me and others how he had wanted to marry a beautiful girl
from the village but his suit had been rejected and she had
since become engaged to a cousin living in the Gezira.
The fact that women in Kumur sometimes take the intitiative in
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terminating a marriage can be correlated with their more prod¬
uctive role compared with that of women in Abu Haraz. They
contribute significantly to rainland cultivation and several
other subsistence activities. In the event of their marriage be¬
ing dissolved, they can generally maintain the viability of
their household, either with support from their adolescent child¬
ren or with assistance from members of their family of origin.
The withdrawal of support from a husband does not threaten
completely to undermine the woman's position in these circum¬
stances. If they are young these women have the prospect of
remarrying, and even if this prospect is not realised, the con¬
tribution they can make to their family's productive activities
assures them of a positive role if they are temporarily reinteg¬
rated into their parental family. This does not mean that sin¬
gle women do not face many hardships in meeting their sub¬
sistence needs, but clearly these difficulties are not so great
as to prevent at least some women from taking the intiative in
terminating their marriage if it is unsatisfactory.
In Abu Haraz the situation is very different. Women there no
longer contribute significantly to productive activities, and
they have become much more economically dependent on men. A
woman's life career is increasingly dependent on the stability
of her marriage, and on the ability of her husband to provide
both for her and her children, at least until the maturity of
her sons who should then be able to provide for her if necess¬
ary. In Abu Haraz the whole subject of divorce was more diffi¬
cult to raise, and when actual divorce occurred they v/ere seen
as representing a much greater crisis and misfortune than
would appear to be the case in Kumur. (Two divorces occurred
in Abu Haraz during my period of fieldwork, but none in
Kumur). Given their economic dependence, any action taken by
a woman which is likely to provoke a divorce is strongly dis¬
approved of, and considered extremely foolhardy. I learnt, and
then only inadvertently, of only one case in Abu Haraz where
a girl wanted a divorce and succeeded eventually in bringing
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it about. I had her recorded as never-married in my household
survey, until one day a male informant spoke to me in some de¬
tail of her difficult marriage; this account I later corroborated
with other informants. The girl had been engaged and married
against her will by her step-father to a man from the neigh¬
bouring village of El Eleila. She refused to consummate the
marriage, and repeatedly ran back home. After some six months
her step-father died, and her mother exerted influence on the
girl's husband to divorce her, which he finally did. My origin¬
al informant suggested that the husband was not required to
divorce her, and could have enforced her submission, but
agreed out of kindness to meet the girl's wishes. The girl sub¬
sequently became engaged to her step-father's brother's son,
but this engagement has become a protracted one; possibly the
long delay is related to the girl's previous unfortunate exper¬
ience and her cousin's ambivalent feelings about it.
Various cases that I became familiar with suggest that women
in Abu Haraz feel generally constrained from appealing for a
divorce even in marriages which are severely strained. One
tragic case, in particular, illustrates this. A young woman was
married to a first cousin (FED), who worked as an irrigation
controller (ghaflr) in the Gezira Scheme. He had a rather dis¬
turbing eye-disorder, and. altogether a rather strange manner¬
ism. The marriage was clearly not a very compatible one. It
seems that the wife did not press for a divorce, nor would her
husband have readily conceded, one even if she had. The girl's
family were poor; her father was dead and her three brothers
were all employed in the village as casual labourers; in addit¬
ion two of them cultivated rainlands and jerfs, and kept small
herds of goats. The circumstances of her family may have been
a factor why the girl did not make more explicit demands on
her husband, either to fulfil certain conditions or else to di¬
vorce her. In any case shortly after giving birth to a baby
boy, the young wife became very poorly, and this in turn led
to the weakening of the condition of the baby. Her husband
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denied that she was really ill, and refused to take her to hosp¬
ital for an examination. As a result her condition worsened,
and a zar was arranged to try and diagnose what ailed her.1
Despite a ceremony which lasted two days the local zar sheikha
from Abu Haraz Abu 'Ash© was unable to discover what she
needed. Normally at these ceremonies the spirit which is poss¬
essing the afflicted person expresses certain demands which
have to be fulfilled before it resumes a more latent, non-malig¬
nant presence within the person's body. On this occasion no
spirit expressed itself through the patient in spite of the
sheikha' s wide repertoire of songs and drum rhythms known to
appeal to different spirits. As the girl's condition continued
to deteriorate with her skin taking on a grey pallor, her
brothers took her to the hospital in Wad Medani. But the doc¬
tors there were also unable to diagnose exactly what was
wrong with her. Angry that his wife's brothers had interfered
in her condition without his approval, the husband sought an
injunction from the local court preventing his wife's brothers
from taking any action on behalf of their sister contrary to his
wishes. At the court hearing the girl's brothers appealed to
the court that the husband should be required to provide ad¬
equate treatment and medicines for both his wife and the baby.
Since the members of the court had made themselves familiar
with the case, they asked the husband if it was not best that
he should divorce his wife since it was clear that she was not
happy. The husband replied that he would not divorce her.
Following this the court sought to ascertain from the medical
report what treatment the husband should be required to pro¬
vide for his wife. Since the medical report had been inconclus¬
ive and had prescribed no medicines, the court could only in¬
sist that the husband supply the mother and baby with pow¬
dered milk. The brothers were exhorted not to take action on
1. Zar is a ritual practice to propitiate foreign spirits which possess people and
to cure certain kinds of sickness. The sheikha is the woman who leads the ceremony.
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behalf of their sister without consulting and gaining the con¬
sent of the husband. Finally all of those involved were remind¬
ed of the behaviour expected of them as close kinsmen, and
were asked to bury any differences that they still harboured.
I am not aware that any further action was taken by any of
those concerned in order to diagnose the reasons for the girl's
morbid state. Some four weeks later she died. While this is
clearly a very complex case it seems reasonable to draw at
least one conclusion from it: that if the bonds of marriage had
not constrained the girl so severely a different outcome might
have ensued. As the question of zar practices and beliefs has
been examined by other researchers, and since it was not the
main object of my investigations, 1 do not wish here to exam¬
ine this aspect of the case I have just recorded.1 The point 1
wish to make here is that this particular case seems to support
my argument that the economic dependence of women is an im¬
portant factor conducive to the 'stability' of marriages; certain¬
ly it may constrain the woman from eliciting a divorce even
where the marriage is severely strained. Usually stability of
marriage is discussed in Middle Eastern ethnographies in the
context of marriage patterns, and in particular in relation to
the prevalence of marriages with close relatives. I will turn
to this discussion shortly.
To return to my argument: not only does the economic depend¬
ence of women constrain their resorting to divorce, but I would
also sxiggest that the perceptions of women's dependent status
serves also to discourage men from too readily terminating
marriages which they find unsatisfactory. The problems that di¬
vorce entails, particularly when the woman is so dependent,
encourage the emergence of the belief that divorce is a gener¬
ally undesirable solution to marital problems. More emphasis
is placed on marital adaptation and on corrective measures
such that the spouses learn to fulfil their respective obligat-
1. See P.N.Constantinides: Sickness and the Spirits - a study of the zaar spirit
possession cult in the Northern Sudan. Ph.D. London School of Economics, 1972.
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ions; divorce is seen as the final resort, which should only be
embarked upon with the utmost reluctance. In Abu Haraz much
greater play is placed on the koranic requirement that, in
order to make a divorce binding, the husband must repeat
three times the phrase "I divorce you". Usually the phrase is
repeated on the same occasion, and the divorce takes full eff¬
ect from that time. In two instances that I knew of the hus¬
band had repeated the phrase only once, thus serving as a
warning of final separation. During the subsequent period of
estrangement relatives and friends attempted to bring about an
improvement in the relations between the couple concerned. I
found no instance of this happening in'Kumur.
1 found that discussion of divorce in Abu Haraz was much less
open than in Kumur. However, in the two divorces which came
about during my fieldwork there were severe recriminations,
with criticisms being levelled at either or both spouses for hav¬
ing let the situation come to such a pass. Since, as I have
suggested, it is more likely today that it is the man who init¬
iates the divorce, this criticism is likely to be directed at the
husband; this tends to be regardless of whether the critics are
male or female. For example, 'All Salah came under consider¬
able censure for divorcing his wife, especially since she was
pregnant with their fifth child at the time. Signs of strain be¬
came evident during the rainy season of 1977 when he failed
to cultivate, and chose instead to work as a hair-cutter in the
village. However, while most other people in the village were
busy cultivating, he was inactive for long periods of time.
Failing to raise any significant income, he divorced his wife
and decided to try and find work to support himself in Khart¬
oum. As one of his brothers was a tailor, he took up hawking
women's dresses in one of the Khartoum markets where his bro¬
ther worked. Meanwhile his family got what support they could
mainly from the woman's brother, a medical assistant in Wad
Medani. Eventually some relations found 'All a Job as a care¬
taker in Khartoum, and with this stable though meagre salary
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he was able to make some savings. Just before I left he sent
£S7 to his wife who by this time had had her baby. It was
generally hoped that 'Ali would regain his confidence, and
that he would remarry his wife, or at least that he would be
able to support his family regularly with remittances. In the
case of 'Ali his unsettled frame of mind was considered as an
extenuating circumstance for his failure to support adequately
his family. In the case of able-bodied men who divorce their
wives and then fail to support them, less qualified criticism
is likely to be levelled at them. For example, Hadiyya
Abdall&h married a cousin (MBS) from Wad Medani, who di¬
vorced her shortly after the birth of her first child. Though
he was in full-time employment he paid her no alimony
(nafaga). Hadiyya's family spared no criticism of her husband,
and eventually they obtained alimony following a long court
procedure. Although Hadiyya's family was supported by the sal¬
ary of her father, the local forest warden, as well as contribut¬
ions from a brother working as a plumber in the nearby Agric¬
ultural Institute, they considered the former husband should
have met his obligation in providing alimony, thereby relieving
some of the pressure on the family's limited resources.
In the last chapter we noted that sadag is only a nominal
sum, and, therefore, not an effective deterrence to divorce.
Payment of alimony on the other hand probably does deter
readily-taken divorces, at least by salaried employees. For in
practice alimony car. only be effectively enforced by the courts
if the husband has a fixed salary from which the court can,
if necessary, deduct the required amount. Even where the pros¬
pect of paying alimony does not serve to prevent a divorce, it
certainly reduces the likelihood of the early remarriage of the
two separated partners. For example, Tom Tireifi divorced his
non-related wife on the grounds of non-compatibility. He worked
as a technical assistant at the Soba Hospital near Khartoum,
and earned a salary of £S45 a month. On divorcing his wife
he agreed to give her £S20 a month for the support of their
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four children. This substantial deduction from his income
effectively prevents him from remarrying for a considerable
length of time. In the wife's case, assuming that she continues
to receive this alimony, a major consideration is removed con¬
cerning her need to remarry. Women in Abu Haraz have shown
their readiness to avail themselves of the sharia' courts in
order to obtain their alimony if it is not voluntarily handed
over to them. The case of Hadiyya illustrates this. The women
of Kurour have yet to show such readiness. For example, Haram
Mohammad al feki was divorced by a distant cousin, a primary
school director enjoying a large salary. But she only received
occasional payments from him for the support of her one daugh¬
ter; these payments were usually made during the intermittent
occasions which brought him to Kumur; on one occasion, at a
funeral in the village, he gave his ex-wife £510. If Haram con¬
sidered these payments inadequate, esoecially in view of her
former husband's large income, she never complained of this,
at least net openly. Instead she helped her separated mother
cultivate in the rainy season, and worked in the Gezira during
the cotton-picking season.
Several marriages in Abu Haraz are clearly strained, and if
such constraints as I have discussed did not exist, thev would
most likely end in a clear-cut divorce. However, the partners
involved wish to avoid or delay such an outcome; the wives
know they would be deprived of the main bread-winner; the
men would effectively be deprived of a home-base, and would
have to save up for the exoenditure of a new marriage; the
various relatives concerned know that greater obligations will
fall on them if the marriage is finally dissolved. In these con¬
ditions, where marriages are strained different outcomes are
possible. In one marriage the husband resorted to a bachelor
life-style in Khartoum where he worked as a tailor. Apart from
token remittances he ignored his wife and two children and 1
never saw him in Abu Haraz. It was rumoured that he had
taken up heavy drinking. This behavioural pattern was also
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adopted by at least two divorced men. For they rejected the
sacrifices entailed in paying alimony and saving up for a new
marriage; instead they adopted a life-style of immediate gratifi¬
cation, including indulgences normally regarded as wasteful.
This manner of avoiding the pressures and obligations of marr¬
iage was also adopted by a few renegade bachelors* In an¬
other case, the husband, another tailor in Khartoum, worked
all the more assiduously in order to save up sufficient money
so as to contract another marriage. These last few marriages
that I have mentioned were between first cousins. So it is rele¬
vant here to turn to the discussion as to whether close marr¬
iages are more or less stable than other marriages.
Some writers suggest that there are strong family pressures to
preserve close marriages; this follows from the functionalist
assumption that close marriages, and particularly FBD marr¬
iages, serve to strengthen the solidarity of lineage members
and to preserve property within the lineage; others have sugg¬
ested that since close marriages tend to be arranged matches,
reflecting more the interests of the wider kinship group and
less the personal disposition of the individual partners, such
marriages are often strained and thus liable to end in divorce.
From Sudanese ethnography, for example, Cunnison shows that
among the Baggara Arabs first marriages, which comprise a
high proportion of close marriages, frequently end in divorce
and in the subsequent remarriage of both partners to more dis¬
tant or non-related persons.1 However, it should be pointed out
that all Baggara marriages are marked by a high level of in¬
stability. On the other hand, Barclay (1964) shows from his
data on marriages in Buuri that there is no correlation between
FBD marriages and a high frequency of divorces among such
marriages; in fact his data show that divorces are relatively
more frequent among marriages between non-relatives (p. 125).
1. I.Cunnison: The Baggara Arabs: Power and Lineage in a Sudanese Noaiad Tribe.
Oxford, 1966. See Chapter 6.
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The comparison of such material shows the weakness of attempt¬
ing to draw conclusions about marriage stability if marriage
patterns are isolated from other social and economic factors.
My own data are similar to Barclay's, though showing a more
marked tendency towards divorces in marriages between non-
relatives. In Buuri 52% of all marriages were between non-
relatives, and 67% of all divorces occurred within this categ¬
ory. In Abu Haraz and Kumur 32% of all marriages were be¬
tween non-relatives, and 59% of all divorces occurred within
this category. Most of the marriages between non-relatives that
ended in divorce were not between fellow villagers, but be¬
tween partners from different villages (13 out of 19). I have
already mentioned factors which discourage divorces between
fellow villagers, particularly related persons living in close
proximity. Barclay mentions that in some instances the wife,
if she is divorced, may move out of the house she has been
occupying, at least to a different part of the compound. But
I found no cases of this happening in Abu Haraz. Since the
husband is not supposed to have any contact with his divorced
wife, he faces considerable restrictions on his freedom of move¬
ment and space, if their respective families live in immediate
proximity and if the divorced couple's home is situated in the
same compound as these. Remarriage of either or both partners
relieves this problem, but as 1 will argue now, the likelihood
of remarriage, particularly for women, appears to have de¬
clined.
In general it can be postulated that the conditions affecting
the contracting of a first marriage influence strongly the like¬
lihood of subsequent marriages. That is, if first marriages are
relatively easily facilitated, there is equally little difficulty
in arranging a remarriage if the first one is somehow termin¬
ated. Obversely, if considerable time and expenditure is re-
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quired in getting married, the probability of subsequent re¬
marriages is much reduced. The tendency in Kumur and partic¬
ularly Abu Haraz is towards the latter pattern.
We have already considered the question of men's remarriage
after divorce, in the cases of several migrants with regular em¬
ployment. There is no evidence to suggest that among the older
generation divorce placed any serious constraint on the hus¬
band's prospects of remarrying. In most cases there would
have been strong pressures on the man to remarry, since a
wife was an essential component of the traditional productive
unit. Traditionally there were no forms of payment to the ex-
wife, such as are today provided through alimony. Women were
themselves more productive and thus more self-reliant, require¬
ments for subsistence and for raising children were much simp¬
ler, and in any case most women would be expected to re¬
marry. The main responsibility of the ex-husband to his child¬
ren was in meeting extraordinary expenditure incurred at part¬
icular events in their life-cycle, notably circumcision and marr¬
iage. For example, Yusuf Hamad, from Abu Haraz al Wastani,
who had done little else to support his two sons from his di¬
vorced wife in Abu Haraz al Warrant, provided them with a
very lavish party on the occasion of their circumcision. More¬
over, the older generation were not constrained from remarrying
by heavy marriage costs. Today both of these factors, financial
support for the ex-wife and her children, and the increased
costs of marriage serve at least to delay the remarriage of a
man following divorce. In some cases, as we have noticed, the
divorced man may revert permanently to a single status and
seek his sexual gratification in extra-marital affairs.
Widowers are more likely to remarry, especially if they are
left with young children requiring care. In these cases the new
wife is brought to live at the widower's home, and she assumes
the role of the deceased wife. In one case in Abu Haraz the
wife of a feki died and he then married her sister; however,
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this does not appear to have been a common practice. In a few
cases the widower's children are brought up by close relatives,
as they would have been if both parents had died. For ex¬
ample, Hon, the mother of four children and the wife of Bash-
ir, a migrant worker, died giving birth to a fifth child. Her
family was of slave origin and was still strongly attached to
the household of Sheikh Abu 'Agla, who assumed overall resp¬
onsibility for them. Following his wife's death Bashir came
occasionally to Abu Haraz to visit his children. It was rum¬
oured that he remarried in Khartoum, but he kept this house¬
hold quite separate from that of his children in Abu Haraz.
Some old men who outlive their wives do not remarry, espec¬
ially if they have adult children living nearby with whom they
can eat. On the other hand sometimes widowers form companion¬
ate relationships with widows, merging to form a single house¬
hold from two fragmented groups. In neither Abu Haraz nor Ku-
mur was there any middle-aged or elderly men who had never
married. Nor for that matter were there any spinsters in either
village, though there were an increasing number of women in
their late twenties still unmarried.
The present day chances for remarriage by women are not
great. 322 women from the two villages studied have been in¬
volved in 343 marriages; 251 of these marriages were still ex¬
tant. 66 marriages ended in widowhood, and 26 in divorce. How¬
ever, there are currently 51 widows and 20 divorced women,
which shows that only a small proportion of terminated marr¬
iages have been followed by the remarriage of the woman con¬
cerned. Given the disparate age at marriage between men and
women, there are always likely to be more widows than wid¬
owers. There has been little change in the situation of widows
whose children are already adult; it is unusual for these wid¬
ows to remarry. Normally they attach themselves to the house¬
hold of one of their married children. If, as is common, they
have a number of married children, their position is all the
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easier. What was more prevalent in the past, and appears to
have become less common is the remarriage of widows still of
child-bearing age. My data reveals that women of the older gen¬
eration almost invariably remarried if their first marriages
were terminated at an early age. Informants told me that it
was the custom for the brother of the deceased husband to
marry the widow, if she was of child-bearing age. I recorded
only one instance of this happening, and this involved a wo¬
man now in her late 50s. This woman, though resident in Abu
Haraz, was originally from Gara, a small village east of
Kumur. She had married a non-relative from Gara, and had
borne him three children, two sons and a girl. When her hus¬
band died, she married his brother, by whom she had a daugh¬
ter. This daughter (who takes the name of this brother as her
father) and her two half-brothers have all married in Abu
Haraz; the other daughter, by the original marriage, has marr¬
ied a cousin (FZS) in Gara. The practice of widow inheritance
may have been more common in the past. Culwick (n.d.) men¬
tions a case in the Gezira where a woman, who had received
a tenancy from her deceased husband, married his brother,
also the holder of a tenancy. Admittedly this was the only case
where this had happened among 22 women tenants, of whom 13
were widows. Brausch (1964) mentions that dual households com¬
prised a number of "inherited widows" as well as polygamous
marriages. He does not specify in how many cases of widowhood
the woman is remarried in this way; he merely says that in
some cases the widow is formally married, whereas in others
the brother of the deceased husband takes responsibility for
the widow and her children without actually marrying her.
These cases of widow inheritance in the Gezira afford further
evidence that traditional marriage practices have been main¬
tained further there owing to the system of tenancies than in
areas where families no longer rely primarily on traditional
patrimonial resources. It did not seem that the woman in Abu
Haraz had inherited any significant patrimony, whether of live¬
stock or valued rainland. One of her sons is a painter, and
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the other a caretaker in the girls' school in Abu Haraz.
The extent to which widows were 'inherited' by the deceased
husband's brother in the past is largely open to speculation.
Possibly it never amounted to more than a recourse of action
which the widow could avail herself of if she wanted. At least
if the koranic injunction was followed, the widow could not be
remarried against her will. But it seems clear that whatever
was the force of this 'normative' pattern in the past it has be¬
come far less significant today. This view is supported by the
fact that Brausch notes that in some cases the brother of the
deceased husband assumes responsibility for the widow, rather
than marrying her; and no doubt this responsibility varies in
extent. When I spoke to widov/s and I raised the question of
remarriage, very few expressed either the desire or the likeli¬
hood that they would remarry. The same responses occurred
when they replied to a questionnaire which was addressed to
them by a female assistant of mine from Abu Haraz. Nor even
did widows tend to make any special reference to the brother
of the deceased husband; if they received any tangible support
from this source, then they generally failed to acknowledge
that this was the case. When asked directly if they had had
the opportunity of marrying the deceased husband's brother,
the reply was invariably negative; they generally pointed out
that the brothers of the deceased husband were already married
and had children, thus implying that they had sufficient resp¬
onsibilities of their own. In some cases one at least of the bro¬
thers was not married, but this did not alter the general view
that the widow did not expect to marry into her former hus¬
band's family. In the cases where widows had been married to
cousins, the question of this form of remarriage was not taken
very seriously; for if he is already a close kinsman, the bro¬
ther of the deceased husband has in any case a strong obligat¬
ion to support the widow.
Widows, and to a lesser extent divorced women, also stressed
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that if they had children, especially sons, they should not
think of remarrying. This statement bears the implication that
the children, on growing to maturity, will support the single
mother. But I would suggest that it also has the implication
that, though her marriage has been terminated by the death of
her husband, it still has a binding force on her. This, I
would argue, is because it is marriage that endows the woman
with all, or nearly all that she has, from the house that she
lives in to the clothes she wears. The binding nature of marr¬
iage ties, persisting after the death of the husband, appears
to be particularly marked in cases where women are non¬
productive, and where achieved property counts for more than
inherited property. These conditions are present in Abu Haraz.
There are 71 single adult women, that is widows and divorced
women, in Abu Haraz and Kumur. 25 of these are still of child-
bearing age, and half of these have been single for five years
or more. Only three widov.rs, all in Kumur, and three divorced
women in this age group (under 45) have remarried. While the
sample is small, it does seem to indicate a low frequency of
remarriage.
There must, of course, be reservations about comparing data
from different surveys, since there may be differences in the
social composition of the sample collected, and also there may
be differences in the way the information has been collected.
But, with these reservations in mind, 1 wish to compare my
findings on the number of marriages contracted by women in
Abu Haraz and Kumur with similar data from the Gezira. Cul-
wick (n.d.) records 240 ever-married women having contracted
a total of 298 marriages (124 per 100 women). Henin's survey,
a decade later in the early 1960s records 1052 women contract¬
ing a total of 1205 marriages (115 per 100 women). My figures
show that 322 ever-married women contracted a total of 343
marriages (107 marriages per 100 women). It is tempting to
suggest from these figures, given the different periods when
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they were conducted, that they represent a steady decline in
the number of marriages contracted by women, and thus an in¬
crease in marriage stability. I have already suggested, how¬
ever, both in relation to age at marriage and remarriage of wi¬
dows, that marriage patterns in the Gezira may differ somewhat
from areas where the significance of the inherited patrimony is
sharply declining, as it is in Abu Haraz. However the two sets
of figures from the Gezira do suggest a drop in the number of
marriages by women. If this is so, I would associate this
trend with the same factors as 1 have discussed here - the in¬
creased costs of marriage, fewer divorces, less frequent re¬
marriage of both widows and divorcees, and the factor 1 come
to now - the decline in polygamous marriages.
The frequency of remarriage of women must be seen in conjunc¬
tion with the prevalence of polygamous marriages, since polyg¬
amous marriages often draw from the pool of divorced and wid¬
owed women. (Henin, p.248). There are several indications that
the frequency of polygamous marriages has declined among both
the population of Abu Haraz and Xumur. Table 7 contrasts the
number of marriages contracted by men over 50 with the number
of marriages contracted by the deceased men of the preceding
generation. I have not distinguished between serial and poly¬
gamous marriages, since it was difficult to do so especially for
the deceased generation. Religious families were excluded from
the samples, as 1 will show shortly that there is even more con¬
vincing evidence that the number of polygamous marriages con¬
tracted by their members has declined significantly. The main
occupation of those included in the samples was rainland farm¬
ing; some of the men in Abu Haraz also worked in the riverain
gardens (sagia) when they were still operative, while most of
the men in Kumur combined rainland farming with animal hus¬
bandry. Although the samples are small, they do suggest a de¬
cline in the number of marriages contracted by men in the
course of their life-cycle; a significant proportion of these
marriages would have been polygamous marriages.
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TABLE 6
Number of marriages contracted by men and women in Gezira
and Blue Nile Provinces, as recorded in various social surveys
MEN WOMEN
(per 100 ever- (per 100 ever-







III Buuri, 31ue Nile
Barclay, 1959-60
138 not available
IV Abu Haraz & Xumur
1978
117 107




As befitted their important role in society, the households of
holymen were much larger in the past than they are today.
Their households included a varying number of followers who
lived permanently with their religious teachers, as well as pup¬
ils who were housed and fed for the duration of their studies.
In some cases they also included slaves who assisted \*ith the
domestic duties and helped in the tasks of cultivation. The fam¬
ilies of these holymen were also large, since they often had
more than one wife. Sometimes these women were widows or di¬
vorced women whom, by marrying, the holyman extended a mea¬
sure of security to. By marrying from different villages and
different tribal groups, these holymen created wide-ranging
ties, which served to attract supporters from diverse groups.
Today, since the role of the religious families is much more de¬
limited, their household organisation and marriage patterns
have changed accordingly. Most of the religious families have
dispersed the slaves who were retained in their households.
Those holymen who still derive a major oart of their livelihood
from the special services they provide no longer attract new re¬
tainers and supporters who attach themselves to their house¬
holds. Those non-relatives attached to their households are in¬
variably the second or third generation of clients who were
once drawn to these religious families. Today only two holymen
in Abu Haraz have more than one wife: feki Yusuf el Eleish
has two wives, one in Abu Haraz, and one in Klran, a village
north-east of Kumur; feki ldris also has one wife in Abu Har¬
az, and one in Urnm Tartara, a village on the eastern bound¬
ary of the rainlands some fifteen miles away. The Imam of the
mosque also has two wives, one from each of the two main
quarters of Abu Haraz al Warrant, viz. fariq al Arakiyin and
farlq al Dongolawi. But all the other religious teachers and
descendents of religious families are monogamouslv married.
This contrasts with the earlier generation of holymen. Sheikh
el Eleish had two wives, one in Abu Haraz, and one in Kumur.
Sheikh Hamad al-Nil Abdelbagi had four wives and a total of
twenty-seven children in Abu Haraz and Taiba. Feki Ahmed had
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TABLE 7
Humber of marriages contracted by men over 50 and by
preceding, deceased generation In Abu Haraz and KumurfT i i ,ii . iip ■■ ii i i ii i ■ ■ ii i Wi jii ■ mm i ii, ■ ■■■ ■ ■ i i. in ■ i i i« ■ i up i i ii ■ ii
ABU HARAZ
Sample No. of No. of marriages
marriages per 100 men
Men over 50 25 32 128
Preceding generation 24 36 150
KUMUR
Sample No. of No. of marriages
marriages per 100 men
Men over 50 16 24 150
Preceding generation 12 21 175
Notes
1. Religious families were excluded from the above samples.
The main occupation of most of those included in these samples
v/as rainland farming combined with animal herding.
2. The Kumur sample includes some relatives and forebears
living in the adjacent settlement of Masara and in Taif.
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three wives, one in Abu Haraz, and two in Manasir in the
Gezira. Ahmed al feki Sheikh had four wives, one in each of
the two villages of Abu Haraz, one in Kumur and one in Ros-
eires. The recently deceased khalifa of the Arakiyin in Abu
Haraz al Wastani married at different times nine wives.
We may now consider the other people who are polyg&mously
married at the present time. It will be noted that they tend to
be from the same groups among whom divorces feature more pro¬
minently, i.e. farmers and traders operating in the locality or
in the frontier zones. Taking Abu Haraz first, there are two
farmers who have farming interests both on the east bank and
in the Gezira. Hasan Mabarak has a tenancy in Nuweila, and
he also has a large herd of goats which he takes to the east
bank in the rainy season. His first wife is from Nuweila, but
he recently married the divorced daughter of Mai Mahgoub in
Abu Haraz. The latter, a rainland farmer, has a second wife
in Medina al Arab in the Gezira. Another farmer has contracted
a total of four marriages during the course of his life-time;
two of these marriages are still extant, one in Abu Haraz, and
one in Gara near the rainlands which he cultivates. Another
farmer, who used to keep livestock in the past, has also had
four wives of whom two still live with him in Abu Haraz. This
was the only case where two co-wives lived in close proximity
to each other, though it may be noted that only one of the wo¬
men has borne children. We have already noted certain traders
operating in Poseires and Damezeen who have taken additional
wives in these places. Only two men employed in modern ser¬
vices have contracted polygamous marriages, and both their
lives have been marked by frequent changes of residence in the
course of their work. Ma'ruf Tireifi claimed to have married
women from Khartoum, Dongola. Rufa'a and Tambool during his
active career as a painter before being blinded in an indust¬
rial accident. Mohammed Yusuf, a driver, married at different
times women from Khartoum, Port Sudan, Singa, Shendi and Abu
Haraz, though all but the latter two are now divorced. Both
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these men are now advancing in years, ssJ** no longer
employed.
By contrast, none of the growing number of migrants working
in the towns or employed elsewhere by government ministries
are polygamously married, apart from one young merchant in
Khartoum. This man had been married to a girl in Abu Haraz
for about six years when he unexpectedly announced that he
was to marry a cousin (FBD) from a nearby village in the
Gezira. This engagement was greeted with considerable sur¬
prise, since his first marriage was considered a successful one
and the new bride was rumoured not to be very pretty. Just be¬
fore my departure, a tailor in Khartoum, whose existing marr¬
iage to his MBD was clearly strained, announced he was going
to marry another girl from Abu Haraz. Two shop-keepers resid¬
ing in Abu Haraz married second wives during my stay. One
of them attracted considerable criticism because he had daugh¬
ters of an eligible age whose welfare, it was argued, he
should have secured by seeking to arrange their marriage rath¬
er than his own. Moreover, he went ahead with his own second
marriage at a time of bereavement involving the bride's fam¬
ily. Some criticism was also made of another man who was poly¬
gamously married. This concerned a man who had married a wo¬
man in Abu Haraz and who then went to study in London, and
subsequently set up a business there. During the four years of
his marriage he had spent less than two months with his wife.
During this time he had married a second wife, who was a
more educated girl from Khartoum. Though he supported his
first wife, and on one occasion took her to London, this marr¬
iage was widely recognised, at least by women, as being unsat¬
isfactory for the woman concerned.
If we now turn to Kumur, we may note that there is only one
holyman living in the village today, feki Tom, and he has
only one wife, Zaineb Sheikh el Eleish, There are four men who
are polygamously married, and they have all married into the
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village. One of them is a Ja'ali from Tibeib, who set up a
shop in Kumur. One is a trader from the neighbouring village
of Kiran, and another is a farmer from the Gezira. The fourth
a truck-owner from Taif, contracted the most recent marriage.
He married the daughter of the sheikh el hilla, Hamad al-Nil
Sheikh el Eleish. There is a fifth, if we include the old feki
living in Taif whose two wives from Kumur have voluntarily sep¬
arated from him. None of the men born in Kumur have con¬
tracted polygamous marriages, though most of those whose first
marriages have been terminated have remarried. This contrasts
with a much higher rate of polygamous marriages in previous
generations. For example, five of the eight widows' former hus¬
bands had more than one wife; two of them had two wives, two
had three wives and one had four wives. 1 also recorded a
high proportion of polygamous marriages among the other de¬
ceased forebears of the present families. First and second marr¬
iages were commonly contracted with girls from Kumur or the
adjacent settlement of Masara on the one hand, and from Taif
on the other. Other marriages, however, were contracted in
such places as Taiba, Nuweila and Atara in the Gezira, and
Abu Haraz.
The decline in polygamous marriages in Kumur may be seen in
the context of the decreasing reliance on traditional patrimon¬
ies, particularly herds. As I explained in Chapter 3, the trad¬
itional livelihood of farmers depended on the most effective use
being made of labour and animal resources. This often ex¬
pressed itself in a division of labour between closely-related
families specialising in long-distance herding (Taif) or cultivat¬
ion and local herding of goats (Kumur). Ties were maintained
between the two groups through intermarriages and frequent
polygamous marriages which facilitated the most effective use
of both resources. These ties have been weakened by the kind
of pressures outlined in the first chapters, and the ensuing
cash orientation of individual households.
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The greater diversity of economic interests in Abu Haraz is re¬
flected in the contracting of more polygamous marriages there
than in Kumur, though the frequency of such marriages is prob¬
ably much less than what it used to be. As I have noted, poly¬
gamous marriages are rarely contracted by migrant workers,
who form the largest occupational category. They are mostly
carried out by farmers who have interests in the Gezira as
well as on the east bank, and by local shop-keepers or traders
operating in frontier zones. Changes in occupational patterns,
therefore, appear to be associated with the trend towards mono¬
gamous marriages. The greater durability of first marriages
affects the frequency of polygamous marriages in two ways.
First, the binding nature of these marriages discourages the
formation of other marriages by the husband; and second, the
smaller number of widows and divorced women reduces the pool
of women from which many polygamous marriages are drawn.
In general, the findings concerning marriage patterns that I
have recounted in this chapter accord with those of Henin
(1969). The arguments I have put forward, supported by statist¬
ical evidence wherever possible, suggest trends towards lower
rates of marriage instability, remarriage and polygamy. The
main point of difference in our findings concerns age at marr¬
iage. I suggested that there may be a lower age at marriage
in the Gezira owing to the income deriving from tenancies. But
I also suggested that there may well have been an up-turn in
the age at marriage since the time of Benin's study, as a res¬
ult of the increased costs of marriage, the spread of education¬
al facilities, and the increasing importance of non-tenancy
incomes.
Henin attributes these trends in marriage patterns to the condit¬
ions brought about by settlement, and to improvements in per
capita income. He argues that settlement makes it possible "for
the laws of Islam to be adhered to" (p.255)> while, in con¬
trast, nomadic life entails greater freedom between the sexes,
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and consequently a more fluid pattern of marriage formation.
I would wish to elaborate this position by stressing the import¬
ance of provision for women under conditions of socio-economic
differentiation where a large number of women are withdrawn
from subsistence activities. The concern to provide for women
has been expressed in the intensification of marriage payments
and the establishment of a conjugal fund, rather than in any
change in the system of inheritance of property. Adherence to
the precepts of Islam legitimates and enhances the provision
for women in these terms; by emphasising the respective duties
of the spouses, it also serves to reinforce the binding nature
of marriage ties. And, as I have tried to show in this chap¬
ter, the material and ideological investment in marriages has
been reflected in the various trends in marriage stability that




In this conclusion I wish first to summarise my research find¬
ings concerning various marriage trends in the Blue Nile rain-
lands, notably the changes in the composition, orientation and
timing of marriage payments, and in the degree of fluidity of
marriages. I will then try to specify among which social
groups these trends are most pronounced. By considering marr¬
iages as strategies pursued by individuals in maintaining and
advancing their material and symbolic interests, 1 will seek to
give account of some of the variations in the trends and patt¬
erns I have been describing. In the second part I will return
to the theme of my introductory chapter and investigate the
grounds for positing a causal relationship between the level of
productive activity, the sexual division of labour, and econom¬
ic differentiation and the domestic patterns I have been con¬
cerned with. In this discussion, while not wishing to retract
from the central importance I have attributed to material fact¬
ors in these changes, I wish to consider here the part played
by 'cultural' or 'ideological' factors in these processes.
First - to summarise my research findings. In Abu Haraz in
particular there has been a tendency towards the elaboration
and increase in size of marriage payments. This has occurred
in spite of attempts to maintain a degree of homogeneity con¬
cerning marriage payments and wedding ceremonies. The att¬
empts to impose limitations on marriage expenditure incurred
in intra-village marriages were, I suggested, themselves indic¬
ative of the underlying tendency towards differential expendit¬
ure at marriage. Moreover the kora arrangement provided loop¬
holes for differential expenditure to continue and to develop by
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allowing additional payments to occur one week after the wedd¬
ing, and by largely ignoring other gifts in kind so long as
they were not publicly exchanged or displayed during the wedd¬
ing, The amount of mahr has increased both in kora marriages
- from £S25 to £S100 - and in non-kora marriages generally by
a larger amount. Greater expenditure is incurred in providing
a home for the newly married couple, and this is more likely
to be met by the bridegroom than was the case in the past.
Other payments include the provision of new items of furniture
and household equipment, the provision of a variety of food¬
stuffs, and extensive gifts to the bride, comprising a wardrobe
of clothes, perfumes and numerous other personal effects. Rel¬
ated to the more varied composition of goods transacted at marr¬
iage, changes have also occurred in the orientation of these
goods. While certainly a large proportion of the payments are
for the purpose of providing for, furnishing and equipping the
newly married couple's home, a substantial share is for endow¬
ing the bride. This endowment consists primarily of the clothes
and other items given to her by the bridegroom, but it is supp¬
lemented in wealthy marriages by gifts of gold jewelry from
her own family. Moreover, I argued that since generally the
home and its contents become effectively the property of the
wife in the event of the marriage being dissolved, the expendi¬
ture entailed at marriage in establishing a new home may in
a sense be seen as contributing to the endowment of the bride.
In non-kora marriages there has been considerable ceremonial
elaboration, with lavish festivities lasting several days in
some cases. This includes the incorporation and elaboration of
old marriage customs, such as the bridal dance and the cutting
of the rahat, as well as the introduction of new customs, such
as the modern coiffure of the bride, the photographing of the
couple in their formal attire, and innovations in music, popul¬
ar songs and dancing. Finally there is the introduction of the
honeymoon, which is becoming increasingly common. Contribut¬
ions made by guests, the occasion of which forms part of these
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ceremonial procedures, serve to offset part of the expenditure
incurred at these festivities and events. The system of reciproc¬
al contributions also underlines, 1 argued, the differential
status of participants in their capacity both as contributors
and beneficients. In so far as kora marriages discourage ex¬
penditure on such lavish entertainment and festivities, they per¬
mit the allocation of financial resources to the main payments
concerning the establishing of the new home and the endowment
of the bride considered above.
Changes were also noted in the timing of marriage payments in
relation to the formation of new domestic groups within the dev¬
elopmental cycle. Formerly, when traditional patrimonies were
the basic productive resource, new domestic groups emerged as
a gradual process, establishing their viability and independ¬
ence as they came to fulfil various productive, reproductive
and social conditions; marriage itself did not establish the via¬
bility of the emergent household, but rather constituted only
a preliminary condition or formative stage within that process.
With the spread of new occupational patterns entailing wage
labour and provision of market services, accumulation of sav¬
ings tends to take place prior to marriage and indeed as a
crucial condition of marriage. Correlated with this is the tend¬
ency towards the delayed age at marriage. At the same time
that marriages tend to be delayed, new households formed at
marriage tend to budget separately for their consumption needs.
Long engagements during which savings are accumulated so as
to prepare for the increased costs of marriage have thus tended
to replace earlier marriages often facilitated by resources from
the family patrimony, followed by a varying length of time dur¬
ing which the spouses remained effectively members of their
respective parental families.
The increased expenditure at marriage supports the existence
of a conjugal fund established at marriage. The conjugal fund
may comprise productive property in the form of rainlands
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transmitted to the son from the family patrimony. But more
commonly today the conjugal fund consists of the fruits of ach¬
ieved property, namely the home and its contents together with
the gifts bestowed on the bride. These goods and assets are
added to during the course of the marriage, as that proportion
of money income over and above immediate consumption needs
is converted into durable consumer goods and directed towards
the enlargement of the home and the improvement of its facilit¬
ies. An example of this channeling of family income to the con¬
jugal fund is provided by the women's savings groups which
appropriate a small part of the husband's or son's income in
order to augment the woman's collection of enamel bowls, china
and glass (Jidda), or to provide other items for the home.
The increased significance of the conjugal fund for women and
particularly the endowment of the bride is alluded to, I sugg¬
ested, in the change in the manner in which the marriage pay¬
ment is handed over. Formerly a male public transaction occurr¬
ing at the time of the marriage contract, today in Abu Haraz
it is a relatively informal event performed and witnessed by
women; usually it coincides with the inspection of the bride's
trousseau by the female guests. Several aspects of the elaborat¬
ion of wedding ceremonial point to the newly placed emphasis
on the conjugal aspect of the union. Examples of such innovat¬
ions are the photographs of the couple, their sitting together
at the wedding festivities while the guests come and congratul¬
ate them, and, of course, the honeymoon.
The greater emphasis, both material and ideological, placed on
marriage, and particularly its conjugal aspect as opposed to
the link it provides between two groups of kin, has been con¬
ducive to marriage becoming a less soluble tie. I have attempt¬
ed to show that the frequency of divorces, remarriages and
plural marriages has declined. I argued that the evidence for
such trends would be stronger had it not been for the diff¬
iculty of recording terminated marriages in the past, especially
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those which resulted in no offspring and those contracted with
persons outside the locality. Both Abu Haraz and Kumur re¬
vealed similar trends, though it appeared that women in Kumur
were more inclined to initiate separations that women in Abu
Haraz. 1 suggested this disparity was attributable to the more
productive role of women in Kumur, where, if need be, women
are able to support themselves, allbeit with difficulty. In Abu
Haraz divorced and widowed women tend to be reincorporated
within their families of origin or rely on wage-earning sons,
depending on their age at the termination of their marriages.
A substantial proportion of women still of child-bearing age
had not remarried five years after the termination of their
marriages. Only one widow was recorded as having remarried
the brother of her deceased husband, though in the past this
practice was probably more widespread. In Kumur the remarr¬
iage of divorced women and young widows seemed to be relat¬
ively more common. In Abu Haraz the economic dependence of
women, the prospect of paying alimony in the case of regular
wage-earners and the heavy expenditure entailed in remarrying
combined to deter either spouse from readily seeking a divorce
even in marriages which showed signs of tension. Several men
who had divorced their wives reverted to a bachelor life-style,
and seemed uninclined to remarry. Some farmers, traders and
local shop-keepers still contract polygamous marriages. But
plural marriages are very uncommon among the migrants, wheth¬
er they are workers, professional employees or merchants in the
large towns.
No strong correlation was established between stability of
marriage and closeness of marriages, i.e. marriages between
cousins or other close relatives. Marriages between non-related
fellow villagers tend to be as stable as marriages between
closely related partners. It is true that marriages with non-
villagers, whether male or female, tend to be slightly less
stable. Moreover, since more marriages were contracted by past
generations, it is likely that a large proportion of those addit-
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ional marriages were between non-related persons and from diff¬
erent villages. The relatively fewer marriages contracted by
living members to non-villagers is a factor that must be taken
into consideration, but it is not a determinant of the greater
stability of marriages.^ Rather the fact that fewer marriages
are contracted today suggests that the range of strategies for
social reproduction has become more delimited.
This leads me to the question of marriage choices and the role
of marriage and kinship strategies in the system of social re¬
production. Following Bourdieu's reanalysis of Middle East kin¬
ship patterns, I would argue that the continuing frequency of
close marriages does not imply that the villagers are intent on
following a prescriptive rule or normative practice.1 Rather I
would seek to interpret such choices in the context of the pract¬
ical concerns which individuals have to utilize existing social
relations in furthering their material and symbolic interests.
Thus I would interpret the fact that the proportion of close
marriages has been maintained, if it has not increased, in the
light of the changes which delimit the range of kin and non-
kin with whom individuals retain real connexions.
Given the shift in occupational patterns extensive personal ties
with distant kin or members of other villages are not sought
on the same scale as formerly. Wider contacts are no longer re¬
quired in order to gain access to lands or pastures or in order
to facilitate labour recruitment strategies. For migrants these
considerations have no relevance. In the case of rainland farm¬
ers, the most important requirement for labour recruitment is
the availability of cash; the problem of finding labourers is
clearly secondary. The number of farmers in Abu Haraz who
keep animals is now very small; they generally herd them in
the vicinity of the village, except in the rainy season when
1. P. Bourdieu: Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge, 1977. See Chapter 1,
Case Study: parallel cousin aarriage.
- 231 -
the larger herd-owners hire non-related herdsmen. This is un¬
like the situation in Kumur where a number of families main¬
tain links with both close and distant relatives living in Taif
so that labour and animal resources may be most effectively
combined. Though even here we found the range of cooperative
ties narrowing with each family tending to rely on its own re¬
sources. Marriage strategies thus vary according to the range
of personal contacts and social connexions which have a prac¬
tical use. An example of marriage strategies fluctuating accord¬
ing to these criteria is provided by the original northern sett¬
lers in Abu Haraz. In the first generation most marriages took
the form of alliances with members of the Arakiyin or with
other northern settlers in neighbouring villages. For in this
period these settlers needed to gain access to land for cultivat¬
ion and pasture, and generally to obtain a foothold in the
area. In the next generation, while some members pursued sim¬
ilar alliances, a large number contracted first cousin marr¬
iages since this was the time when many of them were busily
engaged in developing the first sagias - a task which required
intensive cooperation.
Abbas provides illustrative material of a similar trend in marr¬
iage strategies among the White Nile Arabs.1 He analyses the
transformation in these peoples lives, from a predominantly pas¬
toral livelihood which entailed the utilization of connexions be¬
tween wide-ranging groups of patrilineal kin, to a sedentary
life based on commodity production in which these former wide
ties no longer had any value. Marriage choices had become
narrower in range, and, reflecting this, the proportion of marr¬
iages to first cousins as opposed to more distant relatives, had
increased.
In the case of migrants from Abu Haraz, they rely to a vary-
1. Ahmed Mohammad Abbas: Political leadership among two arabic-speaking Sudanese
tribes - the Hassaniya and Hussaynat. Ph.O. London School of Economics, 1972.
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ing extent on practical connexions with close kin and fellow mi¬
grants from the village. In the problems of finding accommodat¬
ion and employment help is often sought from close kin; at
least this is so in Khartoum where a large number of the mig¬
rants from Abu Haraz are employed in related services. For ex¬
ample, it is not uncommon to find that a shop-owner, his shop-
assistants and a tailor working in the entrance to the shop are
all related, and that two or more of them share the same
rented accommodation. Migrants working outside the towns, such
as those employed in the Gezira Scheme, may not share the
same kind of close contact with kin or fellow villagers. But on
the other hand the isolated nature of much of their work, such
as irrigation control, does not encourage intensive social in¬
volvement with other workers. In general, the work and leisure
activities of migrants do not lead to personal relationships
with non-kin or non-villagers, which have a practical value.
Since in these cases the range of practical kin and other soc¬
ial contacts is narrow, marriage choices become more delimited,
and consequently marriages between close kin and fellow villag¬
ers are frequently arranged.
These close marriages do not necessarily imply that the preser¬
vation of property is the dominant factor in bringing about
these matches. In terms of heritable property of value there
may be little at stake to preserve, as is the case with many
migrant families. Rather, the persistence of close marriages de¬
notes the importance of actual kinship connexions, similarities
of life-style and outlook, familiarity and sometimes friendship,
and the experience of mutual assistance in everyday problems.
Even where economic differentiation has taken place between
close kin, a weaker family may manage to effect an alliance
with a stronger related family through an advantage deriving
from a sexual imbalance in the latter family, or through the
strong ties which exist between the women of the two families.
In everyday relationships little distinction is made between pat-
rilateral an(j matrilateral relatives, many of whom in any
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case overlap. Only in those families which have a material and
symbolic patrimony to preserve, such as in the case of the
Arakiyin core families, may we speak properly of a patrilineal
ideology. Most marriages with close relatives, and particularly
with the patrilateral parallel cousin, are not the realisation
of a normative preference, but the result of the mobilisation of
actual kinship ties which have some practical value; the fact
that such marriages conform to the official representation of
marriage practices confers social approval and prestige on a
marriage strategy, which otherwise often amounts to the safest,
weakest resort.1 Bourdieu calls FBD marriage the poor man's
prestige marriage, when it involves making virtue of necessity
(p.46). Many of the close marriages, and particularly FBD
marriages in Abu Haraz and, to a lesser extent, Kumur, are
little more than a forced choice, but which the actors pass off
as a positive choice. For since the range of kin and non-kin
with whom they have real connexions has become narrowed, the
'right' to marry a cousin involves more often a duty to marry
a girl for whom no alternative husband can be found.
Several examples of FBD marriages being a forced choice are
provided by the marriages of daughters of widows to their
FBS,s. Since these male cousins have in any case the obligat¬
ion to help support these widows' families by virtue of their
close kinship, by providing for them through marriage they are
in effect meeting two sets of obligations at the same time; how¬
ever, since it is a FBD marriage, the ordinary circumstances
behind the marriage are deflected by virtue of its acceptable,
'official' presentation. For example, Batul 'AH, a widow, was
originally from another village on the east bank, but no longer
maintained strong connexions with her own relatives. When her
husband in Abu Haraz, an irrigation controller in the Ge-
zira, died, she was left with four daughters and a son to supp-
1. For Bourdieu's discussion of 'official* kinship as opposed to 'practical' kin¬
ship, and of 'ordinary' and '*xtra-ordinary' marriages, see op.cit., pp. 33-58.
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ort. The children of one of the deceased husband's brothers
v/ere already married, but two sons of another brother became
engaged to marry two of Batul's daughters. As migrant workers
in Khartoum, they sent remittances both to assist their father,
a rainland. farmer and vegetable seller, and the widow's fam¬
ily. Quite possibly the arranging of such marriages has taken
the place of the marriage of widows to the deceased husband's
brother.
I wish now to depict certain characteristics of marriage patt¬
erns of particular social groups among the population studied
in the light of the previous discussion. Of course, the social
groups 1 refer to are not static; considerable mobility takes
place between them. But they do provide some indication of the
variation in marriage patterns. First, let us take the religious
core families. Today most of these are involved in transforming
their reliance on traditional patrimonies into modern forms of
business and employment. A small number, however, are still
religious teachers, dispensing services in the traditional man¬
ner to their supplicants and followers. These practising fekis
frequently contract polygamous marriages, though not as many
as in the past; often they marry unrelated commoners, and
even persons of slave descent. Their life-style is generally a
fairly ascetic one, and so their homes are traditionally furn¬
ished, and their consumption patterns modest. By contrast those
members of the religious core families who are engaged in sec¬
ular occupations tend to contract close marriages which are
monogamous. Owing to the frequency of polygamous marriages
in preceding generations, and the large number of offspring
ensuing from them, there is generally a wide range of close
kin who are eligible as marriage partners. Their weddings are
important occasions marked by extensive celebrations and festiv¬
ities. They frequently involve cousins living in different vill¬
ages (e.g. Abu Haraz, Taiba, Kumur), and so they are not sub¬
ject to the kora restrictions. Age at marriage tends to be late,
since, in spite of their families' resources, there are many
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demands on their income; moreover, since each wedding is such
a big affair, they require a lot of preparation. Many of the
close marriages between members of religious families constitute
positive strategies aimed at preserving the material and symbol¬
ic patrimony of the families concerned. However, the extent to
which these marriage choices are voluntary or forced varies;
in some cases, even among these relatively privileged families,
a close marriage represents a safe, if not weak choice, which
nonetheless confers prestige on the parties concerned since it
masks behind the 'official* representation of kinship. For ex¬
ample, a family with several daughters, for whom other hus¬
bands cannot easily be found, may welcome their marriage into
a closely related family, even though the latter is relatively
impoverished. These 'ordinary* marriages can be counterposed
to the 'extraordinary' marriages which some religious families
arrange with unrelated families which have high economic or
political standing.
Turning to the class of merchants, we have already noted var¬
iations in marriage patterns between those traders who operate
in the villages of the east bank and in the frontier market
towns, and those whose operations are based in the large towns
of Wad Medani and Khartoum. Several of the former are poly-
gamously married, while I recorded no instance of merchants
from Abu Haraz operating in Wad Medani or Khartoum being
polygamously married. Marriages in this social group tend to
be between families, which are unrelated, but of similar econom¬
ic standing, and often from the same village - that is, if we
exclude those polygamous marriages which are most frequently
contracted with non-related persons from other villages or
towns. Consequently many of the leading mercantile families,
originally from Abu Haraz but now living in Khartoum, sre in¬
terrelated through marriage. These marriages, like those of the
religious families, tend to be lavish affairs. Of the various soc¬
ial groups that I discuss here, it is this group that exhibits
the most rigid separation of male and female domains.
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The majority of marriages of migrant workers belong to the
class of 'ordinary' marriages, that is marriages effected within
the range of kinship and neighbourhood ties through which
everyday practical relationships are carried on. The range of
kin with whom practical ties are maintained varies, depending
on migration and occupational patterns, residential patterns
and existing kinship configurations. In view of the lengthy
absences of the menfolk, practical kinship ties are in large
part maintained by women. The majority of these marriages are
with fellow villagers, whether kin or non-kin, and thus subject
to the kora. Thus although some marriages, for example those
between close kin living in different villages, are outwith the
kora, the kora can be seen as providing an institutional frame¬
work for the arrangement of most 'ordinary' marriages. On the
other hand, there has been a tendency, in spite of the kora
agreement, towards the increase in marriage expenditure and
the elaboration of wedding ceremonial even among such 'ordin¬
ary' marriages. This tendency I have related to the growth of
socio-economic differentiation, and the desire to express differ¬
ential life-styles through the establishment of a conjugal fund.
Among these marriages there are those, namely patrilateral
parallel cousin marriages, which, being positively and offic¬
ially marked,1 confer distinction on this class of marriage. How¬
ever, many of these reflect a safe resort, and should be distinguished
from those close cousin marriages, such as among the religious
families, which are based on a positive choice relating to the
maintenance and enhancement of a particular material and sym¬
bolic patrimony. As Bourdieu notes (p.53). women play an im¬
portant part in helping to arrange these 'ordinary' marriages.
This is especially so in the case of marriages of migrant work¬
ers' families. For, though in some cases migrants have extens¬
ive contacts with other migrants from the village at their place
of work, it is the women who more effectively maintain connex¬
ions with a wide range of kin and non-kin, through their
t. Bourdieu, op.cit., p.56.
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everyday contacts and regular patterns of visiting. Against the
relatively mundane background of ties which connect different
families in their everyday activities, young men and women are
able to exert increasing influence in directing marriage choices
along lines of personal preference. This latter tendency may be
a contributive factor to the greater degree of stability of marr¬
iage which I argued has expressed itself in the marriages of
migrant workers in particular.
By contrast rainland farmers tend to contract marriages which
entail less expenditure, take place earlier, and are relatively
less stable; they are also more likely to contract polygamous
marriages. When effective links are maintained with close kin
who are migrants, marriages may be sought with these famil¬
ies. But more commonly marriages are made with the families
of other rainland farmers, whether kin or non-kin. Although
V
strong cooperative links no longer exist between separate farm¬
ing families, marriage ties can nonetheless be useful for the
exchange of relevant information concerning their farming activ¬
ities. These marriage ties between farming families serve to re¬
produce their particular life-styles with their associated consum¬
ption patterns, and these tend to be more conservative than in
those households where the main bread-winner is a migrant.
Similarly casual labourers tend to marry within their own soc¬
ial stratum. Casual labourers in Abu Haraz tend to work within
the confines of the village, and thus they have a fairly limit¬
ed range of eligible partners; those in Kumur work in other vil¬
lages and in the Gezira, and so tend to have a more extensive
range of contacts. As with persons of slave descent, casual
workers who have no family patrimony tend to marry late. More¬
over, of the social groups mentioned they are the most likely
to marry a woman who has been previously married.
The above discussion does not purport to give a summarised
account of the system of kinship and marriage as practised by
different social groups among the population that 1 studied. To
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do so would require discussion of a large body of literature on
Middle Eastern kinship and presentation of data and arguments
from my own researches which would alter the scope and the
objectives of this thesis. Rather 1 am suggesting that variat¬
ions in marriage strategies, just as with the trends and var¬
iations in the other aspects of marriage that 1 have been more
properly concerned with, can be best understood if the system
of marriages is seen as an element in the system of social re¬
production: individuals seek to preserve and enhance their rel¬
ative social position, and hence strategies vary according to
the different practical concerns they have, and the range of
practical relationships and connexions that they possess. Marr¬
iages tend to match like with like, although the system of
marriage payments allows new social positions to be negotiated.
At the same time these payments provide a medium through
which sex roles are defined, and, as we have seen, this gener¬
ally implies a more dependent domestic role for women.
In spite of the variations in marriage patterns noted above,
the trends which have been most pronounced have been the in¬
crease and elaboration of marriage expenditure, the elaboration
of wedding ceremonies and festivities, and the formation of
more enduring monogamous marriages. I do not claim that these
trends in marriage patterns are applicable to all rural areas
in northern Sudan which have undergone agricultural intensific¬
ation and witnessed new forms of socio-economic differentiation.
On the other hand certain phenomena, such as the increase in
marriage expenditure, do appear to have a wide applicabil¬
ity.1 Nor would I argue that my arguments are necessarily
applicable to rural groups who have moved permanently to the
towns, which some of the migrants from Abu Haraz have done.
Urban residence opens up the possibility of new social net¬
works, which may have important consequences for marriage
patterns and the position of women. In the towns there are
1. See the article on the costs of marriage in Sudanow, May 1979.
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more occupations open to women, and a greater range of domes¬
tic and sexual services may be carried on outside marital and
familial relations.
***********
In this final section I wish to return to the question of posit¬
ing a causal relationship between the economic changes that
have occurred on the east bank and the various marriage
trends that I have discussed. In particular I wish to discuss
here the cultural aspects of these processes. In general I have
argued that two main factors have been crucial to changes in
marriage and domestic patterns: first, new forms of socio-econ¬
omic differentiation associated with the intensification of prod¬
uction and the withdrawal of a sector of the population from
subsistence activities; second, variations in the contribution of
women to agricultural activities, with many women adopting a
relatively confined domestic role. These two factors I see as be¬
ing interrelated. For the productive activities of women on the
east bank do not constitute a separate economic sphere, as
Barth has argued plausibly is the case with the Fur in Western
Sudan.1 Rather women on the east bank have traditionally con¬
tributed to a range of household productive activities, the com¬
bination of which served to establish household viability; thus
variations in women's contribution are related to the mode of
transformation of these household productive activities.
1 have associated with these two main factors the increase in
marriage payments, particularly in goods given to the bride,
the elaboration of wedding ceremonies, the delayed age at marr¬
iage, and the tendency towards more durable monogamous marr¬
iages. These particular features are what Goody associates with
the establishment of a conjugal fund and the endowment of the
bride; he sees these in turn as characterising systems of diver-
1. F.Bartb: 'Economic Spheres in Oarfur' in Themes in Economic Anthropology, A.S.A.
Monograph 6, ed. R.Firth. London, 1967.
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ging devolution, where property is passed down from parents
to the offspring of both sexes, though not necessarily in the
same proportion. I maintained that since a weak form of diver¬
ging devolution has long been practised by the population stud¬
ied, the system of inheritance or devolution of property does
not seem to be decisive in conditioning the marriage trends re¬
ferred to above. Moreover, I argued that most forms of dowry,
in this case the 'indirect dowry' provided by the bridegroom,
are more concerned with expressing differential social position
as embodied in a particular life-style, than with preserving
differences in property as such. For the marriage goods I have
described as being bestowed on women are of a different kind
from the forms of property which feature most prominently in
inherited wealth. Generally the former are goods for personal
or household use, though they may also include luxury goods
which serve, among other things, as a store of wealth. But
marriage goods rarely comprise productive forms of wealth.
Sharma (1980) makes a similar point in her recent study of wo¬
men and property in north-west India." She emphasises the diff¬
erence between marriage goods, which are moveable and non-
wealth generating, and inheritances comprising land, which are
immoveable and wealth generating. While acknowledging the gen¬
eral value of Goody's appraoch, she too criticises him for mak¬
ing too close an association between dowry wealth and inher¬
ited wealth (p.48). In the context of her own field data she
does not consider it useful to regard dowry as a form of inher¬
itance. Sharma's objective - a more explicitly feminist one than
my own - is to show that though the women she studied are en¬
dowed with certain kinds of property, the women are not able
to generate wealth from them; this unequal allocation of differ¬
ent kinds of property to men and women provides one of the
means by which women's dependence and subordination to men
is maintained. For myself, I would stress the point that has
been explored very sensitively by Jeffery (1979) • that those
i, Ursula Sharma: Women, Work and Property in north-west India. London, 1980.
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women who are provided for, but who do not enjoy the same
control over property, or indeed conduct over their own lives
as men do, find themselves in an ambivalent position.1 For
while on the one hand they may value the security of their pos¬
ition relative to other women, on the other hand they may
find their lack of independent means of livelihood and their
dependence on men a severe hindrance to their own freedoms.
My own data suggests that the intensification of marriage pay¬
ments is due in part to the emergence of new forms of proper¬
ty, particularly achieved earnings and mercantile capital. Thus
I would interpret the trends in marriage patterns that I have
discussed as having occurred relatively independently of the
system of inheritance of property. However, I would agree with
Goody that what is involved in these trends is the expression
of differential social position and the embodiment of particular
styles of living in the course of socio-economic differentiation.
At various points in my thesis I have stressed that though the
main direction of change flows from the transformation of the
system of production to the system of reproduction, I do not
consider the causal relationship to be one-directional. For ex¬
ample, I have suggested that the increased costs of marriage
and the delayed age at marriage encourage in many instances
the adoption of migrant labour and the accumulation of savings
from these earnings; acceptance of the need to make savings
for marriage expenditure may also encourage the accumulation
of capital for entrepreneurial activities, given that other fav¬
ourable conditions are present. The value placed on the family
and on its particular ordering is, of course, subject to ideolog¬
ical factors. For the transformation of social relations such as
I have described on the east bank do not confront and envelop
individuals as passive agents. Individuals attempt to make in¬
telligible their experience of their material and cultural envir-
1. Patricia Jefferys Frogs in a Nail. London, 1979.
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onment using their existing knowledge as a conceptual frame¬
work, and rendering new ideas to themselves in the manner
which their biographical background predisposes them to follow
It is to the formation of Islamic 'values' in particular, and
their relation to marriage and domestic practices, that I now
wish to turn.
Many informants, when pressed to explain a particular marr¬
iage practice, stated that they were Muslims and that they be¬
haved so in accordance with Islam. According to the subject be¬
ing raised, they would reply that the particular practice was
prescribed by their religious teachings, or was considered app¬
ropriate behaviour for a good Muslim, or simply that it was all¬
owed by their religion. At the same time 'common sense' explan¬
ations would frequently be given as to why the behaviour in
question was a good thing. Although I encountered many differ¬
ent personal philosophies, I was aware of no one among the in¬
habitants of the two villages that I stayed with who claimed
he or she was not a Muslim. Personal devotions and extent of
religious knowledge, of course, varied considerably. Most men,
and a good many women perform the stipulatory prayers regular¬
ly. Men would perform the prayers wherever they happened to
be at the designated time, women almost invariably at home.
Ramadan, the month of fasting, was universally observed by
all those on whom it was incumbent. Twelve women from Abu
Haraz and six from Kumur had performed the pilgrimage to
Mecca, as had also a much larger number of men, particularly
from Abu Haraz. In spite of the reputation of Abu Haraz as a
religious centre, extensive religious knowledge among adults is
limited mainly to some of the religious families. Since religious
education is taught in the schools, younger people are gener¬
ally better versed than their parents. In contrast, many but
by no means all of the active members of the Gadiriya tariqa
and other Sufi orders are drawn from the older, illiterate in¬
habitants. Similarly it is older rather than younger women who
- 243 -
tend to express most devotion to the cult of holymen, visiting
their tombs in their quest for a particular favour or blessing,
and seeking cures and charms from living fekis. Many school-
educated girls regarded these customary beliefs as illusory and
ineffectual, if not actually unorthodox and harmful.
To say then that the people in question hold Muslim beliefs has
little explanatory value for understanding particular domestic
practices, given the varied content and texture of these beliefs
among different individuals. Alongside their religious beliefs,
most individuals also hold a range of secular views concerning
different aspects of social relations and of proper behaviour;
these range fivi.; political views to ideas concerning education
and leisure activities. The specific role which Islamic beliefs
occupy within any individual's worldview depends on a wide
range of factors: the religious disposition of the individual's
family and of his practical kin and other social contacts; the
individual's relationship to those religious families which mat¬
erially influence his family's position; the individual's own bio¬
graphical disposition and range of experience gained through
travel and work; the manner in which Islamic beliefs are pro¬
pagated, through local religious families and the local commun¬
ity, and through the schools, the media and not least the polit¬
ical parties - since nearly all Northern Sudanese political lead¬
ers incorporate Islam within their varying nationalist ideolog¬
ies; and finally the dissemination of other beliefs through peer-
groups and work-mates. All these factors mean that the views
and behaviour of one person can be very different from that
of another. This is nowhere more evident than in relation to
marriage and domestic practices.
It can, of course, be argued that the main trends in marriage
patterns that I have discussed are fully compatible with adher¬
ence to Islam, and indeed that the turning away from certain
customary beliefs and practices and the adoption of a more
strict, 'orthodox' rendering of Islam encourage these very
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trends. Numerous passages from the Koran can be elicited to
underline the importance of provision for women, especially the
obligation to endow women at marriage, and the importance of
marriage ties and of the various obligations of the spouses; di¬
vorce and polygamy, though allowed, are subject to various con¬
ditions, which, if they are observed, do not encourage the
ready dissolution of marriage ties nor the formation of new
ones.1 However, this does not explain why there should be this
shift in values, nor how it has come about - other than saying
it is the voluntaristic expression of the people concerned.
As I have stated earlier, it tends to be merchants operating
in the large towns, employees and migrant workers who emphas¬
ise most strongly the respective roles of the spouses, as
provider and dependent, and who in practice afford women the
most clearly pronounced domestic role. Marriage durability and
stability is also most marked among these groups. Historically
it has been these same groups who have been foremost in cha¬
llenging the dominant position of tribal and religious elites,
or at least who have come into being as a result of the break¬
down in the ties which these elites have wielded. The values
that the former groups espouse conflict at many points with
thsoe of the traditional elites. They stress the freedom of the
individual, unconstrained by traditional forms or arbitrary
acts of authority, yet abiding by certain general strictures
provided by Islam; conversely the traditional elites stress close
ties of personal dependence, and interpret Islam according to
their particularist interests, though in the case of the relig¬
ious elites they provide forms of devotion which have strong
popular appeal.
I am not putting forward a simple opposition in values between
two different groups of interests. Clearly the content of beliefs
and attitudes influencing marriage patterns is far more complex
1. See, for exar.ple, the following verses in the Koran: 11,226-237; IV,4-25; V,5.
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than that. For example, the attempts to reintroduce the kora
reveal a complexity and diversity of thought about the format¬
ion of marriages. Although these attempts stemmed largely from
an awareness of the implications of prevailing marriage trends,
and expressed a concern to restore at least an appearance of
social homogeneity, there was also widespread recognition
among its proponents of several of the new marriage practices,
such as the increased payments and gifts to the bride. I have
referred in Chapter 6 to the varying response given to the pro¬
posals by different groups in the village. The initiators of the
proposals to restore the kora were drawn from different back¬
grounds - the main spokesmen were a shopkeeper, a school¬
teacher, c. caipv.n1.er and the village headman, all resident in
the village. In some cases relatively transient views concerning
marriage are formed through the influence of peer-groups. An
example of this is provided by the sympathisers of the Republic¬
an Brothers (Ikhwan Jamhouriyin), a movement which draws
most of its support from secondary school students.1 Seeking in
general to make Islam relevant to contemporary conditions, its
supporters hold that marriage payments should only be nomin¬
al, and they argue for a radical readjustment of the relations
between the sexes. Although there were some school-attenders
in Abu Haraz who sympathised with this movement, the views
of the slightly older age-groups, who generally held that there
should be no restrictions on marriage expenditure suggested
that the former liberal views have not generally taken a perm¬
anent or prevailing hold.
Thus, although there is plenty of evidence for new attitudes
and values concerning marriage and the relations between the
sexes, it is difficult to specify what influence these ideas have
on actual marriage patterns. Moreover, it needs to be estab¬
lished in the first place why there should be this intensified
interest in the family. Familial values are reproduced in part
1. Hot to be confused with the Muslim Brothers,IMiwan Husliaiyin The founder of
the Jaahouriyin was Mahnoud Mohammad Taha, a Sudanese who retired to Egypt to write.
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through the very socialisation process which the family itself
provides, and in part they are reproduced and reinforced by
the social authority which the wider community, represented in
different forms, bestows upon the family. But also the very con¬
ditions of production and exchange in a predominantly monetar-
ised economy tend to underline the distinctive quality of famil¬
ial relationships, and to inscribe an autonomous privatised
character to the domestic domain. In spite of the fact that the
needs of the home and family are increasingly served by mar¬
ket transactions, familial relations stand for something qualit¬
atively different from other social and economic relations. Sex¬
ual and emotional relations, child-rearing, and care of old and
sick, however floured by these wider relations, cannot be re¬
duced to them. For this reason familial relations may well be
endowed with heightened values in contrast to the more utilitar¬
ian and self-interested values entailed in a market economy.
The home becomes something of a haven, a refuge set apart
from the hardships and problems of the outside world; it also
becomes the place where the individual can express himself
through the consumption of goods. 1 have shown how the divis¬
ion of space within the home, which is more elaborate in the
new building styles that I have described, allows the partic¬
ular needs of different family members to find expression: the
divan where the bread-winner can relax and entertain his
friends, the women's room where the womenfolk can carry on
their duties of child-care and domestic work, as well as their
own range of leisure activities, and so on. Thus the home pro¬
vides a means of communication, whereby men and women 'free¬
ly' express themselves, by which I mean not just their social
position, but also their personal biographical make-up.
I have argued that the greater privatisation of women's activ¬
ities, with greater stress being placed on their domesticity,
must be seen in the context of the greater privatisation of the
home as a whole. At the same time the objective conditions gov¬
erning opportunities for female employment encourage the main-
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tenance and even retrenchment of a separate sphere of women's
activities. Given that their own success is largely bound up
with an enduring and successful marriage career and with
raising children to adulthood, women's world-view is largely
inscribed within the traditional domain of marriage and kin¬
ship. Not surprisingly most women in Abu Haraz concern them¬
selves with matters relating to reproduction, child-care, sex,
beauty, health and adornment: these concerns are communicated
through rounds of visits and through life-cycle ceremonies and
ritual. Their traditional and conservative outlook, though chall ¬
enged by some younger educated women, i3 reflected, for exam¬
ple, in the perpetuation of harmful customary practices such
us female circumcision.1
The opportunities for female employment are largely restricted
to the domestic and subsistence domain, seasonal agricultural
labour, and some branches of the modern services sector. A few
young women in Abu Haraz, for instance, work as teachers in
this and other villages. But given the priority of male training
in the modern sector, girls who have been educated find few
chances for further training or employment. Before 1971 the
Sudanese Women's Union, in conjunction with the Communist
Party and other progressive organisations, campaigned consist¬
ently for the greater involvement of women in the labour force.
However, with the dismantling of the Women's Union and the
suppression of the Communist Party in 1971, attempts to imple¬
ment a planned economy, and with it the possibilities for ad¬
vancing the economic position of women, were forestalled. The
restoration of a mixed economy, and the continuing difficulties
oi employment have provided little incentive for large numbers
of women to seek employment. It is not surprising, therefore,
that dowries have increased in size and the extent of provision
for women within marriage has widened, since these provide a
1. Pharonic eircuacision, i.e. infibulation, was practised on all girls in Abu Haraz
and Kuisur. The operation uas perforned by the two rtid-wiv83 ?rot Abu Harar, both
of whoa had close links with ltading religious faaillst.
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measure of security to women; restricted in their opportxmities,
women negotiate their best possible position through marriage.
Given the very real difficulties of entering the labour force,
women's recourse to a relatively more protected role within
marriage is at least understandable.
This is not to imply that most women, say in Abu Haraz, are
eager to find employment, nor that since their aspirations are
frustrated, they consciously seek to manipulate their marital
position in order to obtain security for themselves. For the
very fact that they are provided for in most of their needs,
and that they are preoccupied with an elaborate round of domes¬
tic activities, prevents them from contemplating employment as
an attractive or gainful prospect; 'manipulation' of their marr¬
iage prospects is in most, cases the only practical resort open
to them, other than stepping completely outside all familiar
patterns of conduct. It is not as though they are generally
bored with their predominantly domestic existence; rather their
time and attention is filled with the concerns I have outlined
above, concerns which are given meaning by the rituals in
which the women participate at life-cycle crises and celebrat¬
ions. Most women have sufficient independent income from sale
of craft items, poultry and petty-trading to engage in these rit¬
ual and leisure activities. Women's social networks exert an in¬
fluence on womento conform to similar domestic routines and
leisure activities. This explains why there are families whose
income and resources barely cover their most basic needs, and
yet their womenfolk do not perform agricultural labour even on
their family plots.
But from a broader perspective we return to the hypothesis
with which I started this thesis: that the withdrawal of some
women from agricultural production, at the same time as other
women are drawn into new forms of agricultural wage labour,
is to be related to the transformation of the system of prod¬
uction; in particular, it is associated with the intensification
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of production, with new methods of production and of labour
mobilisation, and to the accompanying conditions of social hier-
archisation. For on the one hand some families find that they
must eke out their subsistence activities with casual wage lab¬
our performed by male and female members alike. On the other
hand other families which possess larger cash resources are
able to hire machinery and labour in their farming enterprises.
Among the latter, and also among families supported by non-
agricultural occupations, the women tend to adopt a predomin¬
antly domestic role. Among these latter groups the importance
of provision for women is highlighted by the increase in marr¬
iage payments, and especially in goods bestowed upon the
bride; moreover, this material and ideological investment in
marriage is conducive to the formation of more durable monoga¬
mous marriages. In short, 1 claim to have shown that various
features which have been noted by Goody to be characteristic
of dowry systems have become more pronounced among the pop¬
ulation that I studied, and that this is congruent with the par¬
ticular transformation of their system of production. Thus 1
would conclude by saying that variations in Muslim marriage
payments provide fertile ground for establishing broad associat¬
ions between different productive and reproductive systems; I
hope that the demonstration that I have provided in this thesis
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